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Abstract
Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) is the process by which military assets can
be requested by civilian authorities, often by state or regional offices of emergency
management. This request is in response to critical incidents, including natural and
human caused disasters. However, little is understood about collaboration and
cooperation between civil authorities and their military counterparts in terms of planning
and training, especially in the unique circumstance of National Capital Region (NCR)
where there are local, state, and federal civil authorities and military organizations. This
is problematic, as a lack of training and preparation may result in delayed response to
emergency incidents in the region, which may cause a disruption of government
nationwide. Using Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s advocacy coalition framework, the
purpose of this case study of DSCA in the NCR was to gain insight on whether
collaborative planning and training between civil and military partners has resulted in
effective public policy that will guide decision making in the event of a natural or human
caused disaster. Data were collected from a total of 15 participants who represented
military and civil emergency managers. These data were deductively coded consistent
with the elements of the policy advocacy framework, and then subjected to thematic
analysis. Findings indicated that military members have a more thorough understanding
of DSCA procedures, where civilian emergency managers had knowledge deficits
regarding procedures and policies guiding DSCA support. The positive social change
implications stemming from this study include recommendations to civil authorities to
collaborate with the Department of Defense related to mobilization procedures and
DSCA policies to promote seamless cooperation in the event of a major disaster.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the study
Introduction
There was an inherent problem with measuring Defense Support to Civil
Authorities (DSCA) within the Washington D.C National Capital Region (NCR). The
problem originated from the absence of a comprehensive mechanism to measure DSCA
proficiency among emergency managers and their military mission partners. As the
center of governance in the United States the events on 9/11 and the 2011 earthquake in
Washington D.C. validated the need for proficient emergency managers and military
organizations in DSCA response. Integral to understanding DSCA proficiency in the
NCR were two fundamental questions. The first was how proficient are organizations in
planning, coordinating, and executing DSCA operations in the NCR? Secondly, what
factors contributed to optimal or below acceptable levels of DSCA proficiency among the
populations in the NCR? I used the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) as the
theoretical framework for this study. Using this theoretical framework, I focused on how
competing coalitions collectively formulate policies while safeguarding their internal
equities and organizational beliefs in collective problem solving. The social implication
for this study was rooted in the belief that this research could assist policy makers in
understanding how entities could work together to provide viable solutions for complex
problem sets while ensuring their internal equities remain inviolable.
Background of Problem
The Advisory Panel on Department of Defense Capabilities for Support of Civil
Authorities After Certain Incidents (2010) report noted DSCA training was severely
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lacking along with a nascent knowledge of strategies, plans, and training to improve
DSCA proficiency.
Carwile, (2005) provided insight on the intricacies tethered to combining
emergency managers and military organization command structures during a catastrophic
event. Fowler K, Kling, N, and Larson M.’s (2007) article highlighted a potential divide
in collective DSCA operations if one organization is delinquent in their capability to
conduct continuous recovery and response operations which significantly stresses
partnered organizations capacity. Hooker (2012) elaborated on the importance of building
relationships between military organizations and their civilian counterparts. According to
[give names and citation], these relationships are based on three general principles:
communication, interaction, and how interaction between the two entities are ordered and
regulated.
Problem Statement
There was no mechanism in place to measure the DSCA proficiency of
emergency managers and their military mission partners in the NCR during this research.
Two previous studies focusing on DSCA determined that emergency managers did not
have optimal knowledge of DSCA operations (Haynes, 2014 & Porter, 2010).
Additionally, the studies recommended additional research to determine root causes for
the lack of understanding. It was therefore imperative to understand why there was no
mechanism in place and what apparatus was being used to measure performance levels
which led to building or maintaining DSCA proficiency.
The larger problem that the research addressed was how military organizations
and their emergency management partners were measuring DSCA proficiency. From
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wildfires in California to flooding in West Virginia, there have been numerous disasters
in the United States that required military units and emergency managers to integrate
resources for optimal response and recovery results.
With two studies completed that outlined DSCA proficiency by using a non-bias
approach, data existed for senior military and emergency management officials to
determine if additional studies should be commissioned to expand the perceived problem
of DSCA proficiency (Haynes. 2014). These two studies showed that there was cause to
carry out further research in a localized region. This rationale would have seemingly
helped to determine if the problem was only relegated to the previous studies or systemic.
Furthermore, findings showing similar trends may have caused leaders to re-evaluate the
importance of measuring proficiency and implementing plans and policies that enable
emergency managers and their military partners to obtain and maintain higher levels of
proficiency than previously reported (Porter, 2010).
This study is relevant because there is no robust literature on the subject of DSCA
proficiency, and until there is an optimal body of research leaders will not have the
appropriate level of data to determine the scope and scale of the problem of measuring
DSCA proficiency.
I conducted this research to build on research that had been lacking over the past
10 years. After an extensive search, which involved the use of several data bases and the
Walden University library assistance service, little research was discovered on DSCA
proficiency or research that was designed to measure DSCA proficiency. The military
published doctrine on DSCA four years ago, but there has been no effort to determine

4

how organizations incorporated the doctrine into their planning, coordination, and
executing this complex operation.
I was driven to address this problem area because in my previous duty position I
had extensive knowledge of DSCA operations after receiving my certification in DSCA
phase II certification course. Additionally, in my role as a planner I had frequent
engagements with other planners from other organizations who did not have an optimal
level of DSCA operations. Therefore, if these key planners did not have an optimal level
of DSCA operations, their plans presumably could not have been validated as succinct
without a basic knowledge of understanding DSCA. From my initial engagements, I
perceived measuring DSCA proficiency in the NCR as a problem. Haynes’s dissertation
in 2014 determined that emergency managers in the state of North Carolina did not have
an optimal level of DSCA proficiency. I understood that after conducting my research it
may have been determined that measuring DSCA proficiency in the NCR was not
problematic and the desired populations may have had an optimal proficiency. If that was
the case I believed that the knowledge gained from the inquiry could complement Haynes
research and make a significant contribution to the continuum of inquiry.
The final aspect of the problem statement was the gap in literature. The gap that
existed in DSCA proficiency was that there was almost no literature on the subject at the
operational level where DSCA operation were planned, coordinated, and executed by
emergency managers and their military mission partners. Additionally, the data that was
collected focused primarily on the proficiency level of emergency managers and not their
military mission partners. This oversight in the literature lends credence to a view point
that senior officials cannot make informed decisions on how to improve proficiency when
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there is no body of work to guide their decisions? Subsequently, as the number of natural
disasters across the United States from the early 2000’s to the present, those responsible
for executing response and recovery operations in support of disasters were obligated to
ensure their organizations were practiced in executing DSCA operations. This included
doctrine, policy, and standard operating procedures built on literature that provided a
comprehensive analysis of findings and recommendations to improve DSCA proficiency.
Finally, coupled with the research that was conducted, it was my intent to provide
meaningful literature that could foster dialogue on this subject.
Purpose of the Study
With the potential for man-made and natural disasters to severely impact NCR,
there was a need to explore the known proficiency levels of our forces who would
execute a comprehensive response and recovery operation during a complex catastrophe.
This study complimented two previous studies conducted to determine DSCA
proficiency: Haynes’s (2014) study centered on determining DSCA proficiency in the
state of North Carolina, and Porter’s study based on measuring the proficiency levels of
parish emergency managers in the state of Louisiana. In their studies, both researchers
were able to determine that the state as well as parish emergency managers who
participated in the study had a very nascent understanding of DSCA operations.
Unfortunately, these studies did not address the proficiency levels of the military
organizations in the immediate vicinity of their emergency management partners in North
Carolina or the Louisiana parishes. To truly inform the research, there had to be an allencompassing study to define where the gaps were in understanding the NCR’s DSCA
proficiency. This in turn had the potential to facilitate discussion on how a collective
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group could provide feasible and suitable courses of action to address the identified
deficiencies if they existed. Finally, there was no current research dedicated to
understanding DSCA proficiency in the NCR. It was my intent for this research to serve
as the impetus for future research and compliment Haynes’s and Porter’s research to
determine potential trends that can improve or sustain proficiency levels for DSCA
operations.
By conducting this research, I hoped to determine the DSCA proficiency levels of
the Joint Forces Headquarters – National Capital Region, the Washington D.C. National
Guard, and emergency managers that comprised the seven counties and two jurisdictions
of the NCR. However, the end aim was not only to determine what the proficiency levels
of these entities were, but to determine contributing factors that led to an optimal or less
than proficiency level. For instance, did leaders in each organization mandate and
monitor training in DSCA operations? Were there budget considerations that negated
proficiency? Did members of each population have access to institutions that were
designated as institutions for high learning on DSCA operations? Subsequently, if these
institutions were available, were they being used by these populations to build DSCA
proficiency for entry-level members, or to sustain DSCA proficiency for mid-level
members of their organizations? This purpose guided the formation of both the research
questions as well as the interview questions that I used to further examine DSCA
proficiency.
The primary purpose of the research questions was to determine how proficient
military organizations and their emergency management partners were in DSCA
operations. By determining the proficiency level in each of these domains, I could
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analyze the overarching research question that dealt with measuring DSCA proficiency
on a more holistic level. I used the second research question to determine which
contributing factors influenced the optimal level of DSCA proficiency or a less than
desirable proficiency. By directly linking these two questions together, I formed a chain
of custody, which answered the how and why of the overarching research questions
which are factors such as constrained financial resources and limited access to
professional training courses contributing to a less than optimal DSCA proficiency? Next,
do initiatives such as collaborative planning and training among emergency managers
and their military mission partners within the NCR impact collective DSCA proficiency?
These research questions provided the very foundation for this research, and the
logic for selecting these questions came from the previous research on DSCA
proficiency. In these previously conducted studies, similar research questions were
proposed to the test populations in order to inform the researcher’s body of work and
provide a baseline of knowledge for the research. The exam used by previous researchers
was the obvious choice to guide my study by applying their template for understanding
DSCA proficiency in the NCR.
Research Questions
The research questions for this study were selected after reading the findings from
previous research. My intent was to fill the gaps that were not addressed by Haynes’s and
Porter’s research. These questions may serve as antecedents for future research on DSCA
proficiency. The research questions from this study were:
RQ1. Are factors such as constrained financial resources and limited access to
professional training courses contributing to a less than optimal DSCA proficiency?
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RQ2. Do initiatives such as collaborative planning and training among emergency
managers and their military mission partners within the NCR impact collective
DSCA proficiency?
My intent was to use open-ended questions in individual interviews with the
research population in order to answer the research questions. For the integrity of the
research, I believed it was imperative to form a personal relationship with the respondents
to establish optimal conditions for an open and free dialogue on DSCA proficiency. By
forming a relationship and using open-ended questions, I believed the respondents would
be more open with me and fully divulge substantive answers that could help me as the
researcher understand the phenomenon of DSCA proficiency. Additionally, by asking
open-ended interview questions in the presence of the respondents, I felt there was an
opportunity to monitor their body language, which could serve as an indicator as to how
they were answering the questions. For instance, observations such as whether they were
comfortable or hesitant while answering questions could be interpreted as trepidation.
Additionally, hesitation while responding may have indicated possible issues underlining
their responses.
Most importantly, my questions for the interview were directly linked to the
research questions, to ensure that both the how and why questions were explored in order
to understand DSCA proficiency at the micro level. These interview questions were
straight forward and recorded to ensure that I had indeed captured the correct responses
that correlated with the questions. This was important because I did not want to interpret
the participants responses. Interpretations can lead to diluted findings which I wanted to
avoid.
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Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework that was used for the research was the advocacy
coalition framework (ACF), developed by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (Sabatier &
Jenkins-Smith, 1999). The ACF has been used to examine the policy-making process
among multiple populations with different beliefs and internal organization equities that
may be contradictory to each other. This framework was applicable to the research
because of the number of different populations in the NCR. Additionally, for a myriad of
reasons, each population had their internal policies, which governed how they would
employ their forces and dedicate resources in case of a disaster event. However, these
populations had to understand that there must be a level of cooperation to ensure there
were no gaps in how a collective response and recovery operation would be executed.
The idea that prompted my research was nested within the research that Haynes
conducted when he performed a study to determine the DSCA proficiency in the state of
North Carolina among emergency managers. Additionally, as a planner in the NCR, I was
also intrigued as to how DSCA proficiency in the NCR could be measured in a study
closely aligned with Haynes’s work. After participating in exercises in which DSCA was
integral in providing a comprehensive response and recovery operation for simulations, it
became apparent that there was a significant knowledge gap among those who were
participating in the exercise. Additionally, from the after-action reports and the research
Haynes conducted, he determined that emergency managers in the state of North Carolina
had a nascent knowledge of DSCA operations. Therefore, after my first-hand account of
DSCA training and exercises in the NCR and Haynes research findings, I decided to
conduct my own independent study.
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Nature of the Study
The nature of this study was qualitative. A comprehensive inquiry of both
populations for this research was conducted to determine which contributing factors led
to optimal or below optimal DSCA proficiency levels. Additionally, to understand the
overarching problem of why there was no mechanism in place to measure DSCA
proficiency in the NCR, qualitative research using the case study design was used to
provide an in-depth analysis of data (Creswell, 2013).
As previously mentioned, there have been two other studies that have measured
DSCA proficiency. However, there was some additional research conducted by groups of
researchers to determine DSCA proficiency. Milliman, Grosskopf, and Paezs (2006)
conducted a quantitative study across five states in the northeast of the United States that
revealed that 72 emergency responders did not have the optimal level of proficiency in
DSCA operations. The trends from that study and other research on DSCA proficiency
suggested that there was an issue with DSCA proficiency on an even greater scale.
The research design was driven by the characteristics that are closely associated
with the case study design. In an effort to understand DSCA proficiency inside the NCR,
I wanted to conduct an in-depth study rather than simply compiling statistical data. By
conducting an in-depth analysis, I assumed that I would have a clear understanding of
DSCA proficiency and extenuating circumstances that led to an optimal or less than
optimal proficiency. Statistical data gathered from an instrument designed to test
populations could have rendered results which may have proved beneficial to how
proficient emergency mangers and their military mission partners were. However, I
considered understanding the why behind the statistical data equally important, which is
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why I used questionnaires for data collection. The other aspect that guided the research
design was the presentation of the results to the intended audience.
Statistical data could have informed policy and decision makers. However, the
statistical data would not inform them of the salient themes and trends identified by
emergency managers and military members and what led to an optimal or undesirable
level of DSCA proficiency. I believed that this was a consideration I had to take into
account when conducting my research. Additionally, researchers must consider whether
the presentation of statistical data will serve their purpose for the research, or will a more
robust narrative on the subject matter will be required.
The research design was also influenced by a previous study. Haynes also used
the case study design in his research for understanding DSCA proficiency in the state of
North Carolina. After reading his research, I wanted to mirror the case study design by
using questionnaires to determine the proficiency of my populations as well. With two
case studies already conducted on DSCA proficiency, I believed there was a baseline
level of data, which could lead to potential policy changes that would aid in maintaining
or improving DSCA proficiency.
The value in these ideas is rooted in the basic belief that researchers must do due
diligence to ensure that the validity and reliability of the research can withstand the
scrutiny of fellow researchers. Even with the use of the qualitative methodology, which
has received criticism for the use of interpretation in data analysis (Baxter, P & Jack, S
2008) the researcher has an obligation to ensure that their research has been fully vetted.
This vetting process helps the researcher to guard against questions of validity and
reliability put forward by those who may use the research in future studies.

12

The value of the ACF theory was two-fold. First, the theory provided the
framework that bonded the research and the population by understanding the advocacy
coalition. The research highlighted the proficiency of DSCA among the intended
populations, whereas the framework nested the populations, their proficiency, and policy
formations to fully understand the phenomenon in its entirety.
Secondly, the construct of the ACF provided the blueprint to further understand
populations by their belief systems, which drives their decision making and ultimately the
policies to mitigate perceived threats or deficiencies that negate the effectiveness of an
apparatus (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999). It was for this reason that the ACF was used
instead of the civil military coalition framework or the disaster management framework,
which was used in a previous body of work.
The aforementioned values and ideas certainly added validity to the proposed
research. However, embarking on this journey reinforced the fact that the values and
ideas must be matched with the integrity of the researcher to ensure the results are
meaningful for those for whom the research is intended.
There are multiple qualitative methods, including: narrative research, grounded
theory, ethnography, and phenomenology. The case study design incorporated
observations, interviews, and surveys with open-ended questions to gain insight and an
in-depth analysis on particular cases (O’Sullivan, Rassel, & Berner, 2008). To add greater
context for the case study design used for this study, Baxter and Jack (2008), in their
article titled Qualitative Case Study Methodology: Study Design and Implementation for
Novice Researchers gave an interesting perspective on the case study that resonated with
my rationale. They stated:
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[Q]ualitative case study is an approach to research that facilitates exploration of a
phenomenon within its context using a variety of data sources. This ensures that
the issue is not explored through one lens, but rather a variety of lenses which
allows for multiple facets of the phenomenon to be revealed and understood. (p.
544)
I collected the data for this research through the use of semi-structured interviews
with open-ended questions. Though the process was time consuming, I believed this datacollection method was beneficial because it provided an opportunity to build trust with
respondents and observe informal communication with them.
The analysis used for this qualitative research plan was descriptive coding
coupled with the compare and contrast technique, and NVivo which is a coding program
used to help identify, sort and organize codes, themes and trends. I chose this mode of
analysis because it allowed me the opportunity to identify themes that may have
resonated throughout the research question responses. These themes in turn helped to
explain DSCA proficiency and the contributing factors that led to certain proficiency
levels among the populations in the NCR. NVivo is a qualitative research program used
to help researchers organize and analyze non-structured data. However, though Nvivo
was certainly a great tool for analysis, I was responsible for ensuring the quality of the
data and the analysis derived from it to form themes for recommendations and findings.
I collected the data for this study through the use of semi-structured interviews
with open-ended questions. This process of data collection proved to be time consuming
because of the number of participants at each location. However, I believed this data-
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collection method was beneficial because it provided an opportunity to gain the
respondents’ trust and engage them in informal communication.
Operational Definitions
[All definitions must be written the way I have modelled the first. The definition
must be unbolded, italicized. and followed by a colon. All definitions must be given in
alphabetical order.]
Catastrophic Incident: Any natural or man-made incident, including terrorism
that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely
affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or
government functions. Catastrophic incident is the same as catastrophic event as defined
by DOD (Joint Publication 3-28, 2013).
Civil Authorities: Those elected and appointed officers and employees who constitute
Th government of the United States, the governments of the 50 states, the District of
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, United States territories, and political
subdivisions thereof (Joint Publication 3-28, 2013, p. GL 5). e
Defense Support to Civil Authorities: Defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) is
support provided by federal military forces, Department of Defense (DOD) civilians,
DOD contract personnel, DOD component assets, and National Guard (NG) forces (when
the Secretary of Defense [SecDef], in coordination with the governors of the affected
states, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, United States Code, status or
when federalized) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for
domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from
qualifying entities for special events (Joint Publication 3-28, 2013, p. vii).
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Disaster: An occurrence causing widespread destruction and distress, a grave misfortune,
a total failure. A disaster is often further defined as being either a man-made or natural
event that results in death, injury, and property damage which cannot be managed
through normal, routine channels. A disaster requires immediate and effective
intervention of multiple government and private sector organizations to help meet the
needs of the community and area just after the disaster occurs and the area and people
begin to recover (Oklahoma Medical Reserve Corps, 2014).
Emergency Managers: The local emergency manager has the day-to-day authority and
responsibility for overseeing emergency management programs and activities. The
emergency manager establishes and/or directs functions of an emergency operations
center (EOC). The EOC is the physical location where multi-agency coordination occurs
(Joint Publication 3-28, 2013, p. II-2).
Immediate Response Authority: A Federal military commanders, DoD Component
Head's, and/or responsible DoD civilian official's authority temporarily to employ
resources under their control, subject to any supplemental direction provided by higher
headquarters, and provide those resources to save lives, prevent human suffering, or
mitigate great property damage in response to a request for assistance from a civil
authority, under imminently serious conditions when time does not permit approval from
a higher authority within the United States. Immediate response authority does not permit
actions that would subject civilians to the use of military power that is regulatory,
prescriptive, proscriptive, or compulsory. State immediate response is addressed in §
185.4(h) of this part (Department of Defense Instruction 3025.18, 2010).
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Mission Assignment: The vehicle used by the Department of Homeland
Security/Emergency Preparedness and Response/Federal Emergency Management
Agency to support federal operations in a Stafford Act major disaster or emergency
declaration that orders immediate, short-term emergency response assistance when an
applicable state or local government is overwhelmed by the event and lacks the capability
to perform, or contract for, the necessary work (Joint Publication 3-28, 2013).
National Response Framework: The NRF is a guide to how the Nation responds to all
types of disasters and emergencies. It is built on scalable, flexible, and adaptable concepts
identified in the National Incident Management System (NIMS)2 to align key roles and
responsibilities across the Nation. The NRF describes specific authorities and best
practices for managing incidents that range from the serious but purely local to largescale terrorist attacks or catastrophic 3 natural disasters (FEMA, 2013).
Posse Comitatus Act: The primary statute restricting military support to civilian law
enforcement is the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) 18 U.S. Code, section 1385. The phrase
“posse comitatus” is literally translated from Latin as the “power of the county” and is
defined in common law to refer to all those over the age of 15 upon whom a sheriff could
call for assistance in preventing any type of civil disorder (Disaster Response Officer
handbook, 2010, p.45).
Title 10: U.S. Code, governs all federal military forces. For the Army, these forces
include the regular Army, the Army Reserve, and all National Guard units ordered to
federal Active Duty in Title 10 status. For the other services, Title 10 forces include all
components except the Air National Guard unless it mobilizes for federal service. Title
10 forces are federal assets under the command of the president. Forces in Title 10 status
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are restricted from conducting law enforcement missions by the Posse Comitatus Act
(Disaster Response Officer handbook, 2010, p. 45).
Title 32: “State military forces (those assigned to state active duty under Title 32 of the
U.S. Code) operate under the command and control of the governor through a state jointforce headquarters led by the adjutant general of the state” (Disaster Response Officer
handbook, 2010, p. 43).
Assumptions
I made three assumptions in this study. The first assumption was that emergency
managers had a nascent knowledge of DSCA proficiency. This assumption was based on
the aforementioned research of Porter (2010) and Haynes (2014), which determined that
the emergency managers who participated in those bodies of work had nascent
proficiency in DSCA operations. The second assumption was that there would be limited
integration, planning, and initiative among emergency managers and their military
mission partners in the NCR. This assumption was based on my personal knowledge as a
planner, when I observed few training and integration exercises in the NCR that
measured DSCA proficiency through the domains of integration and planning. As a
caveat, this was classified as an assumption because I did not have knowledge of other
partnerships that may have existed inside the region. The third assumption was that
military organizations in the NCR would have higher DSCA proficiency than their
emergency management counterparts. Once again, this assumption was based on my
personal knowledge of participation of the courses in which I and my contemporaries
attended. This course was designed to certify military service members and their
dedicated emergency management partners in DSCA operations. I have attended the

18

course and the preponderance of students that were in attendance were military service
members.
The importance of the assumptions came from the study conducted by Haynes.
When determining the assumptions for this research, there were no other studies except
Haynes’s work that provided a foundation for me to gather data and make assumptions
that had a linkage to other research. Therefore, in forming my assumptions, I used his
findings as assumptions in my research. For instance, from the population Haynes
interviewed, he was able to determine that emergency managers from the respondent pool
for the state of North Carolina did not have a working knowledge of DSCA operations.
Therefore, as a baseline assumption for my research, I used his finding as one of my
assumptions.
Additionally, as found in Haynes’s research, if this trend was consistent within the
NCR, a correlation could be drawn to show why this same trend existed in two separate
regions inside the continental United States. Conversely, if this trend was not visible in
the NCR, then analysis was conducted to determine why emergency mangers and
military organizations have an optimal level of proficiency for one region, while having a
less than optimal level in another. Finally, as additional research was produced on this
subject, the findings from my research could be used as a baseline for future assumptions.
Scope
The scope of this study was to measure the DSCA proficiency level of emergency
managers in the NCR, the Joint Forces Headquarters – National Capital Region, and the
Washington D.C. National Guard. The study furthered examined how each entity plans,
coordinates, and executes training for potential catastrophic events that impact the NCR.
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Understanding that a complex catastrophe was not beyond the realm of possibility as
demonstrated by the 9/11 attack on the Pentagon, these entities when integrated would be
examined to determine how their collective efforts could mitigate the tertiary effects from
such an event.
The specific aspects of the research problem addressed was measuring DSCA
proficiency across the domains of planning, coordinating, and execution. These domains
were chosen because they helped to frame the research in a manner that not only
addressed the central question, but dissected the central question among the domains for
greater analysis of proficiency.
For a truly comprehensive research, it is not enough to answer the central research
question without understanding the extenuating circumstances of the phenomenon that
was being studied. By analyzing these circumstances, the researcher provided a more
robust finding that was instrumental in influencing outputs such as policy changes which
was a focal point of this research in context of populations in the NCR. This aspect was
also chosen because even though the populations were exclusively different to a certain
degree, they both conducted planning, coordination, and execution of their essential tasks
to maintain an optimal level of proficiency. By analyzing the data, a comparative analysis
was conducted to understand trends and determine what operational policies, guidelines,
or standard operating procedures could be used to benefit the DSCA proficiency across
both populations wherever applicable.
The populations that were considered for this research were emergency managers
from the seven counties and two jurisdictions that comprised the NCR, the Washington
D.C. National Guard, and the Joint Forces Headquarters – National Capital Region. With
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three diverse population pools, the optimal sample size was 10 emergency managers, and
10 military leaders each from the Washington D.C., National Guard, and The Joint
Forces Headquarters – National Capital Region (n=30). Understanding that there was no
set rule for the sampling size, the rationale for the size of the samples was to provide
interview questions to the upper echelon of each organization due to their experience
levels.
It was my intent that other researchers and organizations, who wished to advance
the continuum of inquiry on DSCA proficiency or are charged with the responsibility of
executing DSCA operations, use this research along with other bodies of work. These
findings, and findings from previous studies could help them measure and assess the
proficiency of their internal organizations. This intent had the potential to help these
organizations determine how they could build their proficiency, or maintain an optimal
level of proficiency if their internal studies determined that they had a desired level of
DSCA proficiency. Finally, it was my intent to publish this work in an effort to
encourage dialogue on where my research could facilitate future research.
Delimitations
Delimitations for this research arose from the use of participants in the research to
the choice of theories. With regards to participants, the use of emergency managers with
at least five years of experience and military officials with 10 years of experience in their
current duty positions was reinforced during the selection of participants. The measure
was reinforced to ensure that the participants had an advanced level of emergency
management military operational knowledge as opposed to entry-level knowledge to
inform the research. The next delimitation was the use of the ACF and the omission of
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other theories such as the disaster management theory and civil military theory. The latter
theories may certainly have held merit when framing the discussion for the actual
execution of DSCA operations, but the primary focus was on how proficiency led to the
formulation of policy and not the actual operation of DSCA.
For the purpose of limiting the scope and scale of the proposed research,
surrounding jurisdictions and military organizations were also omitted for numerous
reasons. First, resources for the study were limited, and therefore the research and the
populations were narrowed to the NCR only. For a broader study, research could have
been conducted in the northern Virginia region, rather than the NCR. However, the
decision was made to initiate the study within the NCR first, and then use the results as
the basis for future research on a broader scale.
Additionally, though Washington D.C. was home to numerous federal agencies
that played a key role in emergency and response operations at the federal level, the
decision was made to omit these organizations as well. The purpose of the research was
to determine the proficiency of those who executed DSCA operations at the
organizational level. Federal organizations normally serve as the policy decision makers
who allocate resources and provide guidance as to how operations will be conducted.
Therefore, their involvement in the research did not provide any value for understanding
the proficiency of DSCA operations. However, once the research was completed, it was
my intent to submit the findings to a small population of federal authorities in an effort to
encourage dialogue on sustaining or improving DSCA proficiency. The research does not
have a purpose unless it is shared with those who can use the findings and decide to use
them to fix a problem, request more data, or disregard the research all together.
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Limitations
The limitations of this research consisted of three salient points. First, though
there were six installations that comprised the Joint Forces headquarters – National
Capital Region, only the headquarters was solicited. Next, the participants in the test
population consisted of military members with 10 years of experience and emergency
managers with at least 5 years of experience. To truly inform the research, it was
imperative that participants with more experience as opposed to the ones with entry level
experience informed the research. Finally, though federal organizations such the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) resided within the NCR, they were not
solicited for this research. This was because the timeframe allotted for the research was
not applicable for this population to be used. Furthermore, most federal organizations
within the region do not have inherent responsibilities to conduct DSCA operations
during catastrophic events.
To further expound on the limitations of this research, it was essential for
preliminary weaknesses and gaps to be expounded upon. The weaknesses and gaps in this
research arose from a lack of literature to guide the research. Though there was a fair
amount of military doctrine in circulation to guide how military organizations should
conduct DSCA operations with regards to policy and protocol, literature that explicitly
discussed collaborative DSCA operations was nascent. To further exacerbate the
research, the two studies on DSCA proficiency only focused on proficiency levels at the
state and local governance level. These studies did not replicate the environment in the
NCR, where there was no one central governing authority or existing model to guide the
research.
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Another weakness related to this research was the time designated for the study.
Data for the research was collected through a series of open-ended questions that were
asked during scheduled interviews. Considering the dynamics of the populations, there
was limited time to conduct the interviews, decipher the data, and possibly re-engage the
population with follow up questions for clarification. Due to the populations competing
demands coupled with their responsibilities, my access was limited and had to be very
direct in order to maximize the opportunities given by participants.
A perceived bias that I had to guard against was military bias from emergency
managers. I understood that by being in the military, emergency managers who agreed to
participate in the research may have felt that I had ulterior motives for the research. To
this particular population, my research could have been viewed as an indictment on them
since I was in the military conducting research on their proficiency. To guard the research
against this potential bias, I ensured all populations that there were no identifying features
that would correlate organizations with responses from the approved survey. Next,
though it may have been a small gesture to derail potential claims of bias, at no time did I
wear my military uniform when engaging any population. My intent was to remain
strictly impartial in an effort to truly inform the research and present myself as impartial.
Finally, once I was given authority to solicit organizations to participate in the research, I
forwarded a letter explaining the research and protocol to be followed which ensured
there was no perceived favoritism that would violate the integrity of the research. Simply
stated, the research questions generated from previous studies and the exhaustive
literature guided my study, rather than any bias that may have infringed on the integrity
of the study.
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Understanding the potential impact of limitations, every effort was taken to
mitigate impacts. First, the number of installations under the control of Joint Forces
Headquarters – National Capital Region, with multiple planners at each installation, were
too numerous to engage for comprehensive interview sessions. Therefore, by limiting the
respondents, the data received was easily managed. Furthermore, additional resources
were used to engage numerous respondents across numerous locations, which prolonged
the research but proved to be very beneficial. Though the Federal Emergency
Management Agency was within the confines of the NCR, the scope of the research was
below the federal level, and therefore, it was not conducive to solicit FEMA or any
federal agency to participate in the research. Finally, understanding time was premium
when it came to interviewing participants, extensive measures were taken for the
preparation of the interviews. Measures ranging from checking equipment and vetting the
interview questions to confirming locations and discussing the terms of confidentiality
served as preliminary milestones that were accomplished before the actual interviews
were conducted. These actions ensured maximum time was dedicated to the actual
participants’ interview.
Questions on what my study will not do among that which is legitimately possible
had connotations of a researchers’ algorithm that has conflicted research since the dawn
of researching. Unfortunately, the peril with any research is that those who are
conducting the research are not the decision makers. We are the instruments the decision
makers use to justify their decisions, or, we are the roadblocks that contradict their claims
and opinions. Legitimately, the only course of action that research can take is to present
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the research without bias and let the decision maker determine the plan his or her
organization will take.
At the completion of this study, the intent was to present it to the leaders of the
population involved to show them the rationale for conducting the research, how the
research was conducted, and what the end result of the research was. By doing this, the
research can provide the leaders with an unbiased view of DSCA proficiency inside the
NCR. With the appropriate level of decision makers receiving the findings of the
research, they can engage in a meaningful dialogue on policy change and how they can
integrate their efforts into a seamless response and recovery operation. However, before
these steps can take place, there had to be a study to guide the dialogue and give a
framework on how to improve or sustain DSCA proficiency across all populations.
When examining the inherent problems with the research methodology that I
chose, the first concern was the sample being indicative of the entire population. Due to
the resources available to conduct this research and the access that I had to the
populations, the number of participants were limited. Understandably, the responses that
were received may not have been reflective of the entire population, which could have
been problematic when presenting the data to an audience who may have reservations
against the size of the population interviewed versus the actual number of emergency
responders and military service members inside the NCR.
Another inherent problem with qualitative research and my research as well, was
subjectivity within the body of research. However, this problem was directed more
towards me, as opposed to the research. In order to truly inform the research, subjectivity
did not influence this study in any way. It was not introduced in the interviews or the
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analysis of collected data that is often left to the interpretation of the researcher.
Subjectivity was unequivocally omitted to ensure that the integrity of the research was
not compromised in order to enhance the continuum of inquiry. Unlike quantitative data,
which can be easily generalized, this characteristic is not reflective of the qualitative
methodology.
Significance of the Study
This research will fill a gap in understanding how proficient military units and
their emergency management counterparts are in DSCA operations within the NCR.
Responsive disaster response and recovery is essential for organizations charged with the
responsibility of limiting pain and suffering, property damage, and loss of life (Look &
Spennemann, 2001). Furthermore, Porter (2010) expounded on the importance of
conducting research to understand how emergency managers request and integrate the
Department of Defense capabilities into a robust response and recovery effort. As
countries such as Canada are embarking on a social change to integrate the military and
emergency management operations in DSCA operations, it is worthwhile for our country
to explore the benefits of this course of action as well (Farrel, 2005). Additionally, the
findings from this research can give rise to a greater requirement for transparency among
the two the entities if the results show that there is a less than optimal proficiency in
DSCA operations among the two populations.
Additionally, my intent was to present the results to the Metropolitan Washington
Council of Governments (MWCOG). This organization serves as the governing body for
the seven counties and two jurisdictions that comprise the NCR, and to a certain degree
they are also responsible for writing policy for emergency managers throughout the
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region. To my knowledge, no study either commissioned or presented in an unofficial
capacity was used to determine how the collective body of emergency managers and
military organizations conduct DSCA operations in the NCR.
By conducting this research as an unbiased researcher, the governing body can
now be informed on the proficiency levels of those required to conduct response and
recovery operations during a catastrophic event. Subsequently, the results can also foster
policy discussions on potential topics such as integrated training, funding for exercises,
and agreements that solidify how each organization will ensure their efforts do not
conflict with that of others; duplication of efforts. In turn this can be done while
simultaneously building a homogenous coalition with complimentary goals and
objectives. However, as with any research, I can only present the results. The decision to
use the research will strictly rest on the decisions of those who are charged with decision
making authority as one of their responsibilities in the Metropolitan Washington Council
of Governments.
On a broader scale, I believe the significance of this research centers on providing
conclusive data that may compliment or contradict the research that was conducted by
Haynes and Porter with regards to DSCA proficiency in the state of North Carolina and
Louisiana Parishes.
By dissecting the phenomenon and analyzing the contributing factors that led to
an optimal or less than optimal DSCA proficiency, there will be sufficient data to
facilitate future research. Additionally, there will be no basis to provide a methodical
process as to how emergency managers and their military mission partners can re-tool
their organizational frameworks for planning, coordinating, and executing DSCA
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operations. Therefore, the driving force behind these discussed changes can be the
literature that was derived from this research.
Additionally, this research can have a tertiary impact on those who write policy
and doctrine for DSCA operations. By coupling this research with Haynes and Porter
studies, potential trends and threads can be expounded upon, which can lead to
systematic streamlining of processes and procedures for greater efficiency across a
broader spectrum of DSCA operations.
My profession will benefit from this research on multiple levels. First,
considering my organization works closely with emergency managers in the NCR, this
research can collectively benefit each organization by determining where the gaps are in
DSCA proficiency. Next, the research can inform our internal leaders how proficient we
are and what collective or organizational training we need to conduct in order to build or
maintain our proficiency. The research will also provide the leaders in my profession
with a comprehensive analysis on why we are deficient in certain areas, if that is indeed
the findings from this research.
The why is important because it can help leaders triage the areas that require
significant resources while those areas that require little assistance can maintain a glide
path for continued proficiency. This point is also important because as resources become
constrained, it is optimal for leaders to divert resources from areas where limited
resources are required to make the most significant impact in a known deficient area.
Finally, if this research has the desired impact on my profession, leaders at numerous
echelons can also direct additional research to determine how proficient other
organizations are in terms of DSCA proficiency.

29

With regards to social change, I believe my work can create a major impact by
expounding on a potential problem that can have immeasurable impacts on how decision
makers and those who execute emergency management operations execute their duties.
This research can provide a lens for leaders to understand why they should routinely test
their organizational proficiency in DSCA operations to ensure there is no degradation in
how this task will be executed. As the number and magnitude of natural disasters
increase, there is certainly a need for more research to support a conversation across
multiple domains of emergency management.
Additionally, this research can also inform the general public on how proficient
their civil authorities and military members are in executing DSCA operations. With this
knowledge, the general public will have unbiased information to either applaud their
service providers or demand they maintain a certain proficiency level to ensure that they
can execute their assigned duties and responsibilities. As witnessed in the previous
research, once the information is presented, there has to be a concerted effort by the
decision makers or by those directly impacted by the results from the research to act.
However, if one party decides to remain at a stalemate, there can be no progress to
energize positive social change.
It is my hope that this work transcends above the NCR and serves as a catalyst for
dialogue among senior leaders to determine how DSCA operations can be
comprehensively evaluated, resourced, and executed should the need arise. Social change
can only start when there is a body of knowledge that serves as the catalyst for change.
The responsibility that I have as a researcher is to allow the research to inform the
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intended audience, rather than establishing convenient boundaries and limitations that
provide an outcome complimentary to the researcher’s desired outcome.
Summary
The key points in chapter 1 centered on setting the stage for why the research was
relevant through the purpose and problem statements, which served as the impetus for the
research. There was no mechanism in place to measure DSCA proficiency which
addressed the problem, and the purpose of this research which was to determine the
current proficiency level among those who execute DSCA operations. Furthermore, this
research complimented two previous studies which focused on DSCA proficiency and
what emergency managers needed to understand when integrating their assets and
resources with their military counterparts at the state and regional levels of governance.
However, what these two studies failed to accomplish is to determine DSCA proficiency
levels of the military organizations that had the potential to combine their efforts with
emergency managers for a comprehensive response and recovery plan in the event of a
catastrophic event. This point was expounded upon in my rationale for conducting the
research and the section dedicated to the significance of the study.
Chapter 2 will provide an analysis of the theoretical framework, the methodology for the
literature review, themes and trends deciphered from the literature relevant to the
problem, and a summation on the methodology that will be used to guide the research.
Chapter 3 will outline the research design and approach, the role of the researcher while
conducting the research, sample and population, data collection and analysis, and the
protection and rights of the participants involved in the study.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
There is a problem with measuring Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA)
proficiency in the National Capital Region (NCR). DSCA is military support provided to
civil authorities in response to domestic emergencies and catastrophic events (Joint
Publication 3-28, 2013). To ensure DSCA operations are carried out seamlessly during
domestic emergencies and large-scale catastrophic events, military organizations
providing the support and the emergency management agency receiving the support must
be proficient in DSCA operations. The proficiency of these organizations and agencies is
the deciding factor in a delayed or expeditious response and recovery effort to save lives
and restore essential services.
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to explore the DSCA proficiency
level of military organizations and their emergency management counterparts inside the
NCR. Without a comprehensive mechanism in place to evaluate and monitor the full
scope of DSCA proficiency across the domains of planning, coordinating, and execution,
civil authorities and military officials cannot accurately establish metrics to ensure
operational readiness. Furthermore, with the rise of emerging global terrorist activity it is
incumbent upon those who are responsible for executing DSCA operations maintain a
proficiency level commensurate with timely response and recovery operations that
minimizes late to need requests for assistance.
Organization of the Chapter
The literature review begins with the search methodology that I used to retrieve
peer reviewed articles for the research. Next, I analyze current dissertations that have

32

been written on DSCA. I explain the theoretical framework to show how the ACF
correlates to the proposed research with regard to the integral relationships among the
numerous DSCA actors in the NCR and how they leverage proficiency to formulate
policies that are succinct DSCA operations. I will identify themes and trends from the
current literature published on DSCA.
Inan effort to describe the dynamics of the NCR, I examined each emergency
management actor transcending federal to local levels of government to delineate their
duties and responsibilities. Furthermore, my analysis offers insight on how actors within
coalitions have competing demands for a finite number of resources. Finally, the chapter
will conclude with a summary of the literature review and an introduction to
methodology in Chapter 3.
I chose the qualitative methodology for this research in an effort to conduct a
comprehensive analysis on DSCA operations and the contributing factors which lead to
an optimal or less than optimal proficiency. Unlike the quantitative methodology, which
uses a system of measurements and hypothesis to establish relationships among
independent and dependent variables, the qualitative methodology was chosen because it
focuses on the how and why of the phenomenon (Isaacs, 2014) which is more compatible
with this study.
Methodology for the Literature Review
In an effort to inform the research through a comprehensive literature review, I
developed a methodical search strategy for three prevailing categories. Those categories
were: theory that was used for the literature review, the gap in literature pertaining to
DSCA proficiency, and the methodology used to guide the collective research.
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The ACF served as the theoretical framework for the research. The ACF
emphasizes the role of individual actors and their beliefs in a collective coalition to
develop comprehensive public policies (Jenkins-Smith, Silva, Gupta, K, & Ripberger,
2014). Kübler (2001) further stated:
The ACF argues that actors perceive the world and process information according
to a variety of cognitive biases which provide heuristic guidance in complex
situations. In the case of public policies, such guidance is provided by belief
systems about how a given public problem is structured, and how it should be
dealt with (p.624).
The ACF was suitable to this study because understanding the collective DSCA
proficiency among the key actors and their beliefs on what DSCA proficiency should
equate to in the National Capital Region help policy makers structure cogent policies.
These policies in turn direct changes to build optimal proficiency among the coalition.
This change further enhances the theory by using it as a general framework for coalition
building that spans the full spectrum of local, district and federal governments.
Peer reviewed literature was the optimal choice for reference materials, but nonpeer reviewed articles from credible sources added merit to the research. For the literature
review, I used search engines such as ProQuest, Google Scholar, Sage, EBSCOhost,
Academic Search Complete, Department of Defense Digital Library, and Thoreau Multi
Database Search. For the theoretical framework, I used terms such as advocacy coalition,
theoretical framework, policy, theories, coalition building, social construct, relationship
in coalitions, and actors in coalitions to refine the search. As a caveat, it was important to
refine the search to ensure an appropriate amount of data was accumulated.
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The encompassing literature for DSCA proficiency and DSCA operations started
with an exhaustive search using the same search engines for the theoretical framework.
However, for this search I also used the Government Accounting Office (GAO) database
to inform the research. It was integral to use this database due to the GAO’s informative
after action reviews on a myriad of subject areas which included, but was not limited to
disaster response and military/civilian conduct during catastrophic events. The GAO is a
non-partisan organization, and the work they have conducted over the years has been
instrumental in several doctoral studies.
Search Terms
I used terms such as defense support to civil authority, civil authorities,
emergency management, emergency, disaster, response and recovery, title 10, title 32,
and immediate response authority in the appropriate search engines. Haynes alluded to
limited research on the subject of defense support to civil authorities. Therefore, to
mitigate this omission, I conducted a review on areas that were closely related to explain
the phenomenon of DSCA that included but were not limited to: emergency manager
education curriculums, deficiency in training emergency managers, combined response
and recovery operations during disasters, and the military in emergency management
roles.
I used the qualitative intrinsic case study for this research used. McCusker and
Gunaydin (2015) stated “Qualitative research is characterized by its aims, which relate to
understanding some aspect of social life and its methods which (in general) generate
words, rather than numbers, as data for analysis” (p.537). Furthermore, I selected the
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intrinsic case study because of my genuine interest to better understand DSCA
proficiency, which Stake (1995) alluded to. Though a statistical analysis certainly has
merit in producing the statistical data for the aggregate population in the NCR, it does not
provide a comprehensive understanding on the contributing factors which lead to optimal
levels of DSCA proficiency or below acceptable levels of DSCA proficiency, as
McCusker and Gunaydin noted.
Literature Search Strategy
The strategy for the literature review focused on finding peer-reviewed articles
relating to defense support to civil authorities, emergency management, emergency
preparedness, and military support to civil authorities. The plan for finding literature was
carried out in several ways. First, I used databases such as ProQuest, Google scholar,
Sage, EBSCOhost, Academic Search Complete, Department of Defense Digital Library,
Thoreau Multi Database Search, and Military and Government Collection for data
collection. Studies on emergency management provided great resources for informing the
overall body of research were very informative.
There was a significant lack of research material on DSCA proficiency and even
less on DSCA proficiency among emergency managers and their military mission
partners in the NCR. Only two dissertations were found that were closely related to my
research. Porter (2010) conducted research on determining what emergency managers
needed to know when integrating the military into their response and recovery efforts.
Haynes’s (2014) research on DSCA proficiency of emergency managers in the state of
North Carolina provided context as well. This study provided insight on trends and
themes emergency managers in the state of North Carolina identified as positives or
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negatives which ultimately contributed to or negated DSCA proficiency. Though the
dissertations were helpful in establishing initial plans for the research collection effort, I
used other measures to inform the research. These measures consisted of conducting
exhaustive reviews on after action reports for disasters from Hurricane Katrina in (2005)
to Super Storm Sandy which made landfall off the coast of New Jersey in 2012. The after
actions reports were essential because they provided information about actual DSCA
operations and the strengths and weaknesses that permeated over a 7-year span.
To gather additional information, I solicited the DoD Defense Support to Civil
Authorities directorate to provide literature that could help in framing the complexities of
DSCA operations.
Theoretical Framework
I used the ACF for this research. This theory was first introduced by Paul Sabatier
and Hank Jenkins Smith (Sabatier & Jenkins Smith, 1999). The premise for the theory is
that in a coalition there are multiple actors and inside these coalitions there are competing
demands from each actor to ensure their equities are equally proportioned with other
members inside the coalition. Additionally, the theory was used as a guide to analyze
how these coalitions approached policy making through their beliefs, subsystems,
guidance mechanism, and most importantly, the time that is required for the collective
coalition to implement change for policies that address the collective coalition issue(s)
(Sabatier & Jenkins Smith, 1999).
The ACF formulated due to a perception by the originators that there was a
nascent understanding of how the individual actors formed coalitions to develop policies.
Considered controversial at the time, Sabatier and Jenkins Smith (1999) felt other
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theories that addressed policy formation focused primarily on single actors rather than
multiple actors. Therefore, in their opinion, accepted theories at that time did not clearly
explain the policy process, failed to show how the environment influenced the policy
formation process and the importance of instruments when forming and evaluating the
policy (Sabatier & Jenkins Smith, 1999).
Menno and Pieter-Jan (2001) article titled “Interdependency, Beliefs, and
Coalition Behavior: A Contribution to the Advocacy Coalition Framework” provides and
analysis on the interdependency of beliefs and coalition on the process of policy
formation. To frame the discussion on inner working of the ACF Sabatier (1993) as
quoted by Menno and Pieter-Jan (2001) stated:
(1) that understanding the process of policy change - and the role of policy
oriented learning therein - requires a time perspective of a decade or more; (2)
that the most useful way to think about policy change over such a time span is
through a focus on "policy subsystems," that is, the interaction of actors from158
different institutions who follow and seek to influence governmental decisions in
a policy area; (3) that those subsystems must include an intergovernmental
dimension, that is, they must involve all levels of government (...); and (4) that
public policies (or programs) can be conceptualized in the same manner as belief
systems, that is, as sets of value priorities and causal assumptions about how to
realize them. (pp.157-158
This article reinforced why the ACF is a suitable theoretical framework for the
proposed research inside the NCR. With numerous coalitions, and each coalition
leveraging their beliefs to influence others, the foundation is clearly established for
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understanding the true essence of policy formulation with multiple actors with diverging
equities.
The choice of the theoretical framework was based on the analysis of coalitions
and the actors that form the coalitions. Inside the NCR there were several coalitions with
multiple actors ranging from the federal to the district levels of government. These actors
certainly had competing demands as they tried to advance their policies, but
understandably, they must develop symbiotic relationships with coalition members that
can facilitate the advancement of their policies while reciprocating this action with
coalition members when applicable.
Additionally, Nonrated (2013) stated “Disruptive crises are generally conducive
to policy conflict between multiple stakeholders. Following the potentially adversarial
nature of crisis resolution” (p.954). Consequently, a catastrophic event which requires
military organizations and emergency managers to pool resources in a collective response
and recovery operation certainly qualifies as a disruptive event. By using the tenants of
the ACF, an optimal blueprint was provided to assess the regions coalitions and how their
relationships either advanced or negated the process of policy formation.
Though the Civil Military Theory was considered, it was not introduced as a
theoretical framework based on the fact that unless a Presidential Declaration has been
declared, the military will always be subservient to civil authorities. The premise for the
Civil Military Theory advocated for the military to be a separate entity with equal
standing in decision making in contrast to the military receiving directives and orders
from civil authorities which we currently abide with. I felt this rationale was not suitable
for my research.
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The selected theory related to the present study because of the similarities
between the coalitions. ACF focused on how populations contributed to the
encompassing policy making process while clinging to their beliefs and policy subsystems to ensure their equities are reflected in the overall policy that the coalition is
presenting. Inherently these dynamics cause conflict because loyalties are not tethered to
the collective group, but to the internal organization. Inside the NCR the coalitions were
vast and like the advocacy coalition framework there were numerous factors that
influenced how policy decisions were formed and implemented. Furthermore, this
dynamic was further influenced by the multiple coalitions at the federal, state, and local
levels of government which have a vested interest in the policy formation process as well.
With regards to DSCA, this dynamic was especially difficult because there is no
overall adjudicating authority between the military and emergency managers in the NCR.
Therefore, the populations were not beholden to adhere to any comprehensive policy
which certainly adds to the degree of difficulty when trying to form a cohesive coalition.
Many researchers have also alluded to this difficulty which caused some to question the
validity of the theory knowing that these factors make the policy process translucent.
In Brecher, Brazill, Weitzman, & Silver, (2010) article titled “Understanding the
Political Context of ‘‘New’’ Policy Issues: The Use of the Advocacy Coalition
Framework in the Case of Expanded After-School Programs”, the researchers provided
an analysis on the applicability of the ACF in after school programs. This article was
especially intriguing because it had a close resemblance to the multiple coalitions
represented inside the NCR. Furthermore, like the NCR, each actor in the coalition
certainly had their internal equities in which they wanted to leverage for a position of
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strength. However, the policy formation, especially in this case, had certain connotations
that required the populations to produce options and frame common goals to avoid
coalition friction. In contrast to Belchee et al, Matti & Sandström (2013) article titled
“The Deﬁning Elements of Advocacy Coalitions: Continuing the Search for Explanations
for Coordination and Coalition Structure”, advocated change to the structure of the
advocacy coalition framework policy sub-system. Additionally, Brecher et al believed the
advocacy coalition framework should continue to explore the dynamics of relationships
inside the coalition and how they stimulate change.
Ellison & Newmark (2010) article titled “Building the Reservoir to Nowhere: The
Role of Agencies in Advocacy Coalitions”, continued the discussion on how agencies at
the federal level set the conditions for debating the merits of the policy. Additionally,
they also establish baseline rules for arbitration and maneuvering of coalition members to
gain an advantage for policy formation. This article was unique because of the focus it
placed on the greater good of a policy forming from the primary actor versus the needs of
the collective coalition. As with numerous policies that are negotiated and ultimately
approved, the policy itself may not be beneficiary for the majority. This dynamic calls
into the question the ability of the minority actor(s) to leverage their equities inside the
coalition and counter balance majority.
Heinmiller (2013) article titled “Advocacy Coalitions and the Alberta Water Act”,
provided a unique perspective on the dichotomy of actors inside the ACF coalition. Either
through a position of authority or their ability to successfully advocate for their equities
within the coalition, there was a dominant actor and a protagonist who together controlled
the equilibrium inside the coalition.
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Furthermore, in an effort to leverage their position and codify their internal
equities into policies, each actor used hard or soft power to maneuver their organization
to an advantageous position. Hard power was derived from policies or directives which
clearly delineated the proportionality of authorities among the coalition. Whereas soft
power was derived as “actors using soft power relied heavily on their credibility,
legitimacy and persuasive abilities. Soft power resources tended to be more diverse and
ephemeral than hard power resources” (Heinmiller, 2013 p.530). However, over time,
beliefs among members change which caused new alignments and positions of
dominance. Therefore, in order to maintain the equilibrium inside the coalition it was
recommended that hard and soft power should be reserved for the most contentious issues
and not reverted to on a routine basis.
Of all literature presented in the review, Heinmiller perspective best describes the
dynamic inside the NCR. There are coalition members who possess hard and soft power,
but must maximize relationships, rather than leveraging these tools to ensure the
equilibrium does not permeate into adversarial relationships that negate positive efforts to
build DSCA proficiency among the collective coalition.
Ripberger, Gupta, Silva, & Jenkins-Smith (2014) article titled “Cultural Theory
and the Measurement of Deep Core Beliefs Within the Advocacy Coalition Framework”
explored the influence of beliefs in the coalition policy making. As it has been widely
noted, the collective coalition inside the advocacy coalition is nested together by a set of
beliefs. These beliefs may be diametrically opposed to other members, but at the core of
the belief system there are similarities which forms the fabric for collective decision
making. As a recommendation, the authors recommended that a system should be
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instituted to measure the different levels of core beliefs among coalition members. The
correlation between the study to determine the different metric among the core belief and
the coalition helps the researcher understand the true influence core beliefs have on
decision making.
For instance, for those with a higher core belief on a particular issue, is it possible
for their decisions to be swayed by the collective group? Conversely, will those with
deeper core beliefs present a significant challenge to the decision-making process by
using their unrelenting belief system to thwart policies that are not in line with their
beliefs?
In contrast to the previous studies on the ACF, Leifeld (2013) conducted an
analysis from the far side of the pendulum by analyzing the dichotomy of beliefs and
relationships inside the subsystems. More importantly, as the beliefs that forged the
relationships among coalition members changed, Lefeld stated “How does the structure
of a subsystem change when belief change occurs? Is there a transition phase, and what
does it look like” (p.170)?
Understandably, the element of time is a major consideration when answering the
question that Lefeld proposes. The changing of beliefs occurs over time. Therefore, it is
imperative to understand what event or series of events occurred over time to impact the
changing of beliefs and the tertiary impact on the relationship with other members. In the
NCR where the coalition consisted of numerous actors at the federal, state, and district
levels of government, the dynamics certainly exist for one or more than one actor to
change their beliefs over an extended period of time. From constrained resources levied
on certain organizations, to methods and procedures that are juxtaposed to previous
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beliefs on DSCA, the environment in the NCR is certainly ripe for this occurrence which
can upset the equilibrium among coalition members.
As a compliment to Ripberger et al perspective, Nohrtedt (2013) article titled
“Advocacy Coalition in Crisis Resolution: Understanding Policy Dispute in the European
Volcanic Ash Cloud Crisis”, expounded on decision making in a crisis situation which
Europe experienced during the volcanic eruptions in 2010. Though beliefs may play a
significant role in decision making, those beliefs are tested when they are conjoined with
a crisis which may cause the beliefs system to be questioned or changed in its’ entirety.
Nohrtedt believed rather than viewing the crisis which caused dissention among the
collective coalition as a new phenomenon that required a different coalition approach by
the coalition, members of the coalition should remain true to the principles of ACF.
Remaining true to the coalition framework insinuated finding common ground
with the collective coalition to effectively and efficiently implement an informed decision
to mitigate the impacts of the crisis. Subsequently, due to the nature of the crisis such as
the Northern European volcano eruptions, Nohrstedt argued that the coalition should rely
on the ACF as a proven framework. This course of action would optimally allow the
coalition to adequately frame the crisis and apply the applicable principles to resolve the
crisis while maintaining the integrity of the coalition. This article was especially
important because like the volcano eruptions in Europe which caused a crisis, DSCA
operations are normally carried out under conditions of duress. Duress under extreme
conditions has the potential to cause the coalition to fracture unless they are committed to
the collective coalition and mitigating the impacts of the crisis at hand. From the above
literature, the landscape for the ACF seemed to be rooted in the context of abandoning
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the framework in a time of crisis where a change may be warranted based on the gravity
of the situation. Conversely, the coalition can also remain true to the principles which
coalitions members have solidified through practiced events or practical application.
Unfortunately, there is no algorithm to determine the appropriate course of action and the
correct equilibrium will be situational dependent based on the assessment of the coalition.
To add further legitimacy to the ACF, Matti & Sandström (2013) proposed future
research as to why policy networks form, grow and evolve over time. The researchers’
summation served as an example of expanding the continuum of inquiry by challenging
the historical blueprint of the ACF. Matti and Sandstorm believed that relationships and
dynamics in the policy subsystems were not linear as Sabatier suggests. Matti and
Sandstrom stated that the policy subsystem as we know it:
has proved increasingly inadequate for capturing the complete shifting, and
complex, shifting, and uncertain patterns of contemporary policy making. The
past decades of policy research have therefore seen are conceptualizing of policy
making as a dynamic process incorporating a range of competing ideas, actors,
and actions, where policy outcomes primarily are determined by spatially and
temporally interconnected processes of negotiation, coordination, and resource
mobilization among actors from a variety of organizations (pp. 240-241).
Though there may be merit to their proposal, in order to change the very
foundation of a theory that has permeated over several decades requires substantial
support and continued dialogue to retool the theory in an effort to replicate policy
subsystems as they view them. This process can be very time consuming and face several
obstacles as authors try to validate the theory.
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The premise for this research was to gain a greater understanding of DSCA
proficiency among emergency managers and their military mission partners in the NCR.
At the conclusion of this research, findings and results were presented to the collective
coalition informing policy makers on proficiency levels and recommendations that should
be considered to build or maintain proficiency levels for optimal success in DSCA
operations. Nedergaard (2008) stated “In the ACF, it is assumed that advocacy coalitions
will resist information that challenges the policy core beliefs of decision actors. This
characteristic is even stronger in semi-federalist systems (p.179). Though the NCR is not
comparable on any scale to the semi-federalist system that is indicative of the EU, the
comparable between Nedergaard study and the proposed research is how results from
DSCA proficiency can influence policy makers. This point is especially true if the
research contradicts the beliefs of certain actors or the coalition in its entirety on DSCA
proficiency and DSCA operations. The fundamental question is how to gain consensus
from the coalition while simultaneously challenging beliefs rooted in anecdotal
presupposition versus erudition?
The literature that established the relevance to the potential problem was literature
that has promulgated from similar studies that categorically identified DSCA proficiency
as an issue with emergency mangers. These studies spanned the spectrum from numerous
geographical locations across the continental United States, to dialogue with emergency
managers that have years of experience in response and recovery operations. Porter
(2010) study which measured DSCA proficiency among emergency managers in
Louisiana concluded that in order to improve the proficiency levels among emergency
mangers there must be a concerted effort from the DoD to provide education assistance to
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achieve an optimal level of proficiency. Haynes research revealed “None of 10 managers
reported they had formal DSCA education. Seven of the 10 managers (70%) reported
they were not well educated on DSCA policies and guidelines” (p.129).
When establishing the linkage between the related research and literature with
regards to DSCA proficiency inside the NCR, the first glimpse into the problem is
alluded to by Homeland District of Columbia Homeland Security and Emergency
Management Director Christopher Geldart. In his testimony to the United States Senate
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Oversight
of Government Management Agency Mr. Geldart stated (2006) “From an emergency
management perspective, the NCR is one of the most challenging regions in the country.
The region will continue to have challenges going forward” (p.8). Though his testimony
did not explicitly define the problem within the NCR with regards to measuring DSCA
proficiency, it provided insight on challenges that encumbered a member of the DSCA
coalition within the NCR.
With regards to literature that has a direct correlation to the problem, Milliman et
al. (2006) discovered that across five states in the northeastern continental United States
the preponderance of emergency managers surveyed did not have a clear understanding
of DSCA operations which included how to request assistance.
In conclusion, though the literature is continuing to mature, if historical findings
are reflected within the NCR, the implications for a lack of DSCA proficiency will be
disconcerting being that the seat of our national power resides within the region.
Additionally, as natural and man-made threats continue to evolve, research will be
required to help mitigate their affects.

47

DSCA Literature Themes
After a comprehensive review on the literature pertinent to DSCA proficiency, the
dominant themes centered on the lack of DSCA knowledge emergency managers
consistently alluded to and collaboration with their military counterparts. Though Porter
(2010) and Haynes (2014) dissertations were two of the most recent bodies of work on
DSCA proficiency, the findings are reflective of Milliman et al (2006) research in which
emergency managers stated:
“Educate all Emergency Managers on what is available from MACA and how to
access it.”
“We have only had one briefing in the five years that I have been Public Safety
Director for my County that explained MACA and the resources, capabilities, etc.
that the military overall can provide. I would urge a more visible and detailed
informational briefings to emergency managers.”
“Today, very few county officials know about or can access the MACA process.
Emergency managers should be provided with specific information regarding the
program and how to access the system.”
“Need to continue to develop working relationships throughout the year between
localities and MACA representatives so when a large event occurs localities will
already be familiar with the MACA system and its representatives before the
crisis occurs.”
“If I have received information on MACA, it was overlooked so I am not sure of
what benefits MACA would have for my community…”
(Caps by the survey respondent) (p.5)
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Additional themes from the literature revealed efforts to improve DSCA
proficiency and the possible expansion of the military’s role in DSCA operations.
Though improving DSCA proficiency may be welcomed by all entities involved in this
complex operation, expanding the role of the military received opposition from those
who understand how standing directives, regulations, and policies will make this
recommendation extremely difficult to implement. Additionally, as the military continued
force reductions and realignment of remaining organizations against new missions, this
effort seemed unattainable. With regards to trends, there was a consistent pattern of
emergency manager’s inability to gain access to the appropriate curriculums to bolster
their knowledge of DSCA operations. Though the DSCA course was offered to
emergency managers and DoD service members, emergency managers systematically
stated there was an inability for their populations to gain access to these forums.
Education
Education in any profession is a paramount building block for organizations to
produce competent, proficient, and effective subordinates and institutions able to carry
out their mission requirements due to their knowledge. Be it through the development of
cognitive skills for emergency managers or setting the conditions for learning and
growing institutions with empowered subordinates, education serves as the antecedent for
proficiency. Muttarak and Pothisiri stated (2013) “education has a positive direct effect
on disaster preparedness because education enhances cognitive and risk evaluation skills”
(Muttarak & Pothisiri, 2013). From implementing standard operational procedures that
clearly delineated duties and responsibilities during a full-scale emergency, to developing
assessment tools to gauge proficiency levels of emergency managers and their military
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counterparts, there must be a comprehensive educational curriculum. This curriculum
should encapsulate training requirements, standards for achieving proficiency, and
training models that guide individuals and organizations with a road map to achieve an
optimal level of proficiency. As the literature under this theme showed, there’s a need to
improve education in DSCA operations based on previous research and after action
reports. Additionally, as concepts, techniques and procedures continue to evolve for
executing DSCA operations, education curriculums must be constantly evaluated to
ensure they are maintaining their relevance in providing solutions sets complimentary for
individuals to achieve operational mission success.
To dissect the importance of education in DSCA operations education Milliman et
al wanted to gain a greater understanding of the role of education in the proficiency level
of their population. Like Porter’s and Haynes research which followed this work,
emergency managers were found to have a nascent level of DSCA proficiency.
Additionally, though there was a substantial finding in DSCA proficiency, the researchers
automatically assumed this deficiency was contributed to education. To their credit, the
researchers did state if they investigated the impact of training or other factors which
contributed to a below average finding on DSCA proficiency.
Johnson (2013) used her research to determine how participants from the Defense
Support to Civil Authorities course used their newfound knowledge to foster learning and
growing environments responsible for DSCA operations. To inform her research on the
impact of the course, she conducted interviews with recent graduates. They expounded on
their experience in the course, and how the course helped them to better understand their
duties and responsibilities in their organizations with regards to DSCA. Understandably,
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many participants in the course entered with a nascent education of DSCA operations.
However, once they completed the course with a new-found knowledge they were able to
articulate certain aspects of DSCA and guide their organizations based of their
knowledge gained from the DSCA educational curriculum.
Theisen (2013) examined the proficiency of military organizations and their
emergency management partners in no notice complex catastrophes that permeated from
chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) incidents. As Theisen noted, most
training for catastrophes normally centered on events such as high category tornadoes,
hurricanes, floods, and wildfires. However, understanding that those who participate in
nefarious activity have the capability to deliver an attack in a CBRN form, Thiesen
proposed that National Guard units should conduct more training centered on this
particular problem set to identify deficiencies that may exist in protocols and standard
operating procedures. This argument was based on the simple fact that the complexity of
CBRN operations can considerably stress the DSCA apparatus. This is due in part to the
simple fact that before the response and recovery operation can begin, emergency
managers and their military counterparts must devise a cogent plan to address the CBRN
environment and the follow on DSCA operation.
Understandably, if the tasks associated with CBRN response were not trained on
or integrated into a large-scale response exercise with the appropriate education
curriculums, the potential for an uncoordinated response could severely hinder the
combined operation. This in turn could cause a greater loss of life and further complicate
the response effort to a degree that leads to a missions within itself. This is why
combined training is important.
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Improving DSCA Proficiency
In the wake of numerous disasters over the past ten years, there were after actions
reports addressing the improvement of DSCA proficiency and DSCA operations as a
whole. Subsequently, the argument can be made that the improvements required in
DSCA proficiency had the potential to form a symbiotic relationship with regards to
DSCA education. Optimally, if there are tangible advancements in DSCA education, the
by product should include incremental improvements for DSCA proficiency. In a RAND
research funded after action report titled “Before Disaster Strikes Imperatives for
Enhancing Defense Support of Civil Authorities” (2010) The Advisory Panel on
Department of Defense Capabilities for Support of Civil Authorities After Certain
Incidents stated:
All leaders should be proficient with the National Response Framework and the
National Incident Management System, but few military leaders have been trained
specifically for DSCA, and the amount and level of formal training for response
planning and operations varies among Federal, State, and local civilian officials,
including Governors. (p.22)
The importance of this finding cannot be underestimated. As the collected
literature shows under this theme, from Hurricane Katrina to Super Storm Sandy this
salient point has consistently emerged in numerous reports and reviews. However, in
defense of this improvement, providing an agreed upon solution set spanning the federal,
state, and local levels of government to improve DSCA proficiency has many pitfalls that
plague improvements in improving DSCA proficiency. Pitfalls such as the proverbial
government bureaucracy, adequate resources, and numerous agencies working in fiscally
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constrained environments versus those with those who have minimal constraints. If there
is to be any efforts made in removing these pitfalls, this unbalanced dynamic must be
addressed before a feasible and suitable solution set can be implemented to improve
collective DSCA proficiency. Once again, this example unequivocally showed why the
advocacy coalition framework is uniquely suited for this study. There are multiple
coalitions with different positions of strengths among the collective group, but they must
find common ground to address a key issue that has the potential to impact all coalition
members.
Glecker (2015) captured the true essence why DSCA and the proficiency levels of
those who execute this operation are essential. As an antecedent, Glecker primarily
focused on the importance of contingency war plans for major campaigns. These plans
were paramount because they helped military leaders manage personnel, resources and
provide a systematic approach to conducting assigned missions. Glecker believed this
same approach should have been instituted by those who execute large scale DSCA
operations with multiple organizations.
As with military contingency operations, there are only a finite number of
resources that can be allocated for different missions. Therefore, it is important for
military leaders and their civil authority counterparts identify these capabilities, the
methods to employ them, and how they will execute command and control of these forces
during DSCA operations.
However, the connective tissue that combines this complex undertaking is the
proficiency of those who will make decisions and develop policies for these operations. If
overall proficiency is lacking to execute this complex mission the results will be less than
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optimal for aiding and assisting local populace. Just as military officers who under take
campaign planning must be proficient, the same adage is true for DSCA planners as well.
Glecker concludes his article by insinuating if we truly commit to the process “we can
foster a rich civil-military dialogue that captures risks and opportunities when the stakes
are manageable and time is available” (p.76).
Larkin (2014) provided a unique perspective on junior officers assigned to
National Guard units who may execute DSCA operations. Larkin established the
conditions for the article by alluding to the skill sets that junior officers in Iraq used
during complex operations that may have merit in DSCA operations. Like combat
operations, there are moments of uncertainty where junior officers will have to make
decisions to save lives, ensure mission success, and protect those under their care.
However, like combat operations these officers charged with the responsibility of
executing DSCA operations must be proficient so they can make sound decisions that are
nested with the overall goals and objectives established by the state or local civil
authorities.
Larkin proposed that in preparation for these complex operations junior officers in
the National Guard should dedicate themselves to understanding the regulations that
guide DSCA operations. Furthermore, they should prepare their formations for
impending deployments by improving proficiency through repetitions in exercises, and
constantly reevaluating areas where improvements can be made.
Apte and Heath (2011) stressed the importance of emergency managers and
military organizations understanding the actual request process for essential assets that
could be used to bolster disaster response operations. As a point of reference, they
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alluded to other studies where emergency managers did not understand how to request
assets which seriously negates a full-scale response and recovery operation. In an effort
to mitigate this deficiency with civil authorities, Apte and Heath (2011) recommend
organizations in close proximity combine their efforts to build prescribed mission
assignments or PSMA’s as they are normally referred to. PSMA’s outline force packages
that civilian authorities predict they will need depending on the scale of the disaster. By
establishing these force packages the response time for a disaster is cut tremendously
because the forces required have been identified and the only protocol required is the
official request from civil authorities to their military counterparts. In order for this
process to produce optimal results emergency managers and military organizations must
have a working knowledge of DSCA operations and establish protocols which allow
PSMA’s to be executed without delay. However, just because PMA’s are established
among the two entities, it should not be assumed they are impervious to potential failure.
Like overall DSCA operations, even this process must be exercised to ensure an optimal
knowledge level exist.
Burke and Mcneil (2015) work titled “Maturing Defense Support to Civil
Authorities and the Dual Status Commander arrangement” took a different approach in
comparison to other articles positions on improving DSCA operations. They recommend
a significant investment into the appointed dual status commander. This military officer
operates under the guidance of the governor and directs military forces to conduct
mission assignments as required during catastrophic events in a designated state. The
authors point to the success of Super Storm Sandy where dual status commanders where
quickly established to facilitate DSCA operations before the super storm made landfall.
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Additionally, they were given the necessary authorities which was extremely important
for DSCA operations because authorities outline what can and can’t be done in the region
or by the dual status commander. This example certainly sheds light on the possibilities
of what emergency managers and their military mission partners can accomplish if they
make a concerted effort to implement steps to streamline their process for greater
efficiency. However, in order to build on the success that Burke and Mcneil elaborated
on, a concerted effort to find deficiencies that impact response efforts must be undertaken
with a comprehensive plan designed to find and fix deficiencies when identified.
In an effort to ensure the Department of Defense is continuing to evolve and meet
the challenges that impact our country, the pentagon embraced their role in facilitating
homeland defense through defense support to civil authorities. In their Homeland
Defense Strategy (2013), the Pentagon reinforced their commitment to civil authorities by
stating:
The second priority is support of civil authorities in the event of catastrophic
domestic events, with two key objectives being to maintain chemical, biological,
radiological and nuclear preparedness and to develop plans and procedures to
ensure such support during complex catastrophes. The core capabilities to carry
out the domestic support mission include being able to rapidly deploy CBRN
response forces, having an immediate response authority for catastrophes, having
forces in various areas of the country to react as needed, and having access to
non-National Guard Reserve forces. (Homeland Defense Strategy, 2013).
Though this strategy was reassuring, there needed to be a concerted effort to
ensure the pledge was complimented with military and emergency managers who were
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proficient in DSCA operations and could truly provide the service outlined in the new
strategy. Furthermore, as the second research question to this research alludes to, there
has to be a concerted effort to determine what contributing factors lead to an optimal or
less than optimal level of DSCA proficiency to ensure the above strategy is successful. If
the root cause of a deficiency can’t be determined there is no conceivable to devise a plan
that has no central point from which to start.
Coordinating and Collaborating DSCA operations
Tussing (2012) perspective on DSCA took a road less travelled in the DSCA
phenomenon. He argued that preparation for DSCA operations is equally, if not more
important than the actual operation itself. From his instructor’s position at the United
States Army War College, Tussing carefully crafted what he believed were imperatives
that must occur between among emergency managers and their military counterparts.
According to Tussing the imperatives are:
• Command and Control of Active, Reserve and National Guard forces in
response and recovery operations
• Aligning military response with civil regional requirements in responding to
disasters that transcend states’ borders
• Attending to the delicate line of demarcation between the military and law
enforcement when responding to the requests, or directives, of civil authorities
• Challenging the impetus that leads to unnecessarily applying federal assets, to
include the military, in a “nationalization of disasters”
• Suggesting another strategic mindset to preparations for response to domestic
crises, applying a center of gravity model to risk assessment requirements (p.132)
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Though critics may debate the merits of Tussing’s list of imperatives, to his
credit, many of the list imperatives appeared in after action reports in which both
emergency managers and military leaders acknowledged as deficient areas.
Topp (2006) thesis titled “What Should be the Relationship Between the National
Guard and United States Northern Command in Civil Support Operations following
Catastrophic Events”, served as one of the central debates in DSCA operations.
Understandably, disaster response is not an exact science with exact measurements that
quantify response capacity evaluated against the disaster itself. With regards to command
and control, Topp expounded on the general construct for senior officials who will
oversee the operation which includes multiple forces, civilian and military, and
organizations that are not affiliated to either population. As previously mentioned, the
state governor and his or her emergency management operational command team are in
charge of disasters within their boundaries. However, if they do have the capacity to
assume this responsibility as witnessed in Hurricane Katrina, is it feasible, suitable, or
acceptable for the state or local government to relinquish this responsibility to federal
authorities until an optimal capacity is reached. It has become widely accepted that speed
of action is a must in DSCA operations, and establishing command and control most
expeditiously is imperative. However, if the response is not equaled to the unfolding
event, should the chain of custody be relinquished until the appropriate authority can
execute their duties without the assistance of a higher authority? Understandably, there
are sensitivities, state sovereignty and policies that addressed this prickly course of
action. However, in times of duress should leaders have the authority to counter policies,
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regulations, and organizational sensitivities for the greater good of populace who will be
directly impacted if there’s a haphazard response to catastrophic incident.
Bharosa, Lee, and Janssen (2010) complimented Topp’s perspective by
expounding on the difficulties of multi-agency operations in support of disaster response
operations encounter. First, as Topp recognized, there was a need for a mechanism for all
entities involved in a large-scale disaster response operation to collect information,
analyze the information, make well informed decisions. Subsequently, during the time of
a disaster is not the most opportune time to place the general concept into practical
application. This multi-faceted operation must be exercised on multiple levels to ensure
all participants understand their roles and responsibilities and determine where there are
duplication of efforts.
Once, a baseline proficiency is built, the authors recommended elevating the
degree of difficulty in a collective exercise to build “muscle memory”, but also train the
force to failure. By training to failure, flaws and deficiencies are identified which helps
organizations identify gaps in their plans and standard operation procedures that must be
addressed to ensure optimal results during the actual disaster. Finally, a central aspect to
their article was the sharing of information. Clear and concise information is central to
making timely decisions that can mitigate the effects of a disaster if it is passed in a
timely manner and properly vetted for accuracy.
Slattery, Syvertson, and Krill (2009) took an analytical view on the role of
leadership in disaster management operations. Their article related to the proposed
research because it also focused on the proficiency that leaders must possess in order to
ensure there, orders, guidance, and employment tactics are rooted in proficiency gained
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through experience, education, and training. Slattery, Syvertson, and Krill recommended
an eight-step training model to help them build organizational proficiency. They stated:
The steps are as follows:
1. Study/Teach the Literature / Doctrine (Certify Leaders); 2. Survey the Training
Site; 3. Develop the Training Plan; 4. Issue the Plan; 5. Rehearse the Plan
(Tabletop Exercise); 6. Execute the Training; 7. Evaluate the Training; and 8.
Retrain as Needed to Meet Goals. At a minimum, the model acquaints participants
with divergent organizational roles and missions and at its best instills confidence
in participating organizations' ability to work together in a simulated setting
before they are forced to collaborate during emergency response. (p.3)
This training model crossed all organizational domains and can be easily
incorporated to ensure proficiency levels are maintained if leaders commit to the model
and not circumvent the system with inferior training models that produce less than
optimal training objectives.
Keeping in the theme of coordinating and collaboration of multiple agencies
during disaster response, Waugh and Streib (2006) provided insight on how the federal
government would integrate into the emergency response operations as DSCA unfolds at
the state and local levels.
Arguably, it may be easier for military organizations and emergency managers to
coordinate their efforts through routine collective training and exercises. However, do to
the vast size of organizations such as FEMA and the Department of Homeland Security
in general, incorporating these organizations into the same cycle of training and exercises
may not be feasible or suitable. With this factor in the mind, planners for DSCA
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operations are faced with the task of how to coalesce all participants to maintain an
optimal proficiency. This scenario certainly stands true for the NCR. Local, district, state
and federal emergency management organizations each have the responsibility for
executing DSCA in their individual roles, but no mandate exist to ensure they are equally
proficient. Unfortunately, if federal organizations cannot commit to planning,
collaboration, or participating in exercises they will never establish a foundation for
employing their capability and integrating into the collective DSCA effort.
In the Government Accounting Office (2015) report titled “DOD Is Taking
Action to Strengthen Support of Civil Authorities”, Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum provided
insight on the DoD actions that are currently ongoing to improve how the military and
civil authorities conduct DSCA operations. In contrast to a report released in 2012 which
highlighted the shortcomings of the department of defense in improving DSCA
operations, this report highlighted changes that will undoubtedly have a major impact on
future DSCA operations. He stated:
DOD has and continues to take action to address our prior recommendations to
strengthen its DSCA strategy, plans, and guidance. As we have previously
reported, clear, current, and complete strategies, plans, and guidance documents
are important for reflecting the direction of the departments’ civilian and military
leadership, defining DOD and its components’ policies and responsibilities, and
sharing practices that could facilitate effective support of civil authorities (p.3)
This report was a product of a comprehensive review of failings in DSCA
proficiency. As trends and themes emerge that highlight proficiency issues in planning,
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coordinating and the actual execution of DSCA operations, the findings can be submitted
to decision makers to make informed decision based off of new data.
For a more recent perspective, The Air, Land, Sea, and Bulletin (2015)
highlighted major efforts the military and emergency mangers have made in improving
how DSCA operations are conducted. To further these efforts, the Air, Land, Sea,
Application Center recommended several improvements further advance DSCA
proficiency. First, continue to ensure incident commanders are experienced in response
and recovery operations which helps to facilitate timely, planning, and execution.
Next, the DoD should streamline its’ mission assignment process for civil
authorities. This point is extremely important because the mission assignment is how
assets and essential capabilities are allocated to civil authorities. The center highlighted
cases where planners provided prescripted mission assignments to alleviate the
cumbersome wait period, but many of the mission assignments were still in the approval
phase by the DoD which lengthen the process. Finally, the center also highlighted the
importance of continuing to streamline command and control operations between the
military and emergency managers. To ensure timely decisions are made to truly impact
DSCA operations, both entities must have a common operational picture of conditions on
the ground, assets required, and the process to link the capability to the affected area.
Finally, FEMA Deputy Associate Administrator for Response and Recovery
Robert Fenton testimony to the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee
on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications hearing (2015) provided
exceptional insight on FEMA’s initiatives to improve DSCA relationships. First and
foremost, at the federal level of government, FEMA and USNORTHCOM are currently
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embarking on a plan to embed planners at each headquarters. This effort will ensure all
plans for response and recovery operations are succinct and request for assistance is
expedited through the use of liaison officers at each headquarters.
Next, to ensure new plans, policies, and protocols for executing DSCA operations
are applicable to the current environment, both organizations have agreed to increase the
number of exercises. This initiative was instituted to validate organization’s processes,
procedures, and organizational mission planning which is essential during actual DSCA
operations. Finally, to ensure senior leaders in both organizations are nested with their
organizational goals, objectives, and future initiatives, significant strides have been made
to host Senior Leader Engagements for even greater cooperation. These engagements
allow the collective group to discuss executive level issues and table discussion on
potential training, issues with current force reductions, or after action reports from
previous training exercises that placed their protocols and standard operating procedures
into application. On the periphery, these organizations should be commended for their
due diligence in ensuring DSCA operations and future initiatives are executed
collaboratively vices individually. However, the effectiveness of these initiatives will
only be proven effective if they achieve an optimal performance during practical
application.
Expanding the Military’s Role in DSCA
The final theme from the literature centers on expanding the military’s role in
DSCA operations. Juxtapose to this position are those who feel this recommendation has
the potential to cause an unintentional intermingling of state sovereignty and federalism.
Though states have their internal National Guard forces, the active duty military has vast
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capabilities that can deploy on relative short notice to mitigate the impact of large scale
emergency response efforts. For a perspective on this position, during Hurricane Katrina,
former Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco was adamant that state sovereignty be
maintained as federal forces began a massive build up to support response and recovery
efforts. Subsequently, during Super Storm Sandy, state and local officials voiced their
disdained for federal forces deploying to Staten Island to support recovery operations
without the consent of the official New York response chain of command.
As a point of clarification, the Department of Defense directives clearly reinforces
the position that state forces should reach a point of resource and manpower exhaustion
before federal forces are requested and deployed. Coupled to this position is the cost of
deploying federal forces Title 10 forces. Burke and McNeil (2015) stated “largely due to
costs associated with using Title 10 assets, as well as the infringement on state
sovereignty, federal forces, at least doctrinally, operate on a “last in, first out” philosophy
in these situations” (p.37)
Clarke’s (2014) article titled “Europe's Armed Forces in Civil Security” spans the
far end of the DSCA pendulum by recommending an expanded role for the DoD in
DSCA operations. For context, this article analyzed a European model where military
forces are assuming greater responsibility in DSCA operations vice the responsibilities of
civil authorities. This position was also championed by President George W. Bush
following the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina where the military response was
categorically superior to their emergency management counterparts.
As many championed this point, several comments were made that the military
may be better suited for response to disasters. For clarity purposes, when there’s a lack of
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proficiency based on a wide knowledge gap between the two populations, conventional
wisdom of outside observers gravitates towards using the population that has shown
superior proficiency.
However, Clarke’s perspective on DSCA operations in Europe is simply not
feasible in the continental United States. Unlike most armies in Europe, the United States
military is continuously deploying forces abroad for a wide array of missions. Though
these forces can certainly maintain an optimal level of proficiency when they are not in a
deployment cycle, they cannot fully embrace a mission that will cause an imbalance of
national power projection versus incorporating duties of civil authorities.
Chitwood (2014) article titled “Merge and Align the Army Reserve Component”
lends a voice to an argument that helps the military expand their capacity in the face of
major disasters. The author recommended aligning the United States Army Reserve and
the National Guard to provide greater capability that will enhance title 32 forces for
emergency response operations directed by the governor. As the DoD continues their
realignment of mission across a very broad spectrum of defense and civil support
operations, the resources and capabilities required to conduct these missions are
becoming finite. Therefore, by aligning reserve forces with the forces from the National
Guard, leaders will have tremendous capacity to respond to catastrophic events. While
the United States Army Reserve falls under the umbrella of the active Army, these forces
can be used before federal active forces are called to respond to a catastrophic event.
However, before this course of action can truly materialize into a viable course of action,
several measures would have to be implemented. There would be a need to reorganize
forces, change policies and directives that guide DSCA operations, and propose
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numerous agreements across the military, state and local authorities to solidify this
relationship.
Sylves (2009) makes the case for the military to take a greater role in DSCA
operations to ensure a succinct operation which may be plagued by a slow response by
local emergency mangers. To validate his argument Sylves pointed to several factors
which makes the military an attractive option. He points to the command and control
apparatus that is inherent with all military organizations, optimal response time, and their
ability to self-sustain forces deployed in support of DSCA operations. Langowiski (2008)
conducted a unique analysis on how the military could balance operational mission
requirements while simultaneously providing capability for emergency managers to
execute DSCA operations. The author suggests DoD develop a rotational schedule where
military forces are solely dedicated to DSCA operations for a period of time and returned
back to their traditional military mission once their commitment is complete. Without
question the military’s primary responsibility is centered on their operational missions.
However, as the number of disaster continues to grow beyond the current capability of
emergency managers, there has to be a viable course of action that will achieve an
optimal DSCA response while balancing the appropriate equilibrium for forces available.
This measure ensures there is no degradation in military organizations that will impact
their operational readiness. This recommendation certainly has validity in view of the
recent northwestern United States wildfires which have caused a massive response by the
military and emergency responders in the Pacific Northwest region. The obvious question
is do we have the right balance of forces for DSCA operations or do we need to
reevaluate what capabilities will be required?
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Smiley (2015) recommended U.S. forces rotating out of their combat missions in
Iraq and Afghanistan should assume non-traditional roles in DSCA operations. The
premise for this recommendation is to ensure a collective response and recovery effort
has soldiers who are equipped and trained to carry a wide array of missions to enable
emergency managers. Smiley construct for this potential course of action would identify
units rotating out of a combat operation, provide them time to transition and assimilate
into their new mission. Once the designated timeframe has been reached, the unit would
rotate out of their DSCA mission back to their habitual mission.
Feaver (2015) revisited the conversation of cooperation between civil authorities
and the military. Since the inception of our nation there has always been a divide between
civilians controlling the military while the military assuming the role as the subservient
arm of American diplomacy. However, Like Samuel Huntington who first proposed an
academic discussion on the symbiotic relationship, Feaver questions the balance on
policy making and the influence that the military has in the process. Feaver, makes the
case that maybe the military should have an even greater role in civil military operations.
This idea is based on the simple fact that those who are going to execute policy should
have a greater say in how the policy will be devised and executed.
Jacobs (2009) article titled “CCMRF (Consequence Management Response
Force) and use of federal armed forces in civil support operations”, gave insight on the
military’s commitment to civil authorities in a consequence management role by
designating an Army brigade for major DSCA operations. The mandate for using this
Army formation that consists of 3,500-5,000 soldiers was rooted in the after actions
report from Hurricane Katrina.
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Rather than requesting a large formation to compliment emergency managers
during major disasters, military planners determined that it was feasible and suitable for
the military to have a brigade on standby with certain capabilities to facilitate response
and recovery operations. As with the National Response Framework, this force would not
be employed unless state National Guard Forces becomes overwhelmed. Additionally,
once the determination was made that local or state authorities could assume full
responsibility for a disaster, the CCMRF would return back to their home of record and
assume their habitual military mission and reconstitution operations.
The preponderance of literature presented in this section focused primarily on
cooperation and collaboration of the military and their emergency management mission
partners. However, Feaver (2015) resets the balance of this discussion by reiterating a
salient point that must be reinforced during major disasters; civil authorities are in charge.
The U.S. military has shown on numerous occasions that their resources, expertise, and
ability to quickly deploy to a disaster or a contingency operation makes them an attractive
option for DSCA response. However, the military has habitual mission and the optics of
the federal army assuming control of a local disaster does not instill confidence to local
populace that their civil authorities can execute disaster response. This point was also
expressed by Burke and McNeil. Subsequently, federal regulations such as the Posse
Comitatus Act and the Insurrection Act ensure the level of military involvement is
limited in scope and scale.
The conundrum for civil authorities is to determine how they maintain a trained
and ready force that can rival the military and produce the same results that the military
has become synonymous for? Optimally, as with the fundamentals of DSCA operations,

68

civil authorities should train their forces for mission essential proficiency and look for
opportunities to train with the military to ensure both agencies can seamlessly integrate
for superlative mission results if called upon.
Finally, for a realistic perspective of increasing the military’s role in DSCA
operation, Soebbing (2012) forced readers to reflect on the current downsizing of the
Army and the implications downsizing will have on DSCA. As the author alluded to, the
decision to down size the Army which executes a small portion of DSCA operation is
based on a number of decisions. These decisions range from the introduction of new
equipment which can execute the mission of soldiers, to reducing defense spending
which is forcing the military to do more with less in a fiscally constrained environment.
Additionally, though the possibility of deploying a large army on foreign soil for
combat operation may seem unrealistic, there are missions in which the Army must
prepare and train for. Therefore, Soebbing believed if these cuts and reductions continue,
an environment may exist where resources for contingency military operations and
DSCA may be significantly impacted. It is for this reason that leaders inside these
populations must continue to engage in meaningful dialogue to ensure there is no
degradation in personnel, equipment, or the training that will impact mission readiness.
Synthesis of the Current Literature Themes
After a comprehensive synthesis of the collected literature on DSCA proficiency
and DSCA operations, the rationale for using the themes and trends were clearly
authenticated. With regards to Education, Haynes (2014) stated “The study revealed
extensive emergency manager experience, but a huge gap of any formal education”
(p.156). This point is especially important because it is nested to the research questions
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which seek to determine what factors lead to optimal or less than optimal proficiency
levels.
Next, Porter (2010) stated “local emergency managers—and state emergency
managers—would very much like the DOD to proactively prepare an educational
package that informs emergency managers about what and how the DOD can provide
domestic disaster assistance” (p.144).
Lastly, though this theme was advocated in the literature, the theme of expanding
the role of the military remains highly controversial. Haynes clearly articulated in his
research recommendations on DSCA proficiency in the state of North Carolina that the
military’s role should not be expanded. Conversely, he advocated for a greater premium
to be placed on educating emergency managers in planning and coordinating for DSCA
operations with their military counterparts.
As a summation, the literature collected and analyzed followed three
aforementioned themes and trends which will promulgate into variables to facilitate the
research. Porter stated:
This research shows that EMs need to know what is possible for types and
capabilities of response assets that the DOD owns. EMs need something that they
can learn from education, training, briefings, etc—that they can file away in their
personal memory. They also need reference material that they can pull of the shelf
to refamiliarize themselves with the possibilities, and information that assist them
in quantifying their requests for assistance that would be well served with a
military response. Ems also recommended exercising with these potential military
assets, to promote the conversion of theory to practice (pp.136-137)
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Haynes noted in his recommendations for future research “this research could
examine the various layers of emergency management, and address the gaps in the both
the civil and military emergency planning programs, which could provide valuable
information to local, state, and military emergency managers” (Haynes, p.170, 2014).
These findings and recommendations clearly highlighted the importance of the
research questions that guided this this study. First, they filled literature gaps that were
omitted from previous research. Next, they helped to service the recommendations for
future research that was recommended by Porter and Haynes. By following this approach,
the research aligned with the iterative research process in which “the role of iteration in
qualitative data analysis, not as a repetitive mechanical task but as a reflexive process, is
key to sparking insight and developing meaning” (p.76)
With regards to what was known about the themes and trends of the phenomenon,
there seemed to be evidence of a less than optimal knowledge of DSCA operations by
emergency mangers across the span ten years during three studies. The respondents from
Porter’s study stated “PEMD’s (Parish Emergency Managers Directors) agreed that they
would be better prepared for DOD support if a training or briefing package, or handbook
could be designed for them that would educate them about just what the DOD could
bring to the disaster response” (p.137). Haynes research (2015) revealed “None of 10
managers reported they had formal DSCA education. Seven of the 10 managers (70%)
reported they were not well educated on DSCA policies and guidelines” (p.129).
What wasn’t known from the responses is the level of DSCA proficiency of
military organizations associated with these parishes, states, and regions. Additionally,
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the obvious unknown is what were the driving factors that precluded these organizations
from gaining an optimal level of DSCA proficiency? This salient point segued into one of
the unknowns that continue to intrigue my interest on DSCA proficiency which is the
impact of policies on DSCA proficiency. However, before policies could be examined to
determine how they impact DSCA proficiency, research has to be done to accurately
determine the proficiency levels of the recommended populations. Until there is an
increased level of knowledge gained through research such as Haynes, Porter and my
own, it will remain as a proverbial unknown until.
As a frame of reference, the research questions that drove my research were, are
factors such as constrained financial resources and limited access to professional training
courses contributing to a less than optimal DSCA proficiency? Next, do initiatives such
as collaborative planning and training among emergency managers and their military
mission partners within the National Capital Region impact collective DSCA
proficiency?
These questions were established after carefully reviewing the findings and
recommendations from previous research. I unequivocally believed the rationale for
using this approach is nested in the time-honored tradition of expanding research for
greater breadth and depth on a subject which continues to evolve and requires greater
inquiry. Subsequently, this approach also authenticates the use of the qualitative case
study. As Baxter and Jack (2008) stated:
qualitative case study is an approach to research that facilitates exploration of a
phenomenon within its context using a variety of data sources. This ensures that
the issue is not explored through one lens, but rather a variety of lenses which
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allows for multiple facets of the phenomenon to be revealed and understood.
(p.544)
With the appropriate approach, coupled with the research findings and
recommendations from previous studies on DSCA, the research certainly has the
potential to fill current literature gaps and set the conditions for positive social change in
collective DSCA operations.
Justification for the Study
After a detailed synthesis of the literature which encompassed articles and
dissertations, there were several significant findings that confirmed the justification for
not only this study, but future studies on DSCA proficiency. In his recommendation for
future research, Haynes alluded to further inquiries into civil authorities and military
organizations decision making, support structures that will facilitate DSCA operations,
and the formation of policies that will establish the parameters for executing DSCA
operations (Haynes, 2014). These recommendations from this study clearly showed there
are areas in the DSCA discipline that remain unexplored and severely lacking.
Furthermore, Porter stated “nearly all of the PEMDs (Parish Emergency Management
Directors) indicated that there was little, if any, formal instruction about the military in
the content of any of their courses. Even federally-sponsored training rarely mentioned
military support” (p.88).
Finally, the findings from Milliman et al (2006) study which served as the first
exploratory study on DSCA proficiency unequivocally validated the justification for my
study. As a scene setter, the findings used the backdrop of Hurricane Katrina in which
communication and coordination issues where rampant as the response and recovery
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operation transcended from the local response, to state and federal control of the
operations. Additionally, the research was actually conducted in 2004, which was before
Hurricane Katrina, but released after the disaster. In their concluding remarks Milliman
et al stated:
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina this study provides further indication that
similar studies on interagency coordination should be considered for other
organizations, such as state EMs, FEMA, military authorities, the National Guard,
and the Department of Homeland Security. More systematic research on these
areas is essential for improved disaster planning and response for both natural and
terrorist incidents. (p.13)
Though all of the findings certainly played a role in justifying my research, this
passage was by far the most important.
The Known and Unknown Known in the Discipline
Unfortunately, the known’s disproportionately point to a need for greater
education in DSCA operations. However, as a caveat to this statement, more definitive
research must be conducted to bolster trends and themes on a broader scale. The more
studies conducted with cogent findings, decision makers are better informed to introduce
mitigation measures to sustain or improve the discipline. Haynes (2014) certainly
advocates this point by stating:
In this study, local county emergency managers discussed their perspectives of
DSCA integration to prepare and respond to a disaster. This yields opportunities
for future research to examine DSCA and emergency preparedness at the local
and state level, which includes the military (p.170).
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Haynes recommendation certainly provided future researchers with a navigational
compass that is sure to build on his work and further expand knowledge on the discipline.
This formula ultimately minimizes the unknowns and provides clarity where ambiguity
on the discipline is predominant. What is not known from the responses is the level of
DSCA proficiency of military organizations associated with these parishes, states, and
regions. Additionally, the obvious unknown is what are the driving factors that preclude
these organizations from gaining an optimal level of DSCA proficiency? It was this
unknown that ultimately provided the foundation for my research questions.
Filling the Literature Gap
In an effort to expand the continuum of inquiry in DSCA proficiency, the research
advanced the knowledge of this discipline by taking a holistic approach to explaining the
DSCA conundrum. The term conundrum was used because despite the efforts of multiple
organizations, the literature synthesis clearly showed a need for greater emphasis on the
discipline. Unlike the previous research which provided a navigational compass for the
proposed research in the NCR, there was a concerted effort to include military
organizations to determine their proficiency in DSCA operations.
This inclusion certainly provided insight on the collective coalition proficiency
rather than dissecting one portion of a population. Subsequently, by reviewing research
questions from the aforementioned bodies of research, my research delved into the “why”
of DSDCA proficiency. For instance, why were some organizations more proficient in
DSCA than others? Did the lack of financial resources in a fiscally restrained
environment contribute to a less than optimal Proficiency? Did military organizations or
emergency managers’ inability to access courses such as the DSCA phase 1 and 2 courses
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further exacerbate proficiency levels? By answering these questions from the
recommended populations multiple gaps in literature were filled and certainly expanded
the knowledge on the discipline.
Literature for the Methodology
In Johnson’s (2013) dissertation titled A Case Study of the Defense Support to
Civil Authority Program, the rationale for using the qualitative research methodology
bared striking similarities to the rationale used for the proposed research on DSCA
proficiency inside the NCR. By using the qualitative case study Johnson (2013) stated “I
had a desire to pursue this study to fill existing knowledge gaps related to the DSCA
program. Quantitative methodologies had been used previously to study military training;
however, the studies conducted often focused on determining specific program
outcomes” (p.59). This explanation resonated with my proposed research because of the
need to understand the phenomenon of DSCA proficiency through personal experiences
in a natural environment. As with her study, Johnson noted “the specific
questions created for the study facilitated a description of participants’ thoughts and
experiences concerning the DSCA training. It involved analyzing participants’ own
descriptions of their experiences” (p.61).
Though the qualitative case study is not renowned for being as rigid as the
quantitative methodology, the multiple lenses in which the researcher can exploit
certainly provided greater context for the subject matter to be studied.
Sousa (2014) freely admitted that the merits of qualitative research has been, and
will continue to be debated by academic scholars and novice researchers. This is due in
part to the subjectivity of the research method which in contrast to quantitative research
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does not have formulas or a rigid methodology that produces concrete findings. Like
similar articles that have been expounded upon to understand qualitative research coupled
with the descriptive methodology, Sousa tried to connect the two by stating “qualitative
research seeks to provide rich thorough descriptions and interpretations about the
phenomena under study as they occur in their natural environment” (p.211).
Additionally, Sousa elaborated on the importance of ensuring data collected using
the descriptive methodology or any methodology for that matter must be thoroughly
vetted for validity. If this step is omitted, it will only add additional fervor to those who
point to the “lose” application of qualitative research that has become synonymous with
researcher bias. Though this unfair designation may not be justified, it is paramount that
the descriptive methodology or any methodology maintains a strict protocol to ensure
research integrity. If theses protocols are followed, the research will certainly with stand
the scrutiny from those who wish to challenge the findings.
In their article titled “Qualitative Case Study Methodology: Study Design and
Implementation for Novice Researchers”, Baxter and Jack (2008) reintroduced their
audience to the guidance Yin promulgated for researchers to contemplate before
committing to the qualitative case study design. Yin (2003) as quoted by Baxter and Jack
stated:
A case study design should be considered when: (a) the focus of the study is to
answer “how” and “why” questions; (b) you cannot manipulate the behavior of
those involved in the study; (c) you want to cover contextual conditions because
you believe they are relevant to the phenomenon under study; or (d) the
boundaries are not clear between the
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phenomenon and context (p.545).
To add further context for the avocation of the qualitative case study, I believed it
was important to couple my qualitative case study with other case studies to form a
comprehensive body of research to inform leaders and other researchers on DSCA from a
holistic view. This view includes comprehensive recommendations and findings based
off of research conducted over a 10-year period on the subject. By coupling qualitative
case studies together, the scope and scale of themes and trends identified can provide
detailed analysis on areas of concern or areas that should be sustained to provide an
optimal DSCA proficiency.
Nassaji (2015) recent article titled “Qualitative and descriptive research: Data
type versus data analysis” sought to differentiate the terms qualitative research and
descriptive research which are used interchangeably. For clarification purposes, Nassaji
stated “The goal of descriptive research is to describe a phenomenon and its
characteristics. This research is more concerned with the “what” rather than how or why
something has happened” (p.129). With regards to qualitative research, Nassaji stated:
Qualitative research, however, is more holistic and often involves a rich collection
of data from various sources to gain a deeper understanding of individual
participants, including their opinions, perspectives, and attitudes. Qualitative
research collects data qualitatively, and the method of analysis is also primarily
qualitative. This often involves an inductive exploration of the data to identify
recurring themes, patterns, or concepts and then describing and interpreting those
categories (pp.129–130).
This explanation without question captured my rational for using qualitative research.
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As a researcher embarking on my journey I believed it was imperative to clearly
delineate these differences to ensure the research was succinct with the principles
associated with the chosen methodology. I have personally used these terms out of
context and found that understanding the meaning behind the terms I can better articulate
my research and bolster validity to subject that is being researched.
Though Isaacs (2014) work titled “An overview of Qualitative Research
Methodology for Public Health Researchers” did not directly correlate to DSCA
proficiency among emergency managers or military organizations, the work had
tremendous value in championing the use of the qualitative methodology. As the author
reinforced the methodology with obligatory comments to which researchers gravitate
towards to justify the use of qualitative research, Isaacs further expounded on the benefits
of the qualitative methodology in public health. He stated “qualitative research
methodology enables researchers to explore social and behavioral issues related to public
health that are not achievable with quantitative methods” (p.318).
The most intriguing aspect to this article was rooted in the framework to which
the qualitative methodology encompassed and the ease to which the methodology allows
the researcher to fully dissect the phenomenon being studied by using a literature review,
incorporating a theoretical framework, and collecting and analyzing data (Isaacs, 2014).
The aforementioned merits of the qualitative methodology were certainly enticing. As a
novice researcher I unequivocally believed the methodology I chose should facilitate a
robust conversation on DSCA proficiency by using a systematic approach to elucidate the
stated problem while simultaneously articulating findings and recommendations. This
dual purpose certainly brings greater context to the stated problem.
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Like Isaacs, Cronin (2014) also expounded on the use of the qualitative
methodology in health science. Though case study research has been labeled as
anecdotal, the use of this design continues to evolve as researchers delve into the benefits
of exploratory research. Admittedly, this was a concern as I wavered on the qualitative or
quantitative methodology. However, as Cronin stated “it is clear that CSR (case study
research) focuses on specific situations, providing a description of individual or multiple
cases. In using this design, the researcher can investigate ‘everything’ in that situation, be
it individuals, groups, activities or a specific phenomenon” (p.20). Furthermore, to
explore the multiple facets of the phenomenon as Cronin suggested, Yin (2009) provided
a unique perspective on establishing protocols for the case study design such as
meticulously collecting and analyzing data to bolster validity and reliability. Though,
these simple steps may not remove the label of anecdotal research from the qualitative
case study, the parameters that Yin suggested and Cronin substantiated in his research
were integral in my decision to choose the qualitative methodology.
Summary
Chapter two provided a comprehensive literature review on DSCA operations and
the Advocacy Coalition Framework which was the chosen theoretical framework for the
proposed research. From the comprehensive literature review, previous research was
analyzed to identify gaps and solidify the two overarching research questions which are,
are factors such as constrained financial resources and limited access to professional
training courses contributing to a less than optimal DSCA proficiency? Next, do
initiatives such as collaborative planning and training among emergency managers and
their military mission partners within the NCR impact collective DSCA proficiency?
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When analyzing what was known and what wasn’t known about DSCA
proficiency in the NCR, the obvious unknown was what the actual proficiency of DSCA
among emergency managers and their military mission partners? The lack of any
mechanism to measure DSCA proficiency left a knowledge gap that this research
attempted to answer. Furthermore, from the previous two studies on DSCA proficiency,
what was known centered on the lack of knowledge that emergency managers had on
DSCA operations. Two studies showed that most emergency managers severely lacked a
comprehensive understanding of DSCA operations despite the fact that recent major
disasters had called for large scale response efforts between the military and their
emergency management partners. Subsequently, what wasn’t known was what are the
factors that led to a less that optimal proficiency of these organizations. Was there
degradation in their proficiency because of training or was the decline in proficiency
caused by resources that were required to ensure emergency responders remain
proficient? It is because of these unknown that I believed the research I conducted was
necessary to answer the unknowns surrounding DSCA proficiency.
By conducting this study the major gap that I wanted to fill was the understanding
of the emergency response apparatus inside the NCR. As previously noted, there had
been no sanctioned or independent studies to measure DSCA proficiency inside the NCR
and my research had the potential to add substance to the conversation centering on
DSCA proficiency. Also, from the knowledge gained there were several key aspects that
could be addressed by both populations inside the region. First, how can the two entities
work together to ensure an optimal proficiency level among the coalition? Second, what
was the common issue that contributed to the less than optimal proficiency level or
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optimal level of proficiency? Lastly, how could the two populations work together in
training exercises or developing academic curriculums to ensure a concerted effort was
being made to improve and maintain an optimal level of DSCA proficiency?
Conversely, I believed rather than filling a gap, the research served an even
greater purpose by drawing comparisons from previous studies findings and
recommendations as well. If the research confirmed there was a below average
proficiency in DSCA operations, the findings could be used in a collective trend analysis
to develop plans and policies that address areas requiring assistance to either bolster or
maintain proficiency.
As a transition point from the literature review to the chapter 3 methodology, the
American Psychological Association (2005) believed reviewing applicable literature on
the subject matter to determine a potential methodology and reviewing previous research
that aligns with the proposed research are essential for cogent research. This sequential
methodology was followed to provide a road map for the intended audience.
Additionally, it served a precursor for chapter three which focus on the chosen
methodology, the research design, the researcher’s philosophy, the population, sampling,
data collection, and data analysis.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
Introduction
The purpose of this intrinsic qualitative case study was to determine DSCA
proficiency among emergency managers and their military mission partners in the NCR. I
used two questions to guide the research and contribute to the existing body of research
on DSCA proficiency:
1. Are factors such as constrained financial resources and limited access to
professional training courses contributing to a less than optimal DSCA
proficiency?
2. Do initiatives such as collaborative planning and training among
emergency managers and their military mission partners within the
National Capital Region impact collective DSCA proficiency?
Chapter 3 includes the methodology and research design, which served as the
impetus to guide the research. Additionally, the chapter discusses the role of the
researcher, the population and sample used for the research, data collection methods, and
analysis procedures which accentuated the purpose of examining the framework of the
methodology. Furthermore, there will be a discussion on managing ethical concerns for
those who will participate in the research. This area will be coupled to a description on
how ethical concern for participants will be taken into account and properly safeguarded
throughout the duration of research. Finally, this chapter includes the ethical
considerations of complementing the research, as well as credibility, validity, and
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reliability of the data used to advance the continuum of inquiry. The chapter concludes
with a summary of the methodology and a brief transition to Chapter 4.
Research Design and Approach
I used the qualitative methodology to measure the DSCA’s proficiency within the
NCR. Compared to the quantitative methodology, which quantifies a particular problem
through the use of statistical data, qualitative research is generally exploratory in nature
(Creswell, 2013). With no mechanism in place to measure DSCA proficiency among
emergency managers and their military counterparts, the prerequisite certainly existed to
use this methodology. To further solidify the use of the methodology, qualitative
methodology is more suitable for conducting research on a nascent topic such as DSCA
proficiency (Creswell, 2013). When a subject is new/emerging and there’s no substantial
data to compare and contrast it to, qualitative research is more desirable because it helps
the researcher to dissect the subject and provide robust feedback to build a knowledge
base. Once robust findings have been derived from the qualitative research, optimally,
they should serve as the foundation for forming ideas and hypotheses for quantitative
research (Creswell,2013).
I chose the qualitative case study design because of this definition of qualitative
studies. My rationale for choosing the design was rooted in the belief that the case study
provides researchers with the ability to examine a phenomenon using multiple lenses
promulgated from multiple data points (Baxter & Jack, 2008). Connelly (2014) stated,
“In a case study, the researcher is striving for substantial depth in the analysis of the
case” (p. 422). Additionally, the case study approach provides the researcher with a
holistic discipline that comprehensively dissects the complexities of a given
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phenomenon. Cronin (2014) stated, “It is clear that case study research focuses on
specific situations, providing a description of individual or multiple cases. In using this
design, the researcher can investigate ‘everything’ in that situation, be it individuals,
groups, activities or a specific phenomenon” (p. 20).
The two foremost authorities on the case study design are Robert Yin and Robert
Stake. Yin (2009) defined the four categories of case study design. The single case study
holistic can be used when “It represents the critical case in testing a well formulated
theory” (Yin, 2009, p. 47). When the single case study design has the potential to have
more than one unit of analysis in a single case, it is considered as a single case study with
embedded units. Yin (2009) stated, “Though a case study might be about a single
organization, such as a hospital, the analysis might include outcomes about the clinical
services and staffs employed by the hospital” (p. 50). With regard to the final two
designs, which are multiple case studies holistic and multiple case studies embedded,
Baxter and Jack (2008) stated:
You might find yourself asking, but what is the difference between a holistic case
study with embedded units and a multiple case study? Good question! The simple
answer is that the context is different for each of the cases. A multiple or
collective case study will allow the researcher to analyze within each setting and
across settings. While a holistic case study with embedded units only allows the
researcher to understand one unique/extreme/critical case. (p. 550)
Stake took a different approach to the case study design by categorizing the
design into three different units: intrinsic, instrumental, and collective. The intrinsic case
study is “undertaken because one wants better understanding of this particular case”
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(Stake, 1988, p. 237). It from Stake rationale that I chose to use this design measure for
studying DSCA proficiency within the NCR. In comparison to the intrinsic case study,
Spake (1988) stated that in an instrumental case study, “a particular case is examined to
provide insight into an issue or refinement of theory. The case is of secondary interest; it
plays a supportive role facilitating our understanding of something else” (p. 237). Finally,
the collective case study design, which has a resemblance to Yin’s multiple case study
design, comprises several cases that may or may not have common characteristics.
Furthermore, the cases that make up the collective case study have been selected because
they may lead to a greater understanding or theorizing with regard to a larger number of
cases (Yates, 1988).
The appropriate paradigm to facilitate the research is as important as the research
design. My research was guided by the interpretivist paradigm as opposed to the
positivist paradigm. The selection of the interpretivist over the positivist paradigm was
rooted in the definitions of these two paradigms. Lee (1991) stated, “Positivist approach
to organizational research puts into practice a view of science that has its origins in a
school of thought within the philosophy of science known as ‘logical positivism’ or
‘logical empiricism’” (Lee, 1991, p. 343). As opposed to the positivist paradigm, the
interpretivist paradigm, like qualitative research, with which it is closely aligned, relies
on a relationship between the researcher and the phenomena that the research is centred
on. Prakash (2012) stated, in his article titled “Interpretivist Tradition in Qualitative
Anthropological Research Writings”, “stranded in a philosophical position, qualitative
research is fundamentally ‘Interpretivist’ in the sense that it is concerned with how the
social world is realized, interpreted, understood and experienced, or produced” (p. 123).
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This definition certainly aligns with qualitative research, and moreover, it serves as the
connective tissue between the interpretivist paradigm and my inquiry into DSCA
proficiency in the NCR.
The research questions for the proposed research were:
1. Are factors such as constrained financial resources and limited access to
professional training courses contributing to a less than optimal DSCA
proficiency?
2. Do initiatives such as collaborative planning and training among

emergency managers and their military mission partners within the
National Capital Region impact collective DSCA proficiency?
I chose these research questions in support of the overarching purpose of the
research, which was to measure DSCA proficiency and to determine what factors
contribute to an optimal or less-than-optimal proficiency. DSCA is the process by which
the DoD provides assistance to civil authorities in preparing for, during, and after a
catastrophic event that may exceed the capability of civil authorities to conduct a
comprehensive response and recovery operation. However, before this support is
provided, civil authorities must request assistance from the appropriate DoD
organization, and the senior ranking official inside the organization must conduct an
analysis to ensure that the request is in alignment with the DOD directives for providing
assistance. However, the merging of military assistance with civil authorities has proven
to be very complex with multiple challenges. Joint Defense Support to Civil Authorities
(2013), which covers DSCA operations, stated:
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DSCA in the US presents a unique challenge based on the history of the country
and the interaction of the federal, state, local, territorial, and tribal governments and
private and non-profit organizations. These relationships establish the multiple layers and
mutually reinforcing structures throughout the state and territorial governments for
interaction based on the US Constitution, as well as on common law and traditional
relationships. (p. vii)
Given the complexity of this operation, it was clear that those who submit
requests and provide assistance must have an optimal level of proficiency to ensure the
appropriate unity of effort exists for a seamless execution of DSCA operations.
Methodology
Just as salient points existed to deter researchers from using the qualitative
methodology, there were also salient points that made the methodology complementary
for conducting research. In his article titled “An Overview of Qualitative Research
Methodology for Public Health Researchers,” Isaacs (2014) was adamant about using
qualitative research to understand complex issues and phenomena through the lived
experiences of those selected to participate in the research. Isaac’s rationale for using
qualitative research correlated to my research, which centered on understanding the
DSCA proficiency and the relationships between emergency managers and their military
partners who will both execute DSCA operations in a large-scale catastrophe.
From my initial observation, this was a very complex issue that involved multiple
actors with an established belief system synonymous with the ACF. Furthermore, like the
ACF, each actor in the NCR had their own goals, vision, and objectives to accomplish
their assigned role in DSCA operations impacting the NCR. Therefore, the desired
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outcome was to dissect the nexus of the actors and determine the common themes and
threads that lead to an optimal or lacking DSCA proficiency among the collective
population. This point was cogent with Creswell’s (2007) reason for conducting
qualitative research in which he has stated, “We conduct qualitative research because we
want to understand the contexts or settings in which participants in a study address a
problem or issue” (p. 40).
In qualitative methodology, there are five qualitative strategies that researchers
can use: narrative research, ethnography, grounded theory, phenomenological inquiry,
and case studies. Narrative research primarily focuses on collecting stories, field notes,
journals, and conversations. McMullen and Braithwaite (2013) stated in their article titled
“Narrative Inquiry and the Study of Collaborative Branding Activity,” that “Narrative
inquiry has at its core a focus on the study of experience as it is lived. This directs
attention to narratives as a means of studying aspects of society” (p. 92). Unfortunately, a
drawback to narrative research, which disqualified it from this research, was confirming
the authenticity of the narratives. With the number of participants required to measure
DSCA proficiency within the NCR, the time it would have taken to triangulate the
narratives to verify authenticity would have simply surpassed the time and the resources
allotted for this study.
Ethnography differs from narrative research in that researchers are afforded the
opportunity to observe their test population in its natural setting over an extended period
of time. When making the case for using ethnography in business research, Anderson
(2009) stated in his article titled “Our Goal is to See People’s Behavior on Their Terms,
Not Ours,” that “While this observational method may appear inefficient, it enlightens us
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about the context in which customers would use a new product (p.1).” To accurately
capture the real story of behaviour in its natural environment, tremendous time has to be
allotted to the design. Therias (2013) identified this factor as a major disadvantage to the
design when she provided insight on when and how to use ethnography. She stated:
One of the main criticisms levelled at ethnographic studies is the amount of time
they take to conduct. As discussed above, ethnographic studies do not always
require a long period of time, but this consideration is nonetheless valid. Because
of its richer output, an ethnographic study will tend to take longer to generate and
analyse its data than many other methods (p.1).
Though this design certainly has its merits in understanding the research
environment due to a deep immersion into the population, it was incompatible for my
research. Nurani (2008) noted that in order for this design to be truly effective, it requires
the researchers to make a commitment to record data continuously. However, due to the
setting and the dynamics of the population within the NCR, this design was incompatible
with the proposed research.
Grounded theory is used when a researcher’s goal is to form a theory based on a
comprehensive collection of data used to assist the researcher in theory formulization.
Through interviews from multiple participants, observations in a natural setting, or
collection of pertinent data from sources such as journals from archived documentations,
grounded theory is a compilation of both inductive and deductive reasoning that
ultimately forms the theory. Though grounded theory was considered for this research, as
a novice researcher I felt that this theory required an advanced level of researcher
knowledge to accurately inform theory generation for my proposed research topic. This
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point has been expounded by Backman (1999) in her article titled “Challenges of the
Grounded Theory Approach to a Novice Researcher.” With respect to the most important
phase of developing a theory derived from the data analysis, Backman stated:
A novice researcher may find it difficult to look for a core variable when coding
his/her data, because switching one’s focus from studying a unit to studying a
process is painful. It takes time and much coding and analysis to verify a core
category through saturation, relevance and workability. (p. 151)
After taking Backman’s views into account, I was not comfortable with using this design
without the assistance of a co-researcher with a proven background in the design.
Todres and Holloway (2004), as quoted by Roberts (2013), stated, “The goal of
phenomenological inquiry is to fully describe a lived experience. It stressed that only
those who have experienced the phenomena can communicate them to the outside world”
(p. 215). Though phenomenological inquiry provides a unique perspective for the
researcher to accumulate a vast amount of data to inform the research, the quintessential
drawback to compiling a vast amount of data is the interpretation of the data, which can
introduce an element of bias. Additionally, to further make the case for not using the
phenomenological inquiry, researchers have identified the discrepancy between policy
formation and this design. Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, and Love (1991) proposed that this
design is not compatible with policy formation because it focuses on the present and does
not provide inference for the future. Because one of the major objectives of this research
was focusing on DSCA proficiency and facilitating potential policy recommendations
within the NCR, this design was deemed insufficient.
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Role of the Researcher
As a novice researcher, it was obligatory for me to keep my research commensurate with
a protocol to ensure that bias and predetermined results were omitted from the study. It
was paramount that I safeguarded those who participated in the research by ensuring they
remained anonymous, and the data they provided to inform the study remained properly
protected. This philosophy was an amalgamation of several philosophies, but was
primarily rooted in the spirit of philosophical assumptions in which Creswell (2009)
deemed it essential for researchers to adopt an unbiased approach to data. Though ethical
considerations will be addressed later, ensuring that all ethical considerations are
identified and mitigated was paramount to the proposed research.
My role as an observer, participant, or observer-participant, was rooted in the
essence of Unleur’s (2012) article titled “Being an Insider Researcher While Conducting
Case Study Research”. This article explained the role of the insider researcher, which if
adopted can have adverse effects on the research. Unleur stated, “as stated above there
are both advantages and disadvantages to being an insider researcher. It is important to
address and overcome the disadvantages in order to ensure credible insider research” (p.
2). For my proposed research, I served in the role of a complete observer. Though I had
in-depth knowledge on DSCA operations in the NCR, it is for this same reason that I
strictly worked in an observer role in order to remain objective. Having extensive
knowledge of the subject matter had the potential to introduce connotations of partiality
and foregone assumptions towards the research, which further promulgates into
researcher bias. Therefore, in order to protect the integrity of the research and to solidify
my role with respect to the population and the potential audience among whom the

92

research would be presented to, I decided to abstain from the participant and observerparticipant roles.
In the case of data collection, my role as the researcher harkened to Creswell’s
(1994) adage that in qualitative research, the researcher is the actual instrument for the
collection of data. Understanding this principle, during the data collection phase of the
research, my role as the primary instrument was to ensure a seamless collection process,
with protocols in place to ensuring data was accurately obtained through unstructured
interviews and observations. This ultimately meant asking probing questions to
understand the phenomenon being studied and keeping a detailed journal with responses
and reactions that would be later used for coding phase of the research. However, before
the actual collection of data occurred, I had the responsibility of ensuring the participants
understood the scope and scale of the research, and their rights during the study during its
entirety.
I believed that this pre-data collection protocol was imperative because it clearly
defined the role of the researcher and the participant while simultaneously removing any
uncertainty that may hinder the participant from providing the data to inform the
research. Finally, during the collection phase of the research, my role was to ensure
accuracy in the information being transcribed. This included out-briefing each participant
to ensure that the data collected was the actual data they divulged during the research.
I worked in the organization solicited for title 10 (Active Army) participation for
two years. However, the relationships established did not impact the proposed research.
As prerequisite, participants from this organization and others whose participation was
solicited could only volunteer, which precluded questions of integrity and ethics.
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Additionally, my previous supervisor was not included in the research and had no
influence over the participants who agreed to participate in the study. With regard to the
organization that was solicited for title 32 (National Guard) participation, I had limited
engagement with this organization, and there were no personal relationships with any
potential participants. As mentioned earlier, the NCR is comprised of seven counties and
two jurisdictions with multiple emergency managers. Though I had attended
symposiums, briefings and exercises with potential participants, I had not established any
professional relationships that would infringe on the integrity of the proposed research on
DSCA proficiency.
Power relationships can unequivocally have an adverse impact on any research
being conducted. With regards to the NCR, the problem that I faced was that as a member
of the military, I would essentially be reporting on the very organization I worked with
for over a two-year period. However, as a researcher, I understood that while conducting
an inquiry to explain a phenomenon, the researcher’s first allegiance was to the research
and not to the organization that provided the population for the research. Subsequently, I
conveyed this thought to the organizations solicited for participation, and well received.
Furthermore, in an effort to remove the stigma of power relationships, I conveyed to
senior leaders that conducting transparent research, without influence, ensured the
integrity of the research and provided decision-makers with the data to make informed
policy decisions. This was juxtaposed to tainted research with predetermined outcomes
for predetermined decisions.
The greatest ethical issue that concerned my research was rooted in the fact that I
actually worked in one of the organizations that have been solicited for participation in
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my research on DSCA proficiency. Understandably, this relationship caused some
concern on my behalf, but as a researcher trying to understand the phenomenon of DSCA
proficiency, I conveyed to my organization that no conciliatory overtures would be made
for their participation in the research. However, their participation in advancing the
research was certainly appreciated. Additionally, working inside the organization also
alluded to the knowledge I had about the organization and how that knowledge could be
used subjectively or objectively in the proposed research. Moreover, I was concerned
about how this perceived conflict of interests would be viewed by the remaining
organization and emergency managers who would be asked to participate in the research.
In an effort to repudiate this perception, which could have certainly impacted
participation, the conflict of interests was mitigated by my researcher integrity, which the
National Institute of Health (NIH) elaborated on in a posting titled “Why Research
Integrity Matters”, where the following is stated:
•Researchers rely on public support, whether through public investments or their
voluntary participation in experiments, to further science.
•The public relies on scientific progress to better the lives of everyone.
•The public could actually be harmed by researchers who are dishonest and act
without regards to integrity.
It is for these reasons that my commitment to research was impervious to conflict
of interests or power differentials while conducting research within my daily work
environment. Additionally, by succumbing to others, the researcher is not serving in the
true spirit of conducting research that will lead to substantive findings dissects the
identified problem.
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Setting and Sample
The setting for the proposed research occurred inside the NCR, which is
comprised of seven counties and two jurisdictions with multiple federal, state, and local
organizations with a wide array of capabilities to execute disaster responses.
Additionally, the NCR consisted of several military organizations with various
operational missions, which include facilitating the efforts of emergency managers in
civil support operations such as the DSCA. Understanding the dynamics of the region,
duties, and responsibilities that these leaders balance, and the time and resources required
to conduct the research, a cogent sampling strategy was used to reach the desired
outcome.
Furthermore, with the understanding that I may have limited access to this
population, my sampling strategy was a convenience sampling, which is a form of nonprobability sampling. Kandola, Banner, O’Keefe-McCarthy, and Jassal (2014) stated
“Non-probability sampling methods are those in which elements are chosen through nonrandom methods for inclusion into a research study” (p. 16). Furthermore, Teddlie and
Yu (2007) stated “Convenience sampling involves drawing samples that are both easily
accessible and willing to participate in a study” (p. 78). In my previous position as a
deputy plans chief in the NCR, my access to the population was virtually uninhibited. As
a novice researcher, this accessibility provided me with an excellent opportunity to gather
extensive data to inform the research. However, there had to be a dividing line between
past relationships and the professional obligation I had in conducting unbiased research
on DSCA proficiency.
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The overarching research question identified the populations that were required to
inform the research, which are emergency managers and military service members within
the NCR. More specifically, the qualitative case study focused on emergency managers in
seven counties and two jurisdictions that comprised the NCR, the Washington D.C.
National Guard, and the Joint Forces Headquarters National Capital Region. The sample
taken from these populations were purposive in nature, which Robinson (2014) explained
as being non-random and compatible with single case studies, and which is indicative of
DSCA proficiency within the NCR.
The first population consisted of emergency management supervisors in the NCR,
who facilitated the request process for federal assistance during a catastrophic event. For
clarification purposes, emergency management supervisors consisted of those personnel
who wrote and executed plans for local emergency operations for their counties or
jurisdictions.
The second population consisted of the Washington D.C. National Guard which
had limited capability to provide assistance during a catastrophic event, but retained title
32 authority (responsibility for National Guard Forces) within the National Capital
Region. The third population was the Joint Forces Headquarters National Capital Region
(JFHQ-NCR). Like the Washington D.C. National Guard, they were also authorized to
provide assistance to civil authorities once an analysis was conducted on the legality,
potential lethality, risk, cost, and appropriateness of the request submitted by the civil
authorities. Unlike title 32 National Guard forces, which required a call-up of personnel
to build the capacity to support civil authorities, the Joint Forces Headquarters had more
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responsive operational forces with limited capability at their disposal to assist in response
and recovery operations if required.
It has been widely accepted in qualitative research that there is no approved
algorithm for determining a sample for research. Researchers have a wide range of
sample figures that may be considered too large, appropriate, inadequate, or inappropriate
(James & Kotrl, 2014). However, with no established criteria for the sample size,
researchers must take into account certain factors such as the size of a population and the
access that the researcher will have to that population. Sedlak, C., Zeller, R., and Doheny,
M. (2002) stated, “The sample size should be large enough to detect an important,
worthwhile, reliable effect, but small enough not to waste resources” (p. 63).
In their article titled “Does Sample Size Matter in Qualitative Research? A
Review of Qualitative Interviews in Research”, Marshall, Cardon, Poddar, and Fontenot
(2013) provided three steps to determine a sample size:
The first and second are external justifications - they depend on other scholars.
The first method is to cite recommendations by qualitative methodologists. The
second method is to act on precedent by citing sample sizes used in studies with
similar research problems and designs [38], The final and third method is internal
justification. It involves statistical demonstration of saturation within a dataset.
(pp. 12-13)
For my research, the sample size deemed appropriate was 10 emergency
managers and 20 participants from the two major military organizations within the
region. As a key characteristic of the convenience sampling method that was used, large
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populations are not required. Additionally, (n = 30) is a homogenous population. Etikan,
Musa, and Alkassim (2015) stated, “Homogenous Sampling would be similar in terms of
ages, cultures, jobs or life experiences. The idea is to focus on this precise similarity and
how it relates to the topic being researched” (p. 3). Though the populations differ in their
primary duty positions, the shared similarity was their experience in planning,
coordinating or executing DSCA operations over a specified timeframe that will be
specified in the eligibility criteria.
There was no formula that would help me determine if I had reached the point of
diminishing returns on the questioning being conducted. From their perspective, Crouch
and McKenzie (2006) suggested that a participant pool of 20 or less is an appropriate
number. Their rationale was based on the belief that by keeping the sample at 20 or less,
the researcher would have ample time to address the participants and establish
relationships which could possibly lead to more information being divulged to inform the
research. However, for my proposed research, I believed it was imperative to incorporate
the lessons of Fusch and Ness (2015) when determining saturation. From their
perspective, saturation should be viewed in terms of rich or thick data, which would
eventually lead to saturation. They stated:
The easiest way to differentiate between rich and thick data is to think of rich as
quality and thick as quantity. Thick data is a lot of data; rich data is many-layered,
intricate, detailed, nuanced, and more. One can have a lot of thick data that is not
rich; conversely, one can have rich data but not a lot of it. The trick, if you will, is
to have both. (p. 1409)
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In my role as a researcher, using a convenience sampling strategy, divested of any
researcher bias, I decided to let the richness of the data determine the point of
diminishing returns.
A comprehensive process for attracting and screening quality participants for the
research could have had a positive or negative impact on the holistic research, depending
on how carefully it was planned. Cosgrove (n.d.) stated in her article titled “Fitting
Round Subjects into Round Holes: The Importance of Eligibility Criteria”:
Frequently called the “inclusion/exclusion criteria”, eligibility criteria specify the
details which precisely define what makes an individual, sample or dataset
appropriate or not appropriate for participation in a study. These criteria are the
ingredients which, when combined, determine the needed participant, sample, or
dataset for a given protocol (p. 1).
Understanding the gravity of the eligibility criteria, careful consideration was
made in ensuring that the appropriate participants were selected for this body of work.
The eligibility criteria for selecting emergency managers was those who occupied
executive management positions in the NCR, with at least five years of emergency
management experience, and who assisted city leaders in requesting DSCA assistance
from their military counterparts.
The five-year criterion was implemented due to the simple fact that there was no
universal criterion for certifying emergency managers. Unfortunately, each state had its
internal criteria for certifying emergency managers. Therefore, the five-year criteria was
used to ensure that the potential participants had a level of experience above those with
an entry-level knowledge, since the latter was not be conducive to the research. The
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eligibility criteria for military organization service members who participated in the
research was officers at the rank of Captain or above. Additionally, senior noncommissioned officers in the rank of Sergeant First Class or above were desired because
of the experience they had in planning or assisting in the planning of DSCA operations.
Participants were authenticated in meeting the selection criteria through a
screening process by their parent organizations and through preliminary interviews that
were conducted before the actual interview session.
Emergency managers consisted of men and women with an age range from 30 to
45 years, with at least five years of experience in emergency management operations.
Additionally, though certification was not a standing prerequisite for obtaining an
emergency management position, emergency managers in the sample had certifications.
These certifications ranged from the actual emergency management certification to those
by federal and state emergency management organizations such as the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
Finally, they had experience in planning emergency management operations for
their jurisdictions and counties. Additionally, this sample also consisted of both
commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers from the DoD. Officers who
participated in the research were college graduates with the rank of Captain or above.
Non-commissioned officers who participated in the study had obtained the rank of
Sergeant First Class or above. Finally, all representatives from the DoD had completed
professional development courses required for all participants to obtain the ranks
previously mentioned and at least 10 years of military duty. Soliciting, identifying,
contacting, and recruiting potential participants for research can be an arduous task that
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requires tremendous patience and resilience. For my research, recruiting was aligned
more with soliciting, which I first initiated with representatives of the organizations that
had direct links to military organizations and emergency managers in the NCR.
Emergency managers were simultaneously identified and recruited from the collective
contact list of emergency managers within the NCR. Once identified, the recruiting
process began with email contact, followed by a scheduled phone conversation which
elaborated on the research. The final phase in the process included office visits with the
potential participant(s) to gain their participation in the research.
Conversely, unlike emergency managers, whom I could contact directly without
any prerequisite screening to determine their feasibility for supporting the research, the
potential military organizations that were solicited for their participation in the research
couldn’t be contacted directly. Prerequisites such as legal reviews, information briefings,
and confidentiality protocols served as precarious barriers for gaining access to a coveted
population that had the potential to inform the research.
Data Collection
Arguably, data collection in either quantitative or qualitative research is one of the
most important – if not the most important – aspects of the research. It is through the
systematic collection of data that the researcher will have the means to answer his or her
research question, inform future research, and potentially influence policies and social
change. Keeping this potential impact in mind, certain protocols and operating
procedures were followed to ensure that cogent and succinct data was used to inform
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intended audience. The data that informs the research can be collected through four
methods: interviews, observations, surveys, and focus groups.
With the accessibility of the populations within the NCR, I used the interview as
the primary means for collecting data to inform the proposed research. Understandably,
with the number of participants from diverse backgrounds, it was not feasible to leverage
observations or focus groups due to the conflict of schedules and the dispersion of the
potential participants. Though surveys were considered, they were viewed as a rigid
instrument that did not provide a medium for a rich dialogue between the researcher and
the participant(s) in order to fully understand the phenomenon of DSCA proficiency.
The task of managing, organizing, interpreting, and protecting the data obtained
through this study was commensurate with protocols and standard operating procedures
that ensured an accurate interpretation of the data obtained from participants. Data
collection was facilitated by the use of several data collection instruments, including
video tape, audio tape, archived data, an open-ended unstructured survey, and an
observation sheet. From several readings, I concluded that using multiple data collection
instruments increased the reliability of the research. This conclusion was rooted in a
fundamental understanding of triangulation. Murphy (2011) stated, “Triangulated
methods of data collection increase the concurrent, convergent, and construct validity of
research. This in turn enhances the researcher's ability to imply trustworthiness of the
analysis” (Murphy, 2011). To further elaborate on this point, Zohrabi (2013) stated:
In order to strengthen the validity of evaluation data and findings, the investigator
should try to collect data through several sources: questionnaires, interviews and
classroom observations. Gathering data through one technique can be
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questionable, biased and weak. However, collecting information from a variety of
sources and with a variety of techniques can confirm findings. (p. 258)
Instrumentation
Though this process was time consuming with the associated responsibilities of
organizing and orchestrating the instruments for data collection, the benefits were
undeniable. Being a novice researcher, the credibility of my research was positioned in a
manner to withstand the scrutiny of those who wished to challenge the content. Next, an
internal system of checks and balances were incorporated to substantiate responses from
the participants, which addressed the dependability of the responses. Furthermore, to
ensure that all instruments were tethered to this specific research, no published
instruments were used. As a disclaimer, it must be noted that it was the researcher’s
responsibility to ensure these instruments were sufficient for the proposed research. If
these instruments were not proofed, their intended purpose would be thwarted and had
the potential to serve as a detriment to the entire research.
There are numerous opinions on how to determine sufficiency in data and in the
instruments used to collect it. Suri (2011) stated, “The logic of data sufficiency is guided
by the synthesis’s perception of what constitutes sufficient evidence for achieving the
synthesis purpose” (p. 73). However, before the determination on data sufficiency is
made, it is imperative for researchers to conduct a pre-test to evaluate the instrument
being used. The purpose of the pre-test is to serve as a trial run for the instrument to
ensure that it can sufficiently capture the necessary data to answer the proposed research
questions coupled with the overarching research question. This step was accomplished by
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soliciting the official Department of Defense DSCA training team to test the instrument
and the research questions that will be answered. Through soliciting their feedback, the
instrument’s sufficiency was improved by reducing ambiguity in the questioning,
validating the content within the instrument, and furthermore, by validating the
instructions that guided the participants on the purpose and directions for using the
instrument (Kielhofner, 2006). As the final action for the instrument, once it was returned
with the recommended changes, the changes were socialized to ensure they were
understood and met the criteria for altering the instrument for greater sufficiency.
As a point of reference for the proposed research, there was no published data
collection instrument used. After reviewing previous research instruments used for
studies on DSCA operations, I concluded that the compatibility of instruments in relation
to the research questions and the follow-on interview questions were not acceptable for
this particular study. Additionally, the DSCA training course instruments used to
determine entry-level proficiency for DoD service members and emergency management
members were considered for use as a published data collection instrument. However,
after attending this course and using the instrument to measure my own proficiency level,
I determined that this instrument was not conducive for data collection. This rationale
was based on the simple fact that this instrument was based on a general proficiency of
DSCA knowledge and not on a narrowed focus on the how and why of proficiency levels,
which was to be investigated by my qualitative research.
Some consider content validity in qualitative research to be ambiguous. This is
“due to the constructivist viewpoint that reality is unique to the individual, and cannot be
generalized” (Biddix, n.d., p. 3). The validity of an instrument measures the effectiveness
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of the instrument to measure what it is intended to measure (Biddix, n.d.). In an effort to
ensure content validity for my research, the nine research questions chosen were sent to
the DoD’s Support to Civil Authority training team. As previously mentioned, this team
is the only sanctioned DoD agency that certifies DoD service members and emergency
management officials in DSCA operations. Their insight and years of knowledge was
essential in ensuring that the instrument was proportionately balanced for DoD service
members and emergency managers to record their DSCA proficiency and the factors that
contribute to an optimal or less-than-optimal proficiency level.
An understanding of the culture and populations in the NCR was carefully
considered during the formation of the data collection instrument. The populations
solicited for the research span numerous jurisdictions with no one entity in charge of the
other. This precarious relationship certainly had connotations that had the potential to
negatively impact the research. Unlike any region in the continental United States, the
NCR has a heterogeneous complexity that involves multiple actors with diverging
interest. Understanding this complexity, and being a member inside the Military District
of Washington, I believed it was important to approach the research with an extended
measure of objectivity. Subsequently, this objectivity was reflected in the instrument
designed for data collection. For the sake of transparency, an additional effort was placed
on ensuring that the instrument did not reflect a biased perception of a particular
population, but was proportionately balanced to measure DSCA proficiency from the
perspective of all populations.
To determine DSCA proficiency in the NCR, a data collection instrument was
developed to facilitate answering the two overarching research questions: (1) Are factors
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such as constrained financial resources and limited access to professional training
courses, contributing to a less-than-optimal DSCA proficiency? (2) Do initiatives such as
collaborative planning and training among emergency managers and their military
mission partners within the National Capital Region affect collective DSCA proficiency?
During the analysis, it was determined that the instruments used to collect data for those
studies would not be conducive for this particular study. Therefore, after determining the
current gaps in the literature that my research attempted to fill, the collection instrument
was developed for the purpose of compatibility.
Content validity in qualitative research is considered to be ambiguous by some.
This is “due to the constructivist viewpoint that reality is unique to the individual, and
cannot be generalized” (Biddix, n.d., p. 3). To determine the content validity in my
proposed research, the instrument was developed from a comprehensive analysis of
Porter’s instrument (used to determine the DSCA proficiency of parishes in Louisiana),
Hayes (2014) instrument (used to determine DSCA proficiency for emergency managers
in the state of North Carolina), and Milliman et al. (2006) research (on determining
DSCA proficiency of emergency managers in the northeastern United States). Though
these instruments were developed to determine emergency manager proficiency, they
provided a blue print for developing an inclusive instrument for both emergency
managers and their military mission partners.
As a disclaimer, it must be understood that there is no one criterion or approved
process to establish the sufficiency of data collection instruments. The Danish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs’ publication titled “Danida Evaluation Guidelines” (2012) stated the
following:
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Sufficiency has to do with the amount of information required to provide
persuasive support for the contents of the evaluation report, i.e. will the collective
weight of the evidence be sufficient to persuade a reasonable person that the
observations and conclusions are valid, and the recommendations appropriate.
Some of the factors to consider when judging sufficiency are:
The quality of the data, i.e. its relevance, reliability and validity;
The significance of the finding and conclusion the data are intended to support,
e.g. how important is it?
How much assurance is intended, e.g. is the evaluation important for
accountability purposes?
What is the risk of making an incorrect observation or reaching an invalid
conclusion?
What is the cost of obtaining additional information in relation to its additional
benefits, i.e. in terms of support for observations and conclusions? (p. 45)
The initial plan was for all data to be collected at the offices and headquarters of
the research participants. The purpose of using the participants’ locations for data
collection was two-fold. First, it was my intent to conduct the interviews in a location that
the participant was familiar with, but still sequestered away from non-participants so that
the participants would feel free to answer interview questions without fear of reprisal.
This protocol would be followed for both emergency managers and their military
counterpart. By building and nurturing this protocol during the research, the bonds of
trust formed truly benefited the study. With regard to collecting the data, the primary
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instrument was the open ended interview with the questions aligned with the two research
questions mentioned previously. The interview questions that guided the interview
session were as follows:
1. Approximately how long have you been in your present job position?
(Adopted from Haynes, 2014)
2. Do personnel in your organization have a general understanding of the
DSCA?
3. Is DSCA training incorporated into your organization’s training plan on a
recurring basis?
4. Does your organization conduct combined DSCA training with your
emergency management or military mission partners in the National Capital
Region? If so, what is the frequency?
5. Does your organization certify personnel in DSCA operations through the
DSCA training course?
6. What factors do you attribute to your organizational DSCA proficiency or the
lack of it?
7. What recommendations would you make to sustain or improve your
organizational DSCA proficiency?
8.

Do organizational financial constraints impact overall DSCA proficiency
within your organization?

9. Does your organization conduct reviews of your internal DSCA policies or the
policies of your counterparts to ensure cogent operations in the event of a
major catastrophic event?

109

Next, to ensure a full collection of the data from participants, each session was
initially planned to be recorded via video and audio. The importance of the tape recorder
was essential in clarifying comments from the participants and transcribing notes into
usable data. The addition of video was to reinforce data collection by aiding observations
as the participants answered each interview question. The combination of audio and
visual recording proved to be essential in Bowman’s (1994) research on “Children use of
Computer-based Interactive Stories”, where he stated:
While audio tape might have been used to capture pupils’ talk, this, on its own,
would not have been enough to answer a research question focused on children’s’
talk, since it is important, again as discussed by Edward and Westgate, to
recognize the potential ambiguities introduced by an analysis based upon words
alone. The video served to provide context, together with the opportunity to
search for meaning in the dialogue and the actions before and after any specific
utterance. (p. 45)
Determining the appropriate data collection frequency had a tremendous impact
on the overall data collection plan. Due to the population size and the volume of data that
was projected to be collected, the correct frequency allowed the researcher the
opportunity to synthesize the data on an incremental basis. This in turn established the
order to decipher themes and trends through an initial open coding analysis. Furthermore,
the appropriate frequency allowed data to be properly transferred into the NVivo system
that was used for coding. Therefore, the frequency initially chosen was to designate the
first two weeks for data collection and the following two weeks for analysis and
uploading data into NVivo. This frequency not only allowed optimal time for collecting
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and analysing data, but it also provided the time needed by the researcher to conduct an
after-action review on the previous interview session, and to figure out how the next
session could be improved for greater proficiency of interaction between the researcher
and the participants.
Coupled with the frequency of data collection is the duration of the actual data
collection event itself. Factors such as the participant’s primary duty position must be
taken into account for duration, time constraints for the use of the venue, and the
proverbial researcher or participant burnout from the event were taken into account.
When placing these considerations into context, I chose to use one hour as the duration
for the data collection event. However, adhering to this protocol made it incumbent on
myself to ensure that proper preparation has been conducted before the event occurs.
Dilley (2000) stated, “The interview is a communication act; interviewers are one of the
actors. The questions forms a script for us to use, but like every good actor we should
know our lines well before the curtain rises” (p. 133).
Follow-up recruitment is not a palatable course of action for researchers, though it
may be required. This is due in part to the time it takes to establish a new strategy and
employ it to gain an optimal level of participants. To prevent this from occurring in my
research, I attempted to mitigate this factor by establishing a research participant pool
with the organization from which I had solicited the initial groups of participants. This
new group was designated as the on-deck group if a primary participant had to be
excused or there was a determination that there were indeed too few participants to fulfil
the data collection requirements for the research (Office of the Human Research
Protection Program, 2012). Furthermore, I was prepared to re-engage the organizations
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that provided the initial participants and articulate why there was a need for more
participants. Additionally, if this course of action did not provide an optimal number of
participants, I was prepared to re-engage the Walden Institutional Review Board for a
potential change to my screening criteria in order to gain the appropriate number of
participants to continue the research (Mansour, 2012).
The protocol for exiting the study was briefed to all participants who were
selected for the study at the beginning of the interview session. Once the interviews were
completed, the following actions were taken. Each participant was briefed on the process
that just occurred so that they understood what happened, how the data they provided for
the research was collected, and how it was transcribed. Additionally, at the completion of
this briefing the participants were afforded the opportunity to review both the interview
questions and the answers that the participant provided during the interview session. It
was during this time that the answers were rechecked for any discrepancies or
clarifications on the answers given. Once this action was completed, the participant
signed a memo stating that the answers provided were given freely without any coercion
or distress. Subsequently, the memo addressed the follow-up procedures as well.
The establishment of the protocol for follow-up procedures must be viewed as
being equal to the initial interview itself. However, the key factor that will determine the
extent of the follow-up interview is the preparation done in the initial interview.
Understanding that many participants had additional duties and responsibilities tied to
their jobs, it was important to me, as a researcher, to ensure that the follow-up interviews
were systematically executed to reduce friction and maintain the relationships that had
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been nurtured during the complete evolution of the interview. As mentioned previously,
once the participants had received their out-brief, they were briefed on the potential for
follow-up interviews. This was done to ensure the accuracy of the data received and
inform participants on the next step towards completing research. I believed this step was
important because it allowed the participant to further establish a link to the research and
it also solidified relationships leveraged in the future research as well; a good experience
can lead to more research participation.
Data Analysis
Gibbs (2002) referred to data collected in qualitative research as a language. In an
in-depth summation on data analysis he stated, “Language not only incorporates the
terminology and vocabulary with which we understand the world, use it and transform it,
but also is the medium by which we convey that meaning or interpretation to others” (p.
1). Patton (2002) viewed data analysis in qualitative research as a process of digesting
raw data and producing a logical meaning from the information gathered, coupled with
the evidence to support the end product.
As the initial data was collected from the research, the process of deciphering and
organizing the data began with transcribing data from field notes and interviews. For
clarification, this process was not confused with coding and sorting, which will be
discussed in the forthcoming entry. This cursory review of the data was conducted to gain
situational awareness from the data and to identify information that may establish links to
the research questions. To this end, Lichtman (2013) he stated:
Most people find it helpful to read through all the material in their folders. In
keeping with the iterative nature of the process, you can begin by reading a
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transcript. Add your thoughts and comments to your Researcher Journal file. It is
okay to use informal writing here. Remember to date your notes. (p. 251)
As a researcher, I unequivocally believed there had to be an initial foundation
established to identify themes derived from the data. Subsequently, it was during this
process that data linked to research questions could be aligned with the appropriate
research question. For example, interviews that were pertinent to the question Are factors
such as constrained financial resources and limited access to professional training courses
contributing to a less than optimal DSCA proficiency (RQ1), were linked to this research,
and therefore, on these field notes and direct observation. The same process was
conducted for the second research question as well. Additionally, data collected that was
not pertinent to the research questions was properly identified and labelled for the actual
coding process within NVivo. Though the data may have not had beneficiary properties
from the initial review, it still had the potential to be valuable during the coding and
sorting process.
The NVivo software program was utilized to assist in the coding process.
However, NVivo was secondary to an open line-by-line coding that I conducted. Though
this process was time consuming, the benefits of conducting this type of coding before
the data is placed into the NVivo software were undeniable. Khandkar (2009) stated, “In
the process of open coding, the concepts emerge from the raw data and later grouped into
conceptual categories. As its build directly from the raw data, the process itself ensures
the validity of the work” (p. 8). For the purposes of coding, collected data such as openended interviews, direct observations from field notes, and archived documents pertinent
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to DSCA proficiency within the NCR were uploaded into NVivo for coding into nodes.
Wong (2008) stated:
Nodes created in NVivo are equivalent to sticky notes that the researcher places
on the document to indicate that a particular passage belongs to a certain theme or
topic. Unlike sticky notes, the nodes in NVivo are retrievable, easily organized,
and give flexibility to the researcher to either create, delete, alter or merge at any
stage. (p. 17)
The benefits of NVivo are undeniable in qualitative research. In my research
NVivo was used to decipher the numerous interviews, observation notes, and audio
recordings. As a member of the computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software
(CAQDAS) group, NVivo has revolutionized how researchers conduct comprehensive
analysis in qualitative research. Wong (2008) stated, “This software allows for qualitative
inquiry beyond coding, sorting and retrieval of data. It was also designed to integrate
coding with qualitative linking, shaping and modelling” (Wong, 2008). Bergin (2011)
further expounded the merits of using NVivo in his research by stating, “NVivo has
always set the standard in qualitative analysis” (p. 7). Once the collected data was
synthesized, it was placed into the NVivo software to start the coding process to assist in
the process of identifying themes that would ultimately help to produce succinct findings
and recommendations.
With a computer-generated software package that removes much of the legacy
manual work from the analysis, researchers have to abstain from indolent research
practices. Understandably, it is still imperative for researchers to conduct a rigorous
initial assessment of the quality of the data received and for possible identification of
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potential themes from the collected data. Wong (2008) reinforced this point stating,
“Ultimately, the researcher still has to synthesize the data and interpret the meanings that
were extracted from the data” (Wong, 2008). By cross-referencing data from interviews,
observations, and pertinent archived documents, coupled with using NVivo to conduct
additional analysis, this systematic form of triangulation certainly aided in producing
cogent results and findings.
Kaplan and Maxwell (2005) alluded to the process of subjectively identifying and
attempting to address discrepant cases in research as a key factor in bolstering the validity
of the holistic body of research. In an effort to provide a comprehensive analysis that
dissects every facet of DSCA proficiency, establishing a protocol for the treatment of
discrepant cases was centred on the following precepts. Before data was determined as
discrepant, a rigorous analysis was conducted by the researcher to cross-reference data
that supported the research and the discrepant data for a final analysis (Bickman, L., &
Rog, D., 2009). It is from this analysis that a determination was made to execute two
courses of actions.
The first course of action was to alter the conclusion based on the final analysis
done to authenticate the discrepant case. Though this may not have been the most
palatable course of action, it was certainly an acceptable course of action because it
reinforced the validity of the research and allowed the data, rather than the researcher, to
guide the research. Subsequently, if that course of action was chosen, steps taken in the
second analysis would be carefully annotated to strengthen the reliability of the research.
The next course of action was to accept the conclusion from the discrepant cases
without modifying the future conclusion. This course of action, which was advocated by
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Wolcott (1990), allowed the researcher to report the discrepant case and enabled the
reader to draw their own conclusions from the research.
Trustworthiness
In both qualitative and quantitative methodologies, trustworthiness is paramount
for advancing the inquiry into the chosen subject area. However, as Cope (2014)
mentioned, qualitative research has been viewed as less rigorous due to a certain degree
of subjectivity and anecdotal reasoning whereas quantitative research is rigid with respect
to the uses of experimental methods. Trustworthiness for my research was ensured by
measures such as triangulation, coding with software to reinforce validity and reliability,
and maintaining a detailed audit trail with the use of NVivo software. In their article
advocating greater trustworthiness in qualitative international business research,
Sinkovics, Penz, and Ghauri (2008) stated:
We advocate formalized procedures of gathering, analyzing and interpreting
qualitative data and discuss these issues in view of the emergence of computer
assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS). Although formalization
and the aim to establish trustworthy research results does not necessarily
presuppose CAQDAS, we maintain that its application enhances the
trustworthiness and thus quality of qualitative inquiry. (p. 691)
Comparatively speaking, trustworthiness equated to credibility for the overall
integrity of the research. If the integrity of the research was called into question, the
findings and results, and subsequent recommendations have little to no impact on DSCA
proficiency within the NCR. Credibility in qualitative research ultimately centers on three
key factors: the rigor implemented to gather quality data, the researcher executing the
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research, and an inherent belief in the value of the qualitative methodology (Patton,
1999).
Credibility
Credibility for this body of work was ensured by conducting a systematic
triangulation of data collected in the research, presenting detailed debriefings to the
research chair and committee members for feedback, providing a thick description of
research, and rigorously analysing the data contributing to the research (Shenton, 2004).
Additionally, credibility was assured by keeping detailed field notes which complement
the researchers’ decision trail and by soliciting feedback from research participants to
ensure that the themes and trends identified were consistent with the research data
provided (Noble & Smith, 2015).
Transferability (External Validity)
Shenton (2004) stated, “The concern often lies in demonstrating that the results of
the work at hand can be applied to a wider population” (p. 69). In Chapter One, it was
revealed that the research centred on determining DSCA proficiency is nascent.
However, along with the recent study conducted by Haynes (2014) and Porter (2010), my
research has the potential to expand the scope of DSCA proficiency. By identifying
threads, trends and themes pertinent to emergency managers and their military
counterparts, follow on researchers can use my research as the baseline to start their
inquiries. With respect to transferability, Thomas and Magilvy (2011) stated, “One
strategy to establish transferability is to provide a dense description of the population
studied by providing descriptions of demographics and geographic boundaries of the
study” (p. 153).
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Therefore, in keeping with their recommendation, a detailed description or thick
description was provided to bolster transferability. This description addressed data
collection methods, the environment in which the research was executed, the participants
and samples used, and my ancillary notes that encompassed the experiences of the
researcher while conducting each phase of the research.
Dependability
In practical terms, dependability in qualitative research was centered on the
simple question that if the research being conducted is repeated by another researcher,
will the same results be obtained (Thomas & Magilvy, 2011)? Commensurate with
dependability in qualitative research is a comprehensive analysis of the methodology,
design, methods, and analyses that have been used to articulate results and findings. To
ensure dependability in my research, three measures identified by Shenton (2004) were
implemented to bolster the dependability of research. The measures were:
a) The research design and its implementation, describing what was planned and
executed
b) The operational detail of data gathering, addressing the minutiae of what was
done in the field;
c) Reflective appraisal of the project, evaluating the effectiveness of the process
of inquiry undertaken. (pp. 71–72)
With the aforementioned measures and a transparent audit trail, the integrity of
the research will certainly withstand scrutiny as it makes a meaningful contribution to
understanding DSCA proficiency.
Confirmability
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Confirmability in qualitative research equates to a holistic audit of the research
that is being conducted. Confirmability for the proposed research on DSCA proficiency
was ensured by the software system NVivo. The software package provided a systematic
audit of the data used and can be reviewed by others who wish to verify the authenticity
of the data. Houghton, Casey, Shaw, and Murphy (2013) used the NVivo system in their
research and stated:
NVivo was able to locate all the passages that matched the criteria set in a query.
Locating ensured that any issue described in the findings was not the perception
of just one person, but rather confirmed that a number of participants held the
same opinion. In addition, this confirmation guaranteed dependability in different
contexts. (p. 15)
Additionally, the audit trail was coupled with field notes or a reflexive journal that
was kept throughout the research. This document captured the researcher’s thoughts and
actions during data collection, and any noteworthy events that occurred while conducting
the research (Koch, 2006; Wallendorf & Belk, 1989).
Inter-coder reliability mandated that there must be at least two researchers who
participate in the coding process, whereas intra-coder responsibilities are conducted by a
single researcher. For my research, I assumed all intra-coder responsibilities (Stacks,
2011). For reliability purposes, it certainly bodes well when there are two researchers
checking the data. However, since this was not the case for my research, it was
incumbent upon myself to ensure that the same reliability was duplicated to ensure
trustworthiness. With this responsibility, the protocol that I used was derived from Smith
(2010), who stated:
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To code only when your mind is fresh and clear and (ii) make explicit notes to
yourself about how and why you categorized the items. These notes might be part
of your content analysis diary. If you find you are changing how to classify
certain items that should be grouped together, you may have to go back and revise
your earlier classification. (p. 213)
Protection of the Participant’s Rights / Ethical
Protecting human subjects during any research is an essential priority for
institutions of higher learning. From mandating training that researchers must attend and
pass, to developing institutional guidelines centred on the protection of human subjects,
researchers and institutions are continuing to develop new protocols and procedures to
ensure that there are no gaps in participant protection. In their introductory course
“Protecting Human Research Participants”, the National Institute of Health (2011) stated:
Research with human subjects can occasionally result in a dilemma for
investigators. When the goals of the research are designed to make major
contributions to a field, such as improving the understanding of a disease process
or determining the efficacy of an intervention, investigators may perceive the
outcomes of their studies to be more important than providing protections for
individual participants in the research. (p. 1)
For my research, steps that were taken to ensure the subjects’ rights to privacy
and protection from harm ranged from viewing the Office of Human Research
Protections website for the latest guidelines and regulations, to consulting with
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institutional review board with research proposals that articulated how the subjects’ rights
and protection would be guaranteed during the actual research.
Subsequently, research could not be conducted until the IRB granted official
approval after the proposal was submitted. Though these steps were certainly beneficial
to the collective research, steps such as reviewing PH 398 and establishing a research
protection checklist were beneficial as well.
This checklist consisted of a series of questions that researchers can align with his
or her research to ensure their research does not have the potential to harm or violate the
rights of the human subject. It began by identifying the potential harm or the possible
violations of participant rights. Once those harms and violations were identified, the
researchers clearly articulated the mitigation measures that were used to eliminate the
harm or potential rights violations. Finally, as an extra precautionary measure, the
researcher expounded on additional safeguards that were used in the research to ensure
human subjects’ rights or any threat of potential injury posed to them was consistently reevaluated to ensure that the mitigation factors mentioned previously remained relevant.
Protecting the rights of participants informing this study was essential for the
integrity of the study. Understanding their contribution was vital for informing the study;
each participant will receive a consent form that served as the precursor for participating
in the research. The consent form disclosed the purpose of the research, the actual
conduct of the research, the participant’s role in the research, and any potential risk that
may be associated with the research. Additionally, the participants were informed that if
at any time they felt threatened or in danger, they could exit the research. Finally, the
confidentiality of the research was discussed in detail to assure the participants that the
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information they provided could not be linked to them, and every protocol would be
established to ensure their identity would be protected. At the completion of this
overview, each participant signed their consent form with the understanding that at any
time, they could ask to be excused from the research.
At the completion of Chapter Three, the oral defence for my proposal was
executed, which was followed by several gates that I had to successfully negotiate in
order to start the data collection phase of the research. Walden University (2015) stated:
IRB approval is required before collection of any data, including pilot data.
Walden University does not accept responsibility for research conducted without
the IRB's approval, and the university will not grant credit for student work that
failed to comply with the policies and procedures related to ethical standards in
research. (Walden University, 2015)
The process of obtaining approval from the IRB took 4–6 weeks. Once the
approval was given, it was explained to me in an official letter that it was good for only
one year. Though this process may have seemed cumbersome due to the time required for
approval, I unequivocally believed it was essential for ensuring the protection of the
participants and for solidifying the integrity of the research.
Treatment of Participants
For my research, the protocols established to eliminate ethical concerns related to
recruitment materials and processes resulted from a combined effort between the
organizations that were being solicited for participation and myself. Recruitment for
participation in any research is essential, and special considerations must be taken into
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account to ensure all ethical concerns are completely eliminated from the equation. With
regard to my research, it was decided that all research participants’ participation would be
on a strictly volunteer basis. Due to certain legal requirements coupled with the research
being conducted by the military, I could not personally solicit members of any
organization to participate in the research. Once the military’s legal review was
completed and the organization agreed to participate, the organization itself disseminated
the requirements for participating in the research. Conversely, with regards to the
recruitment of emergency managers, this protocol was not instituted. Emergency
managers were contacted directly for participation.
Ethical Concerns
Eide and Kahn (2008) stated, “Qualitative research poses ethical issues and
challenges unique to the study of human beings” (p. 199). Coincidentally, as a researcher,
my internal bias, values, and personal background did not allow me to infringe on the
integrity of the research. Rather than artificially inducing bias and personal agendas into
the research, I believed that as a novice researcher I had to follow the direction of the
research rather than establishing predetermined destinations for his or her work. With
regards to my research, the guidance received from the IRB was followed explicitly to
ensure that protections with redundant measures were in place to protect the participants
and the integrity of the research. From a preliminary assessment of the data collection
protocol, there were no identified components that could have potentially led to physical
or mental harm for the participants. Additionally, the consent form for my research
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outlined procedures for stopping the interviews if the participant had an adverse reaction
while the session was in progress.
To address the issue of anonymity, names were not used and all data collected via
interviews, observations, and audiotape were stored in a safe that only I had access to.
Finally, if participants decided to withdraw from the study, they were released without
prejudice from the researcher.
For this study, all agreements were viewed as contracts of protocol between
myself, research participants, and the organizations that provided the participants. With
regards to the federal title 10 organization, a legal review was conducted by the
organizational Judge Advocate to ensure the research did not violate any standing
protocol for title 10 representatives participating in doctoral research. To facilitate the
review, a brief overview was given to the leadership to explain the purpose of the
research and the actual conduct of the research in which their members would be asked to
participate in. This protocol was also followed with the title 32 National Guard
organization that was solicited to participate in the research, and with the emergency
managers in the NCR who were asked to participate in the research as well. Finally, as
part of the process of solidifying the agreements, each organization was assured that they
could withdraw from the research at any time.
For the purpose of this research, all data collected was considered anonymous. As
mentioned earlier, protecting the anonymity of the participants was of utmost importance
throughout the data collection phase and beyond. The measures that were implemented to
ensure discretion were carefully considered, but labelling data as confidential required a
different protocol, especially with the participation of DoD service members. A
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confidential classification required the military to mandate how I would collect, store,
and maintain the data until the classification was removed. This classification would also
determine how the data would disseminated in findings and recommendations. It was for
these reasons that the label “anonymous” was used on all data received, including that
from the emergency managers. As a disclaimer, though the data was not classified as
confidential, it was handled as such to ensure the data and those who submitted it
remained anonymous.
For my research, protocols for handling and protecting the data collected from
participants was considered just as important as the protocols for protecting those who
divulged the data. In essence, protecting the data was protecting the voices of those who I
formed a bond of trust with to decipher a phenomenon worthy of research. Data from this
research was only handled by myself. To ensure protection, no other individual had
access to the safe where recordings and hand-written documentation were stored.
Additionally, a password-protected program was used for the NVivo software, which was
used for coding the data used for the research. Finally, the data was only disseminated if a
request was made by the research chair, the IRB, or participants who wished to clarify the
information that they provided.
From the aforementioned procedures, the protocol for treatment of sensitive data
was addressed to ensure accountability. By ensuring confidentiality and anonymity of the
participants who agreed to take part in the research, and by physically protecting the data
they provided to inform the research, I unequivocally believed that every precaution was
implemented to uphold the researcher’s duties and responsibilities throughout the study.
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Additionally, the legal reviews that were conducted by military organizations also
bolstered protection for their service members.
Presentation of the Results
The presentation of results will be conducted in three phases. The first phase will
begin with a finding briefing to the leadership of each organization that provided
participants for the research. These organizations provided the population for the
research, therefore it is only fitting that they have an opportunity to view the findings and
recommendations before they are submitted to a much wider audience. The second phase
will consist of a briefing to the emergency management governing body of the NCR. A
comprehensive presentation will be conducted to inform the audience on the purpose of
the research, the research problem, data collection, and analysis. The presentation will
conclude with findings and recommendations that are based solely on the research
conducted. Finally, to inform a wider audience on DSCA proficiency in the NCR, a
condensed version of the research will be presented for publication in emergency
management magazines and for publications by military organizations that focus
primarily on defence organizations supporting civil authorities during catastrophic events.
Summary
Chapter Three served as the road map for executing the research. A
comprehensive articulation was presented in defence of the methodology and the case
study design, which was used in previous dissertations on DSCA proficiency. Next, after
explanations that the methodology chapter encompasses the road map as to how the
research will be conducted, the role of the researcher was highlighted to verify a clear
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understanding of the duties and responsibilities that accompany the actual research that
will take place. Responsibilities such as remaining impartial and allowing the research to
provide a road map to answer research questions rather than setting predetermined
assumptions that provide a more palatable outcome composed this entry.
Additionally, the use of the appropriate instrument for collecting data was
addressed to articulate why previous instruments used to measure DSCA proficiency are
not feasible or suitable for this study. Further, it was mentioned that though previous
instruments were deemed insufficient for the study, the instrument that will be used will
be sent to the United States Army DSCA training team for their concurrence or nonconcurrence on the tool’s ability to gauge DSCA proficiency among the populations.
Subsequently, the chapter concluded by describing the population and the sample
size that is projected for use in the research. The rationale for the population and sample
size dictated the data collection and analysis. This section systematically laid out a
process for collecting data through the use of open-ended questions in semi-structured
interviews and analysing the data through an open coding process by the researcher. This
process was further bolstered by an automated coding and sorting process facilitated by
NVivo to bolster reliability and validity. Finally, ethical considerations such as protecting
the confidentiality and the anonymity of those who participated in providing the data for
the research to ensure protocols were addressed to mitigate potential violations that may
degrade the research.
Chapter Four will present the results and the findings gleaned from the research
population used to determine DSCA proficiency within the National Capital Region. The
chapter will also outline the interview question responses and their correlation to the
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research questions. Subsequently, these responses will serve as the precursor for
discussions and recommendations in Chapter Five. Additionally, themes and trends from
the responses will be presented in an effort to provide greater understanding of the
contributing factors that led to an optimal or less-than-optimal proficiency level among
the collective population.
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Chapter 4
Introduction
The purpose of the qualitative case study was to measure the proficiency of
DSCA among emergency managers and their military mission partners inside the NCR.
Currently, no mechanism within the NCR exists that measures DSCA proficiency
between these two populations. Additionally, the research recommendations from Haynes
(2014) and Porter (2010) on DSCA proficiency advocated further research to determine if
the patterns they found are systemic in other regions. Porter stated that,
The researcher recommends an examination of familiarity with the domestic
support mission that DOD forces currently have. Even after recent actions to
assign forces a domestic civil support mission, it is unclear whether DOD units
are equal to the non-warfighting tasks as are NG forces, which perform domestic
support missions much more frequently. (p. 142)
After conducting similar research in the state of North Carolina to measure DSCA
proficiency among emergency managers, Haynes made two recommendations from his
findings. With regard to building DSCA proficiency and establishing baseline standards
for all participants in DSCA operations, he recommended “a rigid program to evaluate
state and local emergency management integration of the military where first responder
training should be funded. In addition, to ensure standards are applied consistently
throughout the emergency management community” (p. 168).
Hayes’ second recommendation, which served as the impetus for my research,
encapsulated the broad scope of DSCA proficiency that must be examined to determine
the underlining variables that holistically affect DSCA proficiency. He stated that:
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Future research should build on this study’s findings by examining emergency
manager’s decision-making processes; military and civilian support structures
(i.e., coordinating organizations, how-to literature, and case studies), public
policies, and social interactions (i.e., learning and using trust and reciprocation for
public good). This research could examine the various layers of emergency
management, and address the gaps in the both the civil and military emergency
planning programs, which could provide valuable information to local, state, and
military emergency managers. A qualitative study could be conducted that builds
on the themes found in this study to improve funding for integration gaps. (p. 170)
In keeping with Hayes’ salient points, this research examined the layers of
proficiency by soliciting emergency managers and members of the military to gauge their
internal DSCA proficiency. The two research questions that guided this inquiry are as
follows:
1. Are factors such as constrained financial resources and limited access to
professional training courses contributing to a less than optimal DSCA
proficiency?
2. Do initiatives such as collaborative planning and training among

emergency managers and their military mission partners within the
National Capital Region impact collective DSCA proficiency?
These two research questions served a primary purpose to validate, challenge, or
present extenuating circumstances in comparison to other studies on DSCA proficiency.
Their value in the research was integral throughout and certainly aided in the content.
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The research method for my research did not follow the plan that was initially
presented. Originally, the plan was to interview participants from a Title 10 organization
(active duty military), Title 32 (Army National Guard), and emergency managers from
within the NCR. After receiving approval from the Walden Institutional Review Board
(IRB; approval #09-27-16-0482079) to conduct my research, each organization was
contacted to solidify participation. However, as I learned during the solicitation, in order
for U.S. Army organizations to participate in research, the Army Research Protection
Office (AHRPO) must review the proposed research. This protocol was implemented to
ensure that the research did not infringe on the rights or well-being of those in the
military solicited to participate in research outside of the DOD. The approval process
from the AHRPO began with an official review of my Walden IRB application once it
was approved, submission of a curriculum vitae, interview questions for the potential
participants, and a signed approval letter from the military organization solicited. Once
these documents were submitted, it was explained to me that even though the prospective
military organizations had initially agreed to participate in the research, a legal review
had to be conducted to ensure that participant protections were safeguarded. This
approval process began in July 2016, and I was officially notified that my research was
approved on October 13, 2013.
Unfortunately, as I waited for the permission from the AHRPO, my proposed
face-to-face interviews were changed as well. This change occurred due to my
assumption of new responsibilities in the Middle East. I immediately informed the
Walden IRB and submitted a change in procedure form, which was approved on
November 4, 2016. After receiving permission from the Walden IRB to alter the research,
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I informed the potential participants that the interviews would have to take place over the
phone, and that follow-ups would be conducted via email. The participants of Title 10
organization scheduled their interviews over a 2-week period, while emergency managers
scheduled their interviews over a 3-week period. In the process of scheduling the
interviews, I was informed that the primary Title 32 organization solicited for the
research was designated as a lead organization for the 2017 presidential inauguration.
This distinction was coupled with a massive planning and execution effort, which
guaranteed that their participation in the research would not happen. In an effort to find a
viable replacement, a different Title 32 organization was solicited. Unfortunately, the
alternate Title 32 organization was designated for an operational deployment to outside of
the continental United States. This development meant that my research would only
consist of emergency managers in the region and a Title 10 organization within the NCR.
Finally, I had to ask the Walden University IRB to expand the age requirements for
emergency managers to participate in the research and for permission to use Nvivo 11
instead of Nvivo 10. This request was made due to younger emergency managers
assuming the roles of director of emergency management in key counties and
jurisdictions inside the NCR and a newer version of Nvivo being available for data
analysis. I received formal approval for these requests on December 11, 2016.
Setting
The setting for the research centered within the NCR. The NCR is not the
immediate area within and around Washington DC. This region comprises seven counties
(Frederick, Montgomery, Prince Georges, Loudon, Fairfax, Prince William, and Charles),
with independent emergency managers leading daily emergency management operations.
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These emergency managers are beholden to their states and not to any entity within the
NCR. Additionally, within the region, there are six major Department of Defense
installations: Marine Base Quantico, Fort Belvoir, Fort Lesly J. McNair, Joint Base
Myers Henderson Hall, Joint Base Anacostia Bolling, and Joint Base Andrews in
Maryland. These organizations conduct a full spectrum of military operations ranging
from military ceremonies at Arlington National Cemetery to greeting foreign dignitaries
arriving in the United States.
Unfortunately, inside the NCR, there is no single command or organization that
controls emergency management operations. Due to federal restrictions, as outlined in
DSCA directives, federal organizations such as the military forces within the region
cannot provide support to local governments until there is an official request by the local
government authorized official. Until such a request is submitted, local jurisdictions have
full control of managing the incident on the ground. Subsequently, though military forces
may deploy to a jurisdiction when additional assistance is requested, local authorities
maintain operational control.
During the course of gathering data for the research, many of the participants
were conducting major planning operations for the 2017 presidential inauguration, which
affected their participation in the study. Though some organizations had greater
responsibilities than others due to their proximity for scheduled events, as a collective
group, their primary focus was to ensure their internal organizations are prepared for
scenarios that could negatively impact the inauguration. Some of the organizations
experienced a significant influx of personnel to facilitate operations, while others only
experienced a minimal influx of personnel to augment staffs for operational readiness.
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Understanding the complexity of orchestrating this event through seamless execution,
many of the organizations participated in numerous rehearsals to ensure that all
participants had a common operational framework for the inauguration. Planning and
rehearsals were conducted internally to determine deficient areas that required changes to
operating procedures. As the lead planning organization for this event, Title 10
organization hosted numerous symposiums and conferences to ensure that each
organization understood its primary duties and responsibilities.
Though the 2017 Inauguration planning was not a catastrophic event synonymous
with DSCA operations, the planning and preparation were certainly indicative of major
DSCA operations. Furthermore, with the potential for hostile acts directed against local
populace and dignitaries in attendance, it was imperative for all the involved
organizations to develop succinct plans designed to mitigate multiple hostile acts. Simply
stated, the inauguration itself was the forcing function that provided emergency managers
and their military counterparts with the opportunity to solidify coordination and
familiarize each organization with their counterpart’s operational capability for
responding to a potential catastrophic event. Philips (2009) stated, “Coordination means
more than providing information about what is happening…[It] means that all
stakeholders are informed about and allowed to participate in the process” (Phillips,
2009, p. 64).
Additionally, Joint Publication 3-28 entitled DSCA stated that
Non-DOD actors, including local civil authorities and first responders, are
frequently not familiar with US military terms, definitions, and doctrine. When
working with non-DOD actors/partners, especially in an emergency situation,
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clear, effective, and mutually understandable communication is essential. DOD
elements will be able to work much more seamlessly, efficiently, and
productively by employing operational concepts and terms that other departments,
agencies, and authorities already understand. (p. 1)
Demographics
Seven counties, two jurisdictions, and the District of Columbia form the
geographical boundaries of the NCR. No single entity or seat of power governs the
region. Each county has autonomy to conduct its daily operations without operational
reach or directives from a higher seat of power. However, to ensure that there’s a form of
cooperation across all spectrums of governments in the region, each member voluntarily
participates in the Metropolitan Washington County of Governments. According to their
website (Metropolitan Washington County of Governments, 2016), “COG connects
leaders across borders to help shape strong communities and a better region. Every
month, more than a thousand officials and experts come to COG to make connections,
share information, and develop solutions to the region’s major challenges.”
These challenges also include emergency management operations, which have a
certain degree of difficulty due to the numerous federal, state, and local responders in the
region. For the purpose of this research, each county lead emergency manager except for
one, voluntarily participated and provided essential data to determine DSCA proficiency
in the region. Emergency managers ranged in age from 36 to 57 years (Table 1). The
longest serving emergency manager had a 17-year tenure, while the shortest tenure was
just 10 months. All the emergency managers were certified through an emergency
management course, but none of the participants received certification in the official
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DSCA training course. Lastly, two emergency managers who participated in the research
were directors for the largest counties in their state.
Participants of the Title 10 organization were all above the rank of Sergeant First
Class, which was a desired selection criterion. This rank was optimal for the research
because officers and non-commissioned officers at or above this rank have completed
numerous professional development prerequisites, which speaks to their level of maturity
and proven leadership. The shortest tenure of service was of 14 years and the longest was
of 30 years (Table 2). All the members of the Title 10 organization were certified in the
DSCA training courses (Phase I and II), and the range of time in their current duty
positions ranged from 6 months to three and a half years. Lastly, each member of the
organization had participated in a DSCA training exercise, but no participant had
experience in planning, organizing, or executing an actual DSCA event.

Table 1
Emergency Management Participants

Participant

Age

EM01
EM02
EM03
EM04
EM05
EM06
EM07
EM08

46
45
57
36
45
36
41
65

Time in
position
14 years
1 year
5 years
10 months
17 years
7 years
4 months
8 years

CEM

DSCA Certified

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
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Table 2
Military Participants

Participant
MM01

Years of
service
24

Rank

DSCA
Certified

Lieutenant
Colonel
Major
Lieutenant
Colonel
Lieutenant
Colonel

Yes

Time in
Position
15 months

MM02
MM03

14
17

Yes
Yes

6 months
3 years

MM04

27

Yes

3 and 1/2
months
2 and 1/2
months
16 months
18 months

MM05

22

Lieutenant
Colonel

Yes

MM06
MM07

30
25

Colonel
Lieutenant
Colonel

Yes
Yes

Data Collection
For this research on DSCA proficiency within the NCR, the desired population
was n=30. However, as the data collection phase began, this number was reduced by 10
participants due to the absence of the Title 32 organization. Next, the participation of 10
emergency managers was reduced to eight participants. It should be noted that the eight
emergency managers were the primary directors for emergency management operations
in their counties and jurisdictions within the NCR. The Title 10 organization solicited for
the research provided seven participants. Once again, due to planning for the 2017
presidential inauguration, three initial participants could not participate in the research.
This development further confirms why the selection of a convenience sample was
optimal. The final number of participants was n=15.
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I collected data for this study over a 5-week period. The original collection plan
was to conduct face-to-face interviews with each participant at their offices, asking openended questions with the aid of voice and video recorders to capture the content from the
interviews. Unfortunately, due to extenuating circumstances, the data collection plan was
revised to facilitate due to the fact that I was geographically removed from the research
participants. To ensure that my research stayed within the guidelines of the Walden IRB
protocol, I immediately informed the Walden IRB and submitted a Request for Change in
Procedure form. Additionally, separate from the Request for Change in Request form, I
also had to change my participant consent form to ensure that face-to-face interviews
were changed to telephonic interviews with email as the means for follow-up questions.
After a 2-week waiting period, I received permission to begin the research with the
changes I requested.
Novich (2008) stated, “Respondents have been described as relaxed on the
telephone, and willing to talk freely and to disclose intimate information” (p. 393). For
my interview protocol, interviews lasted from 45 minutes to one hour.
The two-primary means for recording data were recorded telephone interviews
and the researcher’s field notes taken while asking open-ended interview questions. As
the participants answered the interview questions, their responses were recorded on a
recording device that served as one of the two official records for conversations.
Subsequently, to facilitate line-by-line data analysis, field notes were also taken. Before
conducting each interview, participants were informed that the data they were providing
was being recorded and field notes were being taken. Though these recording methods
proved to be very effective, in several instances, I had to ask the participants to speak
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clearly or project their voice, so that the data being recorded could be properly
transcribed. As a key after action point, researchers should not assume that their data
recording plan is impervious to deficiencies just because they are recording the
conversations. If the participants have a low monotone voice, there’s a probability that
the conversations will not be clearly recorded, which adds additional time to deciphering
and confirming information from the interview sessions.
Additionally, at the conclusion of each interview, the participants were given the
opportunity to review their answers from my field notes, in order to ensure the
information they provided was correct. After confirming the data provided was accurate,
the data was stored in preparation for the follow-on data analysis.
During the collection of data, there were several unusual circumstances that I
encountered before and during this phase of the research. Surprisingly, the Department of
Defense participants were more forthcoming with discussing their planning, coordination
procedures, and practices than their emergency management counterparts. On several
occasions, emergency managers who participated in the research wanted to confirm my
credentials through several means before divulging information on their knowledge of
DSCA operations. Furthermore, this was done even after I presented my IRB approval to
conduct the research.
In one case, a participant wanted to call the Walden University Dean of the Public
Policy to confirm if I was a student conducting research. In many cases, the emergency
managers were very direct on areas they would not discuss during the data collection
phase of the research. However, in their defense, these circumstances should not serve as
an indictment against the emergency managers who participated. Understandably, with
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prevailing security concerns at the local, state, and federal levels of government, I
unequivocally understood their caution. Finally, it should be noted that when applicable, I
was able to satisfy all the requests for additional information.
The below interview questions were asked to measure the proficiency of DSCA
and overall knowledge of DSCA operations among emergency managers and their
military mission partners. In addition to the original interview questions, two subquestions were added to provide greater depth on DSCA proficiency. As previously
mentioned, during the data collection phase of this research, preparations were under way
for the 2017 presidential inauguration. Therefore, an additional sub-question was added
to determine if the presidential inauguration refocused the efforts of the emergency
managers and their military mission partners on collective DSCA operations within the
NCR.

1. Approximately how long have you been in your present job position? (Adopted
from Haynes, 2014)
2. Do personnel in your organization have a general understanding of the DSCA?
3. Is DSCA training incorporated into your organization’s training plan on a
recurring basis?
4. Does your organization conduct combined DSCA training with your
emergency management or military mission partners in the NCR? If so, what is
the frequency?
5. Does your organization certify personnel in DSCA operations through the
DSCA training course?
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6. What factors do you attribute to your organizational DSCA proficiency or the
lack of it?
7. What recommendations would you make to sustain or improve your
organizational DSCA proficiency?
8. Do organizational financial constraints have an impact on overall DSCA
proficiency within your organization?
9. Does your organization conduct reviews of your internal DSCA policies or the
policies of your counterparts to ensure cogent operations in the event of a major
catastrophic event?

Sub-questions
1. Has the planning for the 2017 presidential inauguration fostered greater
emphasis on DSCA planning?
2. Do you believe it is value added for an organization executing DSCA
operations within a shared region collaborate in planning to ensure a common
understanding of roles and responsibilities?
3. Do you believe collective planning and training or lack of it affects collective
DSCA proficiency in the NCR?

Interview participant’s responses
EM01
EM01 provided a very candid assessment of DSCA proficiency within his area of
responsibility and the NCR. He had 14 years of experience and was not a graduate of the
DSCA certification course. When asked whether personnel in his organization have a
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general understanding of DSCA, he stated yes. However, when EM01 was asked if
DSCA training is incorporated into the organization’s training plan on a recurring basis,
he stated, “No, not really because every time we’ve requested military assets, I’ve usually
been the individual that has done that. As a matter of fact going back, we’ve only made
those requests 3 times in the last 14 years.” EM01 also confirmed that no member of his
staff had attended the DSCA.
R1. Are factors such as constrained financial resources and limited access to
professional training courses contributing to a less than optimal DSCA proficiency?

EM01’s response indicated that there were no financial constraints inside his
organization, which led to a less than optimal proficiency. Furthermore, the lack of access
to professional training was not identified as a contributing factor to a lack in DSCA
proficiency. When asked interview question 6—what factors do you attribute to your
organizational DSCA proficiency or the lack of it—EM01 stated, “A lack of it is based
on the fact that we never really need it except for snow storms when we need high-profile
vehicles.”
R2. Do initiatives such as collaborative planning and training among emergency
managers and their military mission partners within the NCR affect collective
DSCA proficiency?
When asked if his organization conducts combined DSCA training with his
emergency management of military mission partner in the NCR, EM01 stated, “We
haven’t really done a lot of training with our military partners. Occasionally, we will do
exercise or participate in exercise with Marine Base Quantico, but outside of this, it has
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been very limited.” As a precept to collaborative planning, it’s important for
organizations to understand their organizational plans and the plans of their counterparts.
When EM01 was asked if his organization conducts reviews of internal DSCA plans, he
stated, “No, not really, we do have a military annex in our emergency operations plan,
but quite frankly, we have never seen any military plans at all.” This response led to subquestion 2, in which EM01 stated the following:
Yes, absolutely. It’s important for us to know what the military can bring to the
table and also it’s important for the military to know what kind of civilian assets
that we can use to assist them in their mission because at the end of the day, all
are working on the same problem. We just don’t want to work it cross purposes,
which we have seen historically in large-scale disasters.
MM04
MM04 was very forthcoming on DSCA operations inside his organization and the
NCR. With three and a half years of experience in his current position as a planner, he
was a graduate of the DSCA training course. He also acknowledged that it was
mandatory for new military members in his organization to enroll in DSCA phase I and
phase II certification courses. MM04 believed that attending the mandatory DSCA
certification classes was a key component for his organizational DSCA proficiency.
When asked if DSCA training is incorporated into the organization’s training plan on a
recurring basis, he stated the following:
“Yes, DSCA training in the sense of planning and coordination at the staff level.
So, what the staff does through command post exercises add to the planning and
preparation of events and DSCA operations.”
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MM04 also provided insight on how his Title 10 organization uses National Security
Special Events (NSSE) as a training tool for DSCA operations. According to Federal
Emergency Management Agency Center for Domestic Preparedness:
When an event is designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security as a National
Special Security Event (NSSE), the Secret Service assumes its mandated role as
the lead agency for the design and implementation of the operational security
plan. The Secret Service has developed a core strategy to carry out its security
operations, which relies heavily on its established partnerships with law
enforcement and public safety officials at the local, state, and federal levels. The
goal of the cooperating agencies is to provide a safe and secure environment for
Secret Service protectees, other dignitaries, the event participants, and the general
public. There is a tremendous amount of advance planning and coordination in
preparation for these events, particularly in the areas of venue and motorcade
route security, communications, credentialing, and training. (FEMA, n.d.)
In the NCR, a NSSE normally ranges from the annual State of the Union
addressed by the president to a summit by world leaders in the Washington DC area.
During NSSEs, the Title 10 organization normally fills requests for assistance for
national federal agencies such as the Secret Service. These requests can be for a specific
piece of equipment or personnel trained on a specific military task. If the Title 10
organization does not have the asset or the capability being requested, they request their
higher command, which is United States Northern Command, to requisition the asset or
desired capability through the Global Force Management process.
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R1. Are factors such as constrained financial resources and limited access to
professional training courses contributing to a less than optimal DSCA proficiency?
When asked if financial constraints contribute to a less than optimal DSCA
proficiency, MM04 stated, “Yes, to conduct a large-scale or even a medium-scale
exercise would cost money and for an organization, who’s going to pay for it either kills
the idea of a large-scale exercise or holds it up in planning”. Contrarily, MM04 did not
indicate that limited access to professional training courses contributes to a less than
optimal DSCA proficiency. Lastly, MM04 attributed his organization’s DSCA
proficiency to the current coordination efforts with local and state emergency managers
and the collective participation of emergency managers and the military in exercises and
steering committee meetings.
R2. Do initiatives such as collaborative planning and training among emergency
managers and their military mission partners within the NCR affect collective
DSCA proficiency?
Through his responses for interview questions 4, 9, and sub-question 2.1, MM04
conveyed that collaborative planning and training within the NCR affects DSCA
proficiency. He stated, “Yes by the exercise environment at least once a year we exercise
with the local district, and Virginia county emergency managers on a case-by-case basis.
Depending on NSSE’s we conduct planning exercises, rehearsals of concept drills, and
table top exercises with local Virginia county Maryland county, District of Columbia
local emergency managers.” MM04 believed these planning and training initiatives had a
positive impact on DSCA proficiency. This belief was also consistent throughout several
military members responses.

146

EM02
EM02 was the second emergency manager who participated in the research. He
was 45 years old, with 1 year of experience in his current position. Like EM01, he was a
certified emergency manager, but had not attended the DSCA training course. When
asked if personnel in his organization have a general understanding of DSCA, he stated,
“I have information on DSCA, but I would not go as far as to say that I fully understand
the request process.” Furthermore, personnel in his organization were not certified in the
DSCA training course. Like EM01’s organization, EM02 noted that DSCA training was
not occurring in his organization. In his response, he noted that in his relative short
tenure, “I have not seen it since I’ve been here.”
R1. Are factors such as constrained financial resources and limited access to
professional training courses contributing to a less than optimal DSCA proficiency?
EM02 did not indicate that constraints of financial resources were a contributing
factor to his organization’s proficiency. However, he made a point that though there were
no financial constraints inside his organization, his organization had a responsibility to
prioritize what training programs they want to pursue to ensure financial resources were
used to improve deficient areas. Regarding what factor attributes to his organizational
DSCA proficiency or the lack of it, EM02 believed the negative contributing factor was
the constant turnover of personnel. He stated, “Within this region, it would have to be the
turnover. Within my office, there has been a lot of turnover, so I think not only from the
public side but form the military side as well; we’re constantly trying to learn each
other.”
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R2. Do initiatives such as collaborative planning and training among emergency
managers and their military mission partners within the NCR affect collective
DSCA proficiency?
EM02’s responses clearly led to his belief that collaborative planning and
planning affected DCSA proficiency within the NCR. He noted that in an effort to
improve planning and training with the military, he was currently in the process of
designing future training exercises with the military. For sub-question 1, EM02 believed
it was imperative for organizations executing DSCA operations in a shared region to
collaborate on planning operations to ensure a common understanding of roles and
responsibilities. This response was further amplified in sub-question two, but not
specifically toward the NCR. When asked if he believes collaborative planning and
training has an impact on collective DSCA proficiency in the region, he generalized
without directly assessing the impact on the region. He stated, “Yes, training definitely
improves preparedness mitigation operations and recovery and a lack of it does the
opposite.” With regard to the impact on the NCR, EM02 did not provide a definitive
answer because he wanted to have more interaction with his counterparts before making
an assessment.
EM03
EM03 was 57 years old, with exactly five-year tenure in his current position as
the lead emergency manager for his county. EM03 had completed his certification and
was at the time of the interview pursuing his PhD. EM03 acknowledged that personnel in
his organization did not have a general understanding of DSCA or attended the DSCA
certification course. Subsequently, DSCA training was not incorporated into his internal
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training plan on a recurring basis. EM03 clearly articulated that his organization would
not request support directly from the military, which is admissible under DSCA policies.
EM03 noted that if such a case were to arise, he would submit his request to the
Maryland Emergency Management Agency (MEMA). This response served as a
precursor for his responses on DSCA.
R1. Are factors such as constrained financial resources and limited access to
professional training courses contributing to a less than optimal DSCA proficiency?
EM03 did not convey constrained financial resources as a contributing factor to
his organization’s less than optimal DSCA proficiency. Additionally, access to the
professional training courses such as the DSCA training course was not perceived as a
contributing factor. From his viewpoint, DSCA operations have not been historically
exercised in his county. Furthermore, his protocol for requesting military assistance
requires him to forward an official request for assistance to his higher chain of command.
Therefore, DSCA operations were not an operational task that he felt were a priority for
his organization.
R2. Do initiatives such as collaborative planning and training among emergency
managers and their military mission partners within the NCR affect collective
DSCA proficiency?
Similar to EM02, EM03 provided general responses to the research question two.
As alluded to earlier, his organization did not conduct combined DSCA training with his
military counterparts. Furthermore, when asked what factors he attributes to his
organization’s lack of DSCA proficiency, he stated “I don’t know if a reach from the
NCR has been made to all the locals from the military and vice versa, that can work both
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ways. At the federal level, we do a lot of interaction with the feds.” EM03 also noted that
even at the state level of government, in which his county was subservient to,
conversations on DSCA were not taking place. When asked sub-question two, EM03
stated, “Any training that is done and not coordinated throughout the region would have a
negative impact on DSCA.”
MM05
MM05 had 22 years of military service and 2 and a half years of experience in his
current duty position. Like other military members who participated in the research, he
attended the DSCA training course and confirmed that it was indeed mandatory for all the
members of his directorate to attend the DSCA training course. MM05 also confirmed
that DSCA training was incorporated into his organization’s training plan. The training
he referred to was the NSSE inside the NCR, where planning and coordination took place
for real world events such as the State of the Union addresses, which include DSCA
planning. With regard to his overall opinion of DSCA operations in the region, he stated
the following:
This headquarters does a good job in my opinion with working command post
exercises and the tactical level piece with some of the specialized units around
here. Where we have gaps is incorporating our higher headquarters inside these
exercises, and there is no actual involvement with any of the locals; that’s a huge
gap in our training.
He further expounded on key factors to improve collective proficiency through efforts
such as getting local authorities to recognize the value in these training exercises as an
imperative. Ironically, this comment coincides with EM03 and EM02’s comments, where
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they conveyed that their organizations do not normally participate in DSCA exercises
with the military.
R1. Are factors such as constrained financial resources and limited access to
professional training courses contributing to a less than optimal DSCA proficiency?
With regard to financial constraints, MM05 believed that constrained financial
resources lead to a less than optimal proficiency. He stated:
We don’t have the money to contract out for more simulation; we don’t have the
money to allow the staff to go 24/7 for a sustained period of time. Those two are
the biggest factors from a financial standpoint that limit us in our ability to train
for DSCA.
R2. Do initiatives such as collaborative planning and training among emergency
managers and their military mission partners within the NCR affect collective
DSCA proficiency?
MM05 provided rich and thick responses to the interview questions corresponding
to research question two. When asked interview question 4, MM05 stated the following:
We do minimal in the regard of planning and training; it’s mostly within some of
our specialized units inside this headquarters. Our subordinate units do conduct
training with some of the local units, but as a whole, this organization does not do
regular training with the local authorities. We have a relationship with them, but
from an actual training aspect, no.
With regard to interview question 6, his response echoed with previous comments from
military members about his organization in general. His comment mainly focused on
specialized training conducted by his organization. He stated:
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This headquarters does a good job in my opinion with working command post
exercises and the tactical level piece with some of the specialized units around
here. We do that annually; there’s an annual training level exercise we have tried
to expand to include using CBIRF (Chemical, Biological Incident Response
Force).
MM05’s response to sub-question 1 further amplified the importance of
organizations in a shared region collaborating in planning to ensure a common
understanding of roles and responsibilities. When asked the question, he stated, “Yes, it’s
very important. If you don’t train together to work through the grey area on game day,
you won’t be effective.”
MM02
MM02 was the newest member of the Title 10 organization who participated in
the research. With 14 years of military experience and 6 months’ experience in his
current duty position as a planner, MM02 had completed the DSCA phase I and II
certification. MM04 was the first to rate the DSCA certification case, which he had
recently attended. He stated that
On a scale of 1 through 10, 1 being the lowest and 10 being the highest, I would
rate it as a 7 or 8. It gives a basic understanding of what DSCA is and they try to
relate it to your specific mission for your organization. Having no DSCA prior
experience was great for me.
Though MM02 was the junior member of his organization, he believed his
organization had a general understanding of DSCA. During the short tenure, MM05 said
that DSCA training was incorporated into his organization’s training plan on a recurring
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basis. He stated, “It’s part of the initial training plan once you get on board, but once you
start working it every day, I guess yes its part of the training plan, but not formally, but
more of an on-the-job type training.”
R1. Are factors such as constrained financial resources and limited access to
professional training courses contributing to a less than optimal DSCA proficiency?
Understandably, due to MM02’s short tenure in his current position, he had no
frame of reference for financial constraints or limited access to professional courses
directly contributing to a less than optimal DSCA proficiency. He divulged that he had
not observed any instances where a lack of financial resources contributed to a less than
optimal DSCA proficiency.
R2. Do initiatives such as collaborative planning and training among emergency
managers and their military mission partners within the NCR affect collective
DSCA proficiency?
MM02 noted that maybe twice a quarter, his organization conducted combined
arms training with his organizational counterparts. However, when asked interview
question six, he clarified his statement by saying, “I’ve been here in my job for the first
six months; I really haven’t dealt too much with the first responders or emergency
managers.” When asked interview question nine, MM02 provided details about his
organization’s DSCA policies review, but noted that there was no systematic review of
the policies of his emergency management counterparts. This revelation was also made
by EM02, who stated this was indeed the case in his emergency management
organization. These two interviews provided insight on how the organizations in the
region do not understand their counterparts polices for DSCA.
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EM04
EM04 had the second shortest tenure of all emergency managers who participated
in the research, which was 10 months. He was 36 years old and certified in emergency
management operations through a national certified emergency management course, but
he was not a graduate of the DSCA training course. EM04 revealed that his organization
was loosely familiar with DSCA because the training his organization conducted was
with his state National Guard. However, due to his contact with the state National Guard
only, his organization had no interaction with federal Title 10 authorities. This response
was similar to that of EM03, who was an emergency manager in the same state with a
similar standard operating procedure for interacting with the state National Guard
juxtaposed to Title 10 military forces. Furthermore, like EM03, EM04 clarified that his
parent organization would make all requests for assistance for support required outside of
the State National Guard. Finally, EM04 divulged that his organization had no DSCA
policy or procedure until after a major snowstorm earlier this year.
R1. Are factors such as constrained financial resources and limited access to
professional training courses contributing to a less than optimal DSCA proficiency?
Constrained financial resources were not a contributing factor for DSCA
proficiency of EM04’s organization. EM04 stated, “We’re pretty fortunate in our county
in terms of both being a part of the Urban Area Security Initiative, which is a DHS ran
program, that affords us a fair deal of Homeland security related and emergency response
related funding.” EM04 also alluded to limited access being a contributing factor to a less
than optimal DSCA proficiency. With his state organization conducting the
preponderance of DSCA operations, EM04 believed he didn’t know enough about the
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encompassing DSCA process, which could be addressed in a professional DSCA training
course.
R2. Do initiatives such as collaborative planning and training among emergency
managers and their military mission partners within the NCR affect collective
DSCA proficiency?
EM04’s organization did not conduct combined DSCA training with his military
mission partners in the region. However, he did state that there are coordination meetings
with the state National Guard liaison officers. Though there are several military
installations in the region, EM04 stressed the point that the only military was Walter
Reed Medical Center. When asked interview question 6, EM04’s response was that since
the state buffered interaction with the federal military, there was no need to incorporate
principals of DSCA. However, when asked sub-question three, EM04 said that
collaborative planning and training had an impact on collective proficiency in the NCR.
Furthermore, he believed that proportionality wise, counties and jurisdictions closer that
were to military installations were probably more proficient than those without
installations.
MM07
Like MM05, MM07 was a supervisor in the Title 10 organization participating in
the study. He had 25 years of military experience, with an 18-month tenure in his current
position as the training and exercise director. MM07 was certified in the DSCA training
certification course, and he noted that 75% of his subordinates had attended the DSCA
certification courses. Like most participants in the Title 10 organization, he believed his
organization had a general understanding of DSCA. Like MM02, MM07 believed that the
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DSCA certification course was a major factor that attributed to his collective
organization’s DSCA proficiency.
R1. Are factors such as constrained financial resources and limited access to
professional training courses contributing to a less than optimal DSCA proficiency?
When asked about constrained financial resources having an impact on DSCA
proficiency, MM07 stated the following:
To date, not necessarily because oftentimes when we participate with other
agencies, we are able to tap into a broader money pool and interestingly enough,
if we don’t include those agencies, we are actually much more restricted.
Historically, we haven’t had to curtail or shut down training because of funds.
Finally, there were no indications that limited access to professional training
courses were a contributing factor to a less than optimal DSCA proficiency.
R2. Do initiatives such as collaborative planning and training among emergency
managers and their military mission partners within the NCR affect collective
DSCA proficiency?
MM07, who served as the lead training and exercise director for his organization,
divulged that his organization conducted combined DSCA training with local emergency
managers maybe twice a year. He stated the following:
We need to do one more semi-annual exercise. Annually, we have a really sexy
annual exercise with them; the other one, there is some tangential participation,
but it’s less rigorous than the other exercises. I think if we had two of those high
impact heavy-density interagency plays per year, then we would increase our
proficiency at such a point where we would be a T (trained) across the board. In
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the band of excellence, we have peaks and troughs and potentially because we
only have one major exercise involving those folks (local emergency managers)
that the troughs tend to be a little longer than the peaks.
Finally, when asked sub-question 3, MM07 stated, “I would say so; certainly the more
one contributes, it’s positive, and the less one contributes, it’s negative.” MM07, caveat
to this point, was in a recent training exercise, where there was a huge disagreement
among participants discussing how to care for local populace that is affected by a
catastrophic event. He noted that collaborative planning and training certainly helped
reveal the gap, but it also exposed a deficiency that had to be shelved because there was
no viable solution to the problem set, as every organization had a different plan.
MM03
MM03 was one of the longest tenured members of the military organization who
participated in the research. MM03 had spent three years in his current duty position as a
planner and a total of 17 years of military service. He, like other military members, had
attended the DSCA certification course and believed his organization had a general
understanding of DSCA. MM03 was the first respondent to reveal that before each
NSSE, his organization participated in organizational DSCA professional academics
training. This training reinforces organizational responsibilities for DSCA operations
should a need occur within the NCR.
R1. Are factors such as constrained financial resources and limited access to
professional training courses contributing to a less than optimal DSCA proficiency?
MM03 noted that there was a financial constraint, which led to a less than optimal
DSCA proficiency. Due to a lack of funds, equipment could not be purchased to enable
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communication for real world DSCA operations. This admission was unique because
other admissions focused more on training, while this admission focused on equipment.
MM05 divulged this information that was made known by his immediate chain of
command.
R2. Do initiatives such as collaborative planning and training among emergency
managers and their military mission partners within the NCR affect collective
DSCA proficiency?
When asked interview question 4, EM03 stated the following:
“Our Police Management Protective Division does do some on-site and off-site
clearing buildings with other SWAT teams here in the area. So they do some
DSCA support to other law enforcement agencies here in the area. We do some
with Fairfax fire, but at the headquarters level, we don’t do a whole lot of
exercises.
Unlike other military respondents, MM03 attributed his organization’s DSCA
proficiency to the long-standing relationships with local agencies (federal, regional, and
cities). When asked interview question six, he stated, “They know our capabilities and
can request the capabilities we can perform for them.” However, MM03 was very direct
in saying, “This is helpful, but our permanent or available assets for DSCA are very
limited. So, we have a very limited scope of DSCA support without augmentation.”
Finally, MM03 revealed that his organizational policies were reviewed by his higher
headquarters, but there was no mechanism in place to review the policies of local
emergency managers or vice versa. Additionally, there was set time for his organization
to review their internal polices.
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EM05
EM05, at age 45, was the longest serving emergency manager of all emergency
managers who participated in the research. He had a 17-year tenure in his current position
and was certified in emergency management operations, but not the nationally recognized
certified emergency management course. EM05, nor any of his subordinates, attended the
DSCA certification course; however, EM05 did believe that key personnel in his
organization had a general understanding of DSCA due to his interaction with the
National Guard. Lastly, EM05 noted that though DSCA training is not conducted in his
organization regularly, it is reviewed regularly due to his affiliation with the state
National Guard.
R1. Are factors such as constrained financial resources and limited access to
professional training courses contributing to a less than optimal DSCA proficiency?
EM05 did not attribute constrained financial resources as a contributing factor to
his organization’s less than optimal DSCA proficiency. However, like his
contemporaries, he believed limited access to professional courses was a contributing
factor.
R2. Do initiatives such as collaborative planning and training among emergency
managers and their military mission partners within the NCR affect collective
DSCA proficiency?
EM05 noted in his interview that his organization does not conduct combined
DSCA training with his military mission partners. When addressing DSCA proficiency
among counties and jurisdictions in the NCR, EM05 stated, “One factor is that when you
don’t have a military installation within your community, you are not as proficient or
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knowledgeable as a jurisdiction or community that does have a military installation in
their region.” While addressing sub-question three, EM05 stated the following:
I would definitely say planning and training enhance proficiency and if you’re not
able to plan, when you write and develop plans, and be in a position to
operationalize them, then you absolutely lose the ability to be proficient and you
lose the effectiveness when you need to utilize the plans. It’s a key element or a
core element of success to be in a position to work collaboratively in planning and
training to ensure proficiency.
EM06
EM06 was 36 years of age with seven years of experience in her current position
as county emergency manager. She also had two years of experience as a county
emergency manager in another county. EM06 was certified in her state as a certified
emergency manager, but had not attended the DSCA certification course. For a frame of
reference, EM05’s county was the farthest county from the NCR, but there were military
organizations in her county. Additionally, EM06 was in the same state as EM05 and
EM03. Like her contemporaries, EM06 stated that her organization did not have a basic
understanding of DSCA because her state mandated how counties would request assets
should the need arrive. For greater context, EM06 noted that until the governor of her
state signed an emergency declaration, the request for assistance would be considered
invalid.
R1. Are factors such as constrained financial resources and limited access to
professional training courses contributing to a less than optimal DSCA proficiency?
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EM06 did not identify constrained financial resources as a contributing factor to
her organization’s less than optimal DSCA proficiency. However, access to the training
course was one factor that led to the organization’s lack of knowledge. She stated, “I had
no idea that this training existed.”
R2. Do initiatives such as collaborative planning and training among emergency
managers and their military mission partners within the NCR affect collective
DSCA proficiency?
EM06 revealed that her organization used to participate in some of the military
exercises inside her county. She stated the following:
We used to participate in some of their exercises, but it’s been a few years since
they invited us to do that. I think the last one was around the 2011–2012
timeframe; they did it every year and we would participate by standing up our
emergency operations center. However, we haven’t done that for a number of
years.
When asked sub-questions 2 and 3, EM06 was reticent to answer because due to
the nascent knowledge of DSCA operations, she believed she could not answer the
questions. Furthermore, since her county was the farthest away, she believed her county’s
priorities were drastically different than those closer to the epicenter of the NCR.
EM07
EM07 was the director of emergency management for his state’s largest county in
his state. He was 41 years of age, with a state certification for emergency management
operations. As with his counterparts, he was not a graduate of the DSCA training course,
but he admitted that he did receive a briefing on DSCA years ago. He further stated that
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in the brief, the presenters divulged what assets were available and how they could be
used. EM07 did not clarify if other members of his organization had a general
understanding of DSCA. EM07’s county was in close vicinity of a military installation,
and he stated that his organization had established a relationship with the installation.
R1. Are factors such as constrained financial resources and limited access to
professional training courses contributing to a less than optimal DSCA proficiency?
When asked interview question 8, EM07’s response differed from that of other
emergency managers’ responses who participated in the research. He stated, “On a
preparedness side, no; on a response side, me asking for something, and getting a bill,
there may be some impact on why I wouldn’t go the DSCA route.” Next, limited access
to professional training was determined to be a contributing factor to a less than optimal
DSCA proficiency. Like his fellow emergency managers in other regions, he believed
since there wasn’t a high frequency in planning or training for potential DSCA operations
with federal forces, there was simply no need to attend professional training courses.
Therefore, the tertiary impact was a lack of DSCA knowledge that was directly attributed
to not attending the course. As a caveat to this response, EM07 clearly articulated that his
primary link to military assets was his state National Guard and not Title 10 forces.
R2. Do initiatives such as collaborative planning and training among emergency
managers and their military mission partners within the NCR affect collective
DSCA proficiency?
EM07’s response to interview question 4 was intriguing in the sense that his
organization provided training to the military organization within his county. This
training was not necessarily DSCA training, but a training that could potentially lead to a
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common understanding as to how each organization is organized for conducting
emergency management operations. He stated the following:
We assist our nearest military installation in training, but not everyone else. We
kind of help them fortify their emergency management program and any kind of
training we have they can attend. They have asked us to assist them with their
emergency operations center structure and provide them recommendations. This
is kind of a one-way street because during things like snow operations, they may
ask for assistance from us.
Though the training provided by EM07’s organization is not considered DSCA by
definition, it certainly showed the importance of cooperation and training, which builds
relationships that can be leveraged during a catastrophic event. Finally, when asked subquestion 3, EM07 replied
Yes, when we’re doing response operations or recovery operations; we want to try
and utilize any resource we can to help and alleviate the problem we are dealing
with, and if the best way to do it is through the request to the military for DSCA,
that is something we should be doing and that is something we should be training
for.
Finally, though EM07’s organization was providing training to his military counterparts,
he admitted there was no protocol in place to review their counterparts’ policies or vice
versa.
EM08
EM08 was the last participant interviewed for the research. He was 65 years of
age, certified as an emergency manager through a certified emergency management
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program, and had an eight-year tenure in his current duty position. EM08’s knowledge of
DSCA operations was vastly different from his contemporaries. He understood the
principles of DSCA and explained that prior to his interview, his organization conducted
a major DSCA exercise with his military counterparts in the region. EM08 also divulged
that due to his proximity to several key military installations within his county, he is in
constant communication with his counterparts. Though his experience was sharply
different from his fellow emergency managers, he did state that he does not certify
personnel through the DSCA training course.
R1. Are factors such as constrained financial resources and limited access to
professional training courses contributing to a less than optimal DSCA proficiency?
EM08 did not believe that constrained financial resources affected his DSCA
proficiency, but he certainly believed that emergency managers should have greater
access to professional courses to build proficiency. As his counterparts alluded to, EM08
believed that since most states are the approving authority for requesting assets if
required for a catastrophic event, local counties and jurisdictions feel there isn’t a need to
pursue professional training.
R2. Do initiatives such as collaborative planning and training among emergency
managers and their military mission partners within the NCR affect collective
DSCA proficiency?
EM08 believed that collaborative planning and training had a deep impact on
DSCA proficiency inside the NCR. As an example of collaborative planning and training
at the highest levels, he gave an example of a major planning and training exercise that
occurred at the Pentagon: “We table-topped an exercise for three days before the
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Thanksgiving week. During the exercise, we had DOD and the USNORTCHOM
involved in the exercise.” EM08 was very adamant that there could be no replacement for
collaborative planning. Additionally, another important factor to planning and training is
the relationships that are built because of collaborative planning and training. When
asked sub-question 3, EM08 stated
Yes, I believe that many of the emergency management agencies and even local
government agencies are not sure what DSCA is all about, what the capabilities
are, and how they can get it. This is because we have to go through the states to
access these assets, and I think it kind of hampers it.
To fully understand the evolution of DSCA, I compared my interview responses
to the responses of a study conducted by Milliman, Grosskopf, and Paez (2006) titled
“Emergency Managers’ Views on Improving Defense Support/Military Assistance to
Civil Authorities”. Their primary focus was centered on understanding the role of
education for emergency managers in Military Assistance to Civil Authorities, which
later evolved into DSCA. The below comments are from respondents 10 years ago.
Ironically, the responses provided then still resonate today. The respondents stated
• “Educate all emergency managers on what is available from MACA and how to
access it.”

• “We have only had one briefing in the five years that I have been Public Safety
Director for my county that explained MACA and the resources, capabilities, etc.
that the military overall can provide. I would urge a more visible and detailed
informational briefings to emergency managers.”
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• “Today, very few county officials know about or can access the MACA process.
Emergency managers should be provided with specific information regarding the
program and how to access the system.”

• “Need to continue to develop working relationships throughout the year between
localities and MACA representatives so when a large event occurs, localities will
already be familiar with the MACA system and its representatives before the
crisis occurs.”

• “If I have received information on MACA, it was overlooked, so I am not sure
of what benefits MACA would have for my community…”

• “TELL US WHAT RESOURCES THEY HAVE AND HOW TO BEST
ACCESS THEM.” (Caps by the survey respondent). (p. 5)
Data Analysis
The coding process began with a line-by-line coding analysis of 15 interviews
conducted with emergency managers and members of a Title 10 organization within the
NCR. To understand the true essence of this important first step in coding, Thomas
(2003) stated, “Inductive coding begins with close readings of text and consideration of
the multiple meanings that are inherent in the text (Thomas, 2003, p. 4). Though this was
very time consuming, it gave me a greater appreciation for the data and a general
direction to start the code to categorize them into theme evolution. As I read each
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interview, I highlighted salient points from the data documents, which evolved into my
initial codes. From my personal analysis, I was able to extract 13 potential nodes, which
were planning, partnership, training, information, collaborative planning, state
requirements, relationships, communication, cooperation, National Guard, certification,
policies, and resources. The next step was to upload all interviews into NVivo to build a
word search and text search query of phrases to facilitate the evolution from codes to
potential themes. Special instructions were written for the Nvivo 11 program to conduct
specific word and text searches.
After conducting the first word query, I further defined my search by eliminating
certain words from the query. Eliminating words with limited to no value for the followon queries made the data more digestible. As a caveat, it was important to understand that
because certain words may be weighted more than others in the word search, it does not
necessarily mean that the words that weight more are automatic themes. For instance, in
my initial word search, DSCA, training, organization, and military were heavily weighted
and ultimately formed new nodes for possible themes; however, they were not
automatically designated as themes. Subsequently, it was also important to eliminate
repetitive words from the interview questions. From my first analysis of the word search,
I noticed that some words heavily populated the search results. It was not until I reviewed
the actual interview questions that I determined that the words were from the interview
questions. These two examples clearly show why researchers must constantly refine their
data analysis to ensure that they are clearly and accurately deciphering what the data is
communicating. If this process is not followed the result of the research will be in
accurate which calls the integrity of the research into question.
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After conducting the second word query, NVivo 11 identified the frequency of the
words used from the interviews (Table 3). After reviewing the findings from Nvivo 11, I
then conducted a tree map and cluster analysis. According to Kaefer, Roper, and Sinha
(2015), “Tree maps help us to visualize one or more attribute values within the data.”
After analyzing the outputs, I conducted another line-by-line analysis of the interview
questions. This may have seemed redundant, but as a novice researcher, I wanted to make
sure no relevant information is lost in the transition from my line-by-line coding to Nvivo
11.

Table 3
Nvivo Word Count
Word
Training
Organization
Military
Emergency
Proficiency
Operations
Planning
State
Course
Response
Financial
Management
Contributing
Exercise
Managers
Professional
Factor
Certification
Impact
Limited

Length
8
12
8
9
11
10
8
5
6
8
9
10
12
8
8
12
6
13
6
7

Count
103
67
52
44
43
30
28
23
20
20
19
18
17
16
16
16
15
14
14
14
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Understanding
Access
County

13
6
6

14
13
13

Finally, I looked for stemmed words, synonyms, specialization, and
generalization in all the interviews conducted. The next step was to develop categories.
The categories I selected were relationships with military installations, outreach from the
military, need for exercises, lack of DSCA knowledge, authority to request assistance,
lack of policy reviews, combining training in the NCR, and funding impacts on DSCA.
To complete the evolution, I began the process of identifying potential themes by
reviewing the summary tab for all interviews under designated nodes. After reviewing the
references surrounding the weighted words, my personal analysis, and text search
queries, the following themes were extracted: education, state authority, relationships,
exercises, funding, and policy review (Table 4).

Table 4
Themes with Participants’ Responses
Participants

Responses Aligned with Themes

Education
EM01

We need briefings from the military on assets available and
response times.

EM02

I didn’t know there was a course called DSCA.

EM03

We need to have a better understanding of DSCA.
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EM04

These questions have raised questions for me. The federal military
is a big unknown, which makes it challenging. It is as if they are a
black box.

EM06

I had no idea about DSCA training.

EM08

I think we need to start with education. Most emergency managers
don’t understand what is available and how to implement it;
education first and then look for other ways to incorporate DSCA.

State Authority
EM03

If I’m requesting resources, my request goes to the state and not to
the NCR. So within the state, the Maryland Emergency Agency
will request any type of military assets. So we don’t have as a local
agency no direct connection with any military assets.

EM04

The state buffers our interaction with the military. They believe it
is their responsibility to request assets. Therefore, this leads to our
lack of DSCA proficiency.

EM05

We never encountered a situation where we needed any assets
from the active duty military. We request assets through the state.

EM06

The only time we can request any assistance is if the governor has
signed an official emergency declaration.
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Exercises
MM01

We need to improve with more outreach and exercises.

MM02

Improve exercises with local agencies. Our exercises are focused at
the federal level.

MM02

We need to emphasis the importance of interagency exercises. We
need to do a semiannual exercise.

EM06

We used to participate in some of their exercises, but they haven’t
asked us to participate recently.

MM07

We do not conduct exercises with our partners. We have not
exercised the whole staff in our organization. Half of the people in
our command don’t understand DSCA.

Relationships
MM01

That is actually increasing where we are working with emergency
managers. In fact, this week I was just at a modelling simulation
with Arlington County. How often does this happen; may be once
a year.

MM02

We haven’t dealt with local emergency managers.

MM03

We don’t do a whole lot with our local emergency management
partners.
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MM06

We need to improve local coordination with the National Guard
and state’s emergency managers.

EM03

I don’t know if the outreach has been made by the NCR and vice
versa.

EM05

A critical factor for us is not having Department of Defense
facilities or installations within our county. I think you will find
that counties without military installations are not as proficient as
county emergency managers who do have them.

Funding
MM01

Financial constraints do hold us back from participating in some
events.

MM03

Some units do not have equipment that could facilitate their DSCA
operations.

MM04

Large-scale DSCA exercises would cost, and most of the time they
are killed in planning.

EM05

When the governor signs a declaration, the National Guard is free.
Therefore, cost would be a consideration when using the active
duty military.
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MM07

We don’t have the money to contract out simulations or have
exercises that last for longer periods of time.

Policy Reviews
EM01

We have a military annex in our plan, but I have not seen it.

MM02

We do not review local level plans. I would consider it as a
deficient area for me.

EM03

We have no policies on DSCA planning.

EM04

I would suggest we have not reviewed other jurisdiction policies.
It’s a sound idea, and I think we should do it.

MM03

At the local level, there is no review of our plans.

MM04

The only policies reviewed by us is at the federal level. Personally,
I have not reviewed a policy at the state, local, county, or city
level.

MM05

No, we do not review our local partners’ policies. We exchange
business cards and that is about it.

Training
EM01

We have not done a lot of training with our military bases. Only
Marine Base Quantico.
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EM03

No, I can’t remember being in any type of DSCA training.

MM05

If you don’t train together to work through the gray areas on gameday you want be efficient.

MM06

Local emergency managers should be included in our DSCA
training as well.

MM07

We do minimal training with local emergency management

EM05

We don’t conduct any formal training with our counterparts.

EM07

Whoever is responsible for DSCA training needs to bring it to the
NCR. We need briefings on reoccurring basis.

A key component of qualitative research is to identify and analyze data for
negative or discrepant cases to ensure validity of the research (Maxwell, 2005). For the
scope of my research, there were no discrepant cases identified.
Evidence of Trustworthiness
Evidence of trustworthiness in qualitative research perceivably endures the eyes
of scrutiny more so than quantitative research. According to Shenton (2004), “Although
many critics are reluctant to accept the trustworthiness of qualitative research,
frameworks for ensuring rigor in this form of work have been in existence for many
years” (p. 63). Evidence of trustworthiness for my research began with the process of
ensuring that the responses from the participants were accurately captured, which
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eliminated any interpretation of a response. A key factor in this process was reading the
responses back to the respondents, who confirmed that their responses were accurately
written and recorded.
Credibility
Credibility for any research is paramount when presenting key findings and
having the research potentially scrutinized by fellow researchers and those who may
benefit from the findings. For the purpose of this research, credibility was ensured by first
screening the participants and allowing them to exit the study. Shenton (2004) believes
this step is imperative to ensure research credibility. He stated the following:
In particular, each person who is approached should be given opportunities to
refuse to participate in the project so as to ensure that the data collection sessions
involve only those who are genuinely willing to take part and prepared to offer
data freely. (p. 66)
Next, credibility was further ensured by a personal line-by-line coding and the
coding by Nvivo 11. This triangulation ensured the data was extensively scrutinized to in
turn ensure that correct codes, categories, and themes are derived from the data. This later
ensured accuracy in answering the research questions that guided the research. Finally,
credibility was ensured by the researcher’s knowledge of DSCA operations. This
knowledge was obtained by being certified in DSCA phase I and phase II courses. This
certification is also coupled with two and a half years of experience serving as a DSCA
planner. Finally, it was further bolstered by planning and conducting exercises with
numerous federal, state and local civil authorities who were solicited to provided data for
this research.
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Transferability
Transferability for this research was ensured through several measures. The first
measure was to ensure a rich and thick description of multiple aspects of the research
from the literature review through data collection and analysis. According to Anney
(2014), “Thick description involves the researcher elucidating all the research processes,
from data collection, context of the study to production of the final report. Thick
description helps other researchers to replicate the study with similar conditions in other
settings” (2014, p. 278). Next, by using Nvivo as a computer-assisted qualitative data
analysis software (CASDQ), a detailed audit trail was established for future researchers
to apply, to further explore DSCA proficiency. As a caveat to the audit trail, it’s
imperative for researchers to ensure that the data collected and analyzed is as accurate as
possible. Simply stated, research, qualitative or quantitative, is predicated on trust, trust
that one researcher executed due diligence through rigorous scrutiny of his/her data,
which can ultimately serve as the foundation for future research to further explore the
phenomenon.
Dependability
Dependability, as with the aforementioned transferability, was assured by using
Nvivo 11. Using this CASDQ has been extremely beneficial for researchers since its
inception. In their article titled “Rigor in Qualitative Case Study”, Houghton, Casey,
Shaw, and Murphy (2013) stated the following:
NVivo provided a record of decisions during the analysis phase of the CsL
research. These findings were illustrated in the final research report. In addition,
the dependability and confirmability of the data were demonstrated by running
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queries within the qualitative data analysis software. NVivo was able to locate all
the passages that matched the criteria set in a query. Locating ensured that any
issue described in the findings was not the perception of just one person, but
rather confirmed that a number of participants held the same opinion. (p. 15)
As a summation to this facet of trustworthiness, Nvivo provided an audit trail for
my data analysis, but more importantly, the evolution from theory to research findings
were reviewed by the researcher’s committee chair, committee member, and University
Research Reviewer for soundness. Though their review is not an example of a stepwise
replication used to measure dependability, it certainly aids dependability when seasoned
researchers authenticate the integrity of the research in its entirety.
Confirmability
After completing the research, there were no requirements to adjust confirmability
strategies expounded upon in chapter 3. Confirmability was first ensured through the
initial stages of data analysis. Before data codes were placed into Nvivo, the researcher
conducted a line-by-line analysis of 15 interviews to identify potential codes, categories,
and themes. After this process was completed, instructions were written for Nvivo to
conduct word searches and phrase queries to ensure that the initial researcher’s analysis is
sufficient. After the results were presented, the word searches and phrase queries were
expanded to ensure that there was no omission of potential codes that could have made a
contribution to the code, categories, and theme evolution. By executing this form of
triangulation, the potential for researcher bias was reduced, which is a key component
that bolsters confirmability. Next, confirmability was achieved by actively searching for
negative or discrepant cases in the research. Once again, this measure was taken by the
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researcher to ensure that every facet of the data collected and analyzed is taken into
account before producing findings and recommendations.
Findings of Research Question 1
Research question 1 was formulated to determine if factors such as constrained
financial resources and limited access to professional training courses contribute to a less
than optimal DSCA proficiency. Interview questions five and eight were used to answer
this research question. When these questions were asked to each participant, there was a
clear disparity among emergency managers and their military mission partners. Of the
eight emergency managers who participated in the research, none reported constrained
financial resources as a contributing factor to a less than optimal DSCA proficiency.
Contrarily, of the seven Title 10 participants, who provided 72% of the data (five out of
seven), reported that constrained financial resources did have an impact on DSCA
proficiency, while one participant with a short tenure in the organization could not make
an assessment. MM04 stated the following:

Yes, to conduct a large scale or even medium scale exercise would cost money
and for an organization, who’s going to pay for it either kills the idea of a largescale exercise or holds it up in planning.

We don’t have the money to contract out for more simulation; we don’t have the
money to allow the staff to go 24/7 for a sustained period of time. Those two are
the biggest factors from a financial standpoint that limit us in our ability to train
for DSCA.
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MM03 noted that there was a financial constraint, which led to a less than optimal
DSCA proficiency. Due to a lack of funds, equipment could not be purchased to enable
communication for real world DSCA operations. This admission was unique because
other admissions focused more on training, while this admission focused on equipment.
MM03 divulged this information that was made known by his immediate chain of
command.
MM07 was the only military respondent who believed that constrained financial
resources did not contribute to a less than optimal DSCA proficiency. He stated that
To date, not necessarily because oftentimes when we participate with other
agencies, we are able to tap into a broader money pool and interestingly enough,
if we don’t include those agencies; we are actually much more restricted.
Historically, we haven’t had to curtail or shut down training because of funds.

When asked if limited access to professional courses such as the DSCA training
course contributes to a less than optimal DSCA proficiency, no Title 10 participant
identified this as a contributing factor. As alluded to earlier, all Title 10 participants had
completed DSCA phase I and II of the DSCA certification courses before participating in
this research. Furthermore, as a point of clarification, this was not a criterion to
participate in the research. Emergency managers aligned with their military mission
partners by divulging access to professional DSCA courses was not a factor contributing
to their lack of DSCA proficiency. This was surprising because most emergency
managers had not heard of the DSCA training course which is the only institution that
provides DSCA training.
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Findings of Research Question 2
R2. Do initiatives such as collaborative planning and training among emergency
managers and their military mission partners within the NCR affect collective
DSCA proficiency?
Interview questions 3, 4, 6, 9, and sub-question 3 were used to provide an indepth analysis of this research question. I felt it was not only necessary to answer this
research question but to understand the underpinning of the research question through
carefully designed research questions. In her article titled “Preparing for Interview
Research: The Interview Protocol Refinement Framework”, Castillo-Montoya (2016)
stated, “A researcher wants intentional and necessary interview questions because people
have complex experiences that do not unravel neatly before the researcher. Instead,
helping participants explain their experiences takes time, careful listening, and intentional
follow up” (p. 812).
For instance, interview question three asked participants if DSCA training was
incorporated into their reoccurring training plans. This question was designed to first
understand each individual organization’s training on DSCA. The findings showed that
46% of respondents stated that DSCA planning was incorporated into their existing
training plans, while 53% stated it was not incorporated. Interview question four asked if
the participant’s organization conducts combined DSCA training with their emergency
management or military mission partners in the NCR. If so, what is the frequency? The
purpose of this question was to gauge the frequency of the DSCA training occurring
among the organizations participating in the research. About 79% of respondents stated
that their organization did conduct combined training with their military or emergency
management partners, while 20% stated they did not. When asked to clarify the training
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conducted, responses ranged from once a year training exercises and organizational briefs
to detailed tabletop exercises conducted bi-annually.
Deeper analysis revealed that some of these events couldn’t be classified as
DSCA training. For instance, EM07 alluded to a walk through with a military
organization in his region to show them a basic layout for an Emergency Operation
Center (EOC). Though this gesture is certainly beneficial for building partnerships, it
would not be combined with DSCA training because there is no minimal dialogue on
processes or procedures for requesting, receiving, and integrating assets in a DSCA
operation. However, a key finding from this question was that nearly all agreed training
frequencies need to improve, which is evident from the responses under the training
theme. Interview question 6 provided a medium for participants to determine which
factors contributed to their organization’s DSCA proficiency or a lack of it, if financial
constraints or access to professional training were not the key factors. More importantly,
it gave the participants an opportunity to divulge potential root causes for their
organization’s DSCA proficiency or a lack of it. As expected, answers were wide ranging
as Figure 3 shows.
Table 5
Emergency Managers’ Quotes from Interview Question 6
Emergency
Managers’
Responses
We never need it
Turn-over of people
Out-reach between the military and EMs
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The state buffers our interactions
The state requests those assets
Relationships
No idea about DSCA training
No DOD facilities near us
Military Members’
Responses
DSCA training
Relationship with organizations that have a stake DSCA
Long standing relationship with local and federal agencies
Current coordination with local and state EMs; our current
plans
DSCA phase II; frequency of DSCA planning
Command post exercises
DSCA training

The responses from Table 5 clearly showed disproportionality among the two
populations as to what factors they think contribute to their DSCA proficiency or a lack
of it. Emergency managers felt they were clearly deficient by their responses, while their
military counterparts felt they were proficient when responding to which factors they
attribute to their DSCA proficiency.
Interview question nine—does your organization conduct reviews of your internal
DSCA policies or the policies of your counterparts to ensure cogent operations in the
event of a major catastrophic event—served an essential purpose as well. Irrespective of
training and planning taking place among the organizations who participated in the
research, I felt it was equally important to determine if these organizations also had
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DSCA policies to mitigate the effects of a catastrophic event. Subsequently, if they did,
do they review these policies or the policies of their counterparts to ensure cogent
operations and succinct coordination if a catastrophic event occurred. Training and
planning are certainly essential, but policies dictate the constraints, limitations, and
standard operating procedures, from which training and planning promulgate. Once
again, responses fell along population lines. All military respondents stated that they did
review their internal DSCA policies, but did not review the policies of their emergency
management counterparts in the region. Emergency managers who participated did not
have internal DSCA policies and did not review the policies of their military members.
Finally, sub-question 3 (Table 6) summed up the feelings of the participants on
research question two.

Table 6
Quotes from Sub-question 3

Participant

MM04

Quotes from Participants

Yes…absolutely. Collaborative planning and training involving “The
Whole of Government” ensures the exercising of proficiency in
Communications, Resource Allocation, and Procedural Compliance (with
regard to Policy and Authorities). T10 (DOD) forces bring the “High
Demand-Low Density” capability and forces that civilian agencies may
require in a disaster; therefore, continuous collaborative planning and
training is essential to mission success.

183

MM07

I would say so; certainly the more one contributes, it’s positive, and the
less one contributes, it’s negative.

EM05

I would definitely say planning and training enhance proficiency and if
you’re not able to plan, when you write and develop plans, and be in a
position to operationalize them, then you absolutely lose the ability to be
proficient and you lose the effectiveness when you need to utilize the
plans. It’s a key element or a core element of success to be in a position to
work collaboratively in planning and training to ensure proficiency.

EM07

Yes, when we’re doing response operations or recovery operations, we
want to try and utilize any resource we can to help and alleviate the
problem we are dealing with, and if the best way to do it is through the
request to the military for DSCA, that is something we should be doing
and that is something we should be training for.

Conclusion
As a frame of reference, I previously served as a planner in the NCR.
Understandably, my nearly three-year tenure shaped many of my opinions of DSCA
proficiency in the region. However, the findings from this study gave me new insight into
why my myopic evaluation of DSCA in the region was not reflective of reality. The
findings that promulgated from the data clearly provided context for the two overarching
research questions. It was truly surprising to see that five of seven military participants
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believed their organizational proficiency was affected by the constraints to financial
resources. From executing more inclusive exercises with emergency managers focusing
on building DSCA proficiency, to purchasing equipment to aid the military in actual
DSCA operations, there was clear evidence of financial constraints having an impact on
DSCA proficiency.
Subsequently, when evaluating access to professional courses, these findings were
consistent with my personal observation, which was that most attendees were in the
military or were affiliated with the military. This dynamic was certainly reflected in the
research after the data revealed that all military participants had attended the course
(100%), while none of the emergency managers had attended the course (0%). In his
research on emergency manager’s DSCA proficiency in the state of North Carolina,
Haynes’ research revealed that
None of the 10 managers reported they had formal DSCA education. Seven of the
10 managers (70%) reported they were not well educated on DSCA policies and
guidelines. The data supports both literal and theoretical repetition. First, five of
10 (50%) respondents revealed they were confused by policies and guidelines.
One respondent when asked whether she knew the purpose of DSCA, the
manager reported, “No, not really. It’s to assist the civil authorities – like the
name says?” (p. 129)
These findings would certainly suggest that emergency managers are
disproportionally represented where DSCA education is concerned. As a planner in the
NCR, I would oftentimes wonder why emergency managers or their subordinates would
not attend numerous planning sessions and symposiums on DSCA planning. The study
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conducted by Haynes and my current research would suggest there is certainly a need to
build emergency managers’ baseline knowledge of DSCA. However, after conducting my
research, I found that their lack of participation was not predicated on their unwillingness
to learn or be good partners in the region; it was because of extenuating circumstances
unbeknownst to the military. Since their state emergency management offices provided
guidance, standard operating procedures, financial resources, and state assets to help
them mitigate the effects from catastrophic events, there was no need to affiliate with
large-scale DSCA planning and training. Once again, Haynes’ research also had similar
findings. He stated, “Nine of the 10 respondents (90%) reported they generally depended
on the state for effective coordination” (2014, p. 132).
As alluded to earlier, during the time this research took place, planning was
underway for the 2017 Presidential inauguration. Understanding the scope and scale of
the event, I thought it was value added to gauge emergency managers and their Title 10
active duty military partners on its impact toward DSCA operations. When asked
research sub-question 1, 10 out of 15 (66%) respondents believed the 2017 presidential
inauguration fostered greater emphasis on DSCA planning, while 5 out of 15 respondents
(33%) believed the inauguration did not foster greater emphasis on DSCA. Those who
thought the inauguration fostered greater emphasis on DSCA operations cited greater
cooperation and collaboration among organizations in the region. Contrarily, those who
believed the inauguration did not foster greater emphasis on DSCA had a different
viewpoint. Their response mainly centered on geography and past history. Since most of
their counties were outside of the NCR epicenter, and they had no previous engagements
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with the military with regard to DSCA, their assessment was that there was no greater
emphasis.
Another key finding consistent among the collective population was the belief of
collaborative training inside the NCR and its relationship to DSCA proficiency. This
belief was captured by EM07, who stated that “I would definitely say planning and
training enhance proficiency and if you’re not able to plan, when you write and develop
plans and be in a position to operationalize them, then you absolutely lose the ability to
be proficient.” Though training and planning initiatives among the two populations were
not as regular or extensive as many would have liked, they all agreed it was essential for
preserving DSCA proficiency. Furthermore, as the responses for sub interview question 2
showed, they also believed that each entity should understand the other’s roles and
responsibilities in the region. This belief was captured in EM02’s response:
Yes, absolutely. It’s important for us to know what the military can bring to the
table and also it’s important for the military to know what kind of civilian assets
that we can use to assist them in their mission because at the end of the day, all
are working on the same problem.
The data provided for this study gave tremendous insight into DSCA operations
inside the NCR. While each member of the research population was certainly committed
to protecting local populace should a catastrophic event occur, their candid responses
have provided a foundation for collective dialogue on improving planning, cooperation,
training, and forging relationships to build a stronger DSCA apparatus in the region.
Understandably, each member of the population will certainly protect their internal
equities. States will not absolve themselves of their responsibility for providing guidance
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to their county emergency managers on executing DSCA operations with internal state
assets before requesting federal assistance. Furthermore, federal military forces in the
region will not violate DOD directives by executing an actual DSCA operation until
assistance is requested by the appropriate civil authority. However, by building stronger
relationships and understanding what each member of the collective population can
contribute to the total DSCA effort allows each member to capitalize on the other
strengths and remove barriers that could ultimately hinder a major operation.
Though it will be discussed in chapter 5, these common beliefs serve as pillars for
the Advocacy Coalition Framework, which is predicated on members of the coalition
having common core beliefs that forms the connective tissue between the two entities.
Transition
Chapter 5 will provide the interpretation from the research findings. The
interpretation of findings will be delivered in a manner that examines the research
conducted to measure DSCA proficiency in the NCR. Next, the chapter will also expound
on limitations for the study, recommendations based off the findings from the research,
and implications for positive social change. Finally, the chapter will conclude with my
reflection over the past three years on this truly rewarding journey.
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Chapter 5
Introduction
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to measure the proficiency of
DSCA inside the NCR among emergency managers and their military mission partners.
Currently, there is no mechanism in place to measure DSCA proficiency within the
region, and if there is no mechanism in place, there has to be a collective effort among
emergency managers and military members to address this oversight? Chapters 1 and 3
divulged that other studies have been developed to measure DSCA proficiency. These
studies revealed that emergency managers did not have an optimal level of DSCA
proficiency, but the reason for their lack of DSCA knowledge was left unanswered.
Milliman, Grosskopf, and Paezs (2006) conducted a quantitative research across five
states in the northeast, which revealed that 72 emergency responders did not have the
optimal level of proficiency in DSCA operations. Haynes’s (2014) study among
emergency managers in the state of North Carolina and Porter’s study among emergency
managers in the state of Louisiana also revealed a nascent knowledge of DSCA
operations. The trends from these studies suggest that there is an issue with DSCA
proficiency. Therefore, the focus of this study was to determine if the same trend exists
within the NCR not only among emergency managers but also their military mission
partners who were not solicited for the previous studies.
This study was conducted to determine the proficiency levels of emergency
managers and their military mission partners within the NCR. Based on the
recommendation of a previous study, it was my intent to conduct a qualitative case study
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to determine if the same findings from previous studies existed among three populations
within the NCR. Additionally, having served in this region as a military planner, I felt
there was a true obligation on my part to inform the leaders and organizational members
with unbiased research to determine DSCA proficiency. The populations were emergency
managers, a Title 10 active duty military organization, and a Title 32 National Guard
Organization. Unfortunately, the Title 32 organization was omitted from the study due to
their obligations beyond the scope of this research.
Over a 6-week period, I interviewed 15 participants to determine the proficiency
of their organizations. These interviews were guided by two fundamental research
questions:
1. Are factors such as constrained financial resources and limited access to
professional training courses contributing to a less than optimal DSCA
proficiency?
2. Do initiatives such as collaborative planning and training among

emergency managers and their military mission partners within the
National Capital Region impact collective DSCA proficiency?
I used nine interview questions related to the research questions to glean data
from the participants, which facilitated answering the research questions and provided
insight into the contributing factors that lead to optimal or less than optimal proficiency.
In an effort to add greater depth to the research, three sub-questions were added that
focused on participants’ views on DSCA planning during the 2017 presidential
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inauguration, and their feelings towards cooperation among the populations who are
charged with executing DSCA operations within the region.
After the interviews were completed, I reviewed the data and executed the coding
process using Nvivo 11 as a computer-assisted qualitative data analysis (CAQDS) to
determine themes from the collected data. After this process, six themes emerged
(education, state authority, relationships, exercises, funding, and policy review), which
showed a significant disproportionality among in DSCA proficiency among emergency
managers and their military counterparts. Furthermore, these themes also provided insight
into the contributing factors that either led to an optimal proficiency or a less than
optimal proficiency among the two populations.
The findings from my research were consistent with the findings from other
studies conducted on DSCA proficiency. Emergency managers who participated in the
research had a very nascent knowledge of DSCA operations. Many had no knowledge of
DSCA, while some revealed that since their state emergency management officials
conducted coordination with the state National Guard on their behalf, there seemed to be
no need for them to understand the process. Comparatively, the military members who
participated in the research clearly had an optimal level of DSCA proficiency. The DSCA
training courses were mandatory for all the members within the Title 10 organization, and
to reinforce planning and executing of DSCA operations, they held training events
coupled with academics to ensure that their members remained proficient. However, the
military members also revealed that financial constraints had an impact on their DSCA
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proficiency, in part due to the limited number of exercises they can participate in and
equipment they can purchase to aid in actual DSCA operations.
Interpretations of the Findings
RQ1. Are factors such as constrained financial resources and limited access to
professional training courses contributing to a less than optimal DSCA proficiency?
This research question provided the first glimpse into the disproportionality of
DSCA knowledge within the NCR among emergency managers and their military
mission partners. Five of seven military members stated that financial constraints were a
factor in their organization’s DSCA proficiency, while none of the eight emergency
managers who participated identified financial constraints as a contributing factor to their
organizational proficiency. Additionally, all of the military members agreed that access to
professional training was not a contributing factor to their DSCA proficiency.
Conversely, nearly all the emergency managers expressed concern that their lack of
knowledge was predicated on the simple fact that they had either no knowledge or
nascent knowledge of DSCA. This point was expounded upon by EM02, who stated, “I
didn’t know there was a course called DSCA.” EM03stated, “We need to have a better
understanding of DSCA.”
As the literature in Chapter 2 suggested, this salient point is not diametrically
opposed to findings in other research studies and peer-reviewed articles. The most ardent
representation of this point was made by Milliman, Grosskopf, and Paez, (2006) in their
research recommendation from their research in which they interviewed over 50
emergency managers. They stated:
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It is important to conduct follow-up studies on these initial DSCA education
efforts to ensure that their effectiveness in promoting EM knowledge and ability
to work in DSCA “sticks” not just with EM officials, but also at an institutional
level. This is particularly important given the concerns about EM turnover
expressed by some participants in our study. Such research also needs to
recognize that each state has its own unique culture and context in terms of the
likely events that would trigger DSCA.
Thus, future studies need to evaluate whether any federal based education
programs on DSCA will interface effectively within these different contexts.
Finally, our research on EMs in DSCA education, suggests that it may be
important to determine the views of personnel in other government agencies (e.g.
state EMs, other civilian authorities at the local or state level, FEMA, etc.) on
DSCA education. Expanding the scope of the DSCA education research in this
way would help to ensure that future catastrophic events involving DSCA will
trigger more effective and coordinated responses from each agency involved. (p.
11)
The financial constraints on the military organization that participated in the
research and access to professional training courses, which were shown to have an impact
on the education theme, ultimately have tertiary impact on the advocacy community.
Stirct (2015) outlined this concept in his article titled “The Advocacy Coalition
Framework and Nascent Subsystems: Trade Union Disclosure Policy in Canada”. It
essentially stated that if members of the coalition do not share an appreciation for their
coalition members’ shortcomings or deficiencies, the end result could have a major
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impact on the advocacy community as a whole. For example, the data showed that a lack
of DSCA education had a negative impact on DSCA proficiency as outlined in the
education theme. This belief was repeated by the emergency managers and military
members. Perhaps the best example was EM08’s response. He stated, “I think we need to
start with education. Most emergency managers don’t understand what is available and
how to implement it; education first and then look for other ways to incorporate DSCA.”
The collective populations’ beliefs on education are precursors to establish grounds for
addressing a potential issue through a policy introduction designed to mitigate the issue,
which will ultimately strengthen the collective advocacy community. Regarding this
point, Stritch (2015) stated:
Unless advocacy coalitions are ubiquitous, there will also be situations where
some organizations and individuals are advocates on an issue, and share common
policy core beliefs, but do not coordinate their advocacy. Where advocates share
policy core beliefs—regardless of whether or not they coordinate their activities—
then we have what I have termed an advocacy community. (p. 442)
RQ2. Do initiatives such as collaborative planning and training among emergency
managers and their military mission partners within the NCR affect collective
DSCA proficiency?
This research question was unanimously agreed upon by all the participants that
executed collaborative planning and training can have a positive impact on DSCA
proficiency and if negated, it could have a negative impact on DSCA proficiency. As
alluded to earlier, it was important to develop interview questions and additional subquestions to grasp the scope of planning and training among the two populations.
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However, from the results of the primary research questions and sub-questions, it was
found that all the participants agreed that collaborative planning and training definitely
has an impact on DSCA proficiency. Unfortunately, there were few occasions in which
planning and training were being executed on an optimal frequency among the two
populations. Perhaps the most telling responses out of the 15 were made by EM02 and
MM05. When asked if EM02 believed that collaborative planning and training have an
impact on collective DSCA proficiency in the region, he generalized without directly
assessing the impact in the region. He stated, “Yes, training definitely improves
preparedness mitigation operations and recovery and a lack of it does the opposite.”
MM05 went further in his response by explaining the extent of his organizations’
planning and training with their emergency management counterparts. He stated the
following:
We do minimal in the regard of planning and training; it’s mostly within some of
our specialized units inside this headquarters. Our subordinate units do conduct
training with some of the local units, but as a whole, this organization does not do
regular training with the local authorities. We have a relationship with them but
from an actual training aspect, no.
From the literature, the Federal Emergency Management Agency manual titled
“Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans” (2010) truly encapsulates
the benefits of planning by communities such as the NCR. The manual stated the
following:
Effective planning ensures that the whole community is represented and involved
in the planning process. The most realistic and complete plans are prepared by a
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diverse planning team, including representatives from the jurisdiction’s
departments and agencies, civic leaders, businesses, and organizations (e.g., civic,
social, faith-based, humanitarian, educational, advocacy, professional) who are
able to contribute critical perspectives and/or have a role in executing the plan. (p.
I-2)
Additionally, literature such as Sinclair, Doyle, Johnston, and Paton’s (2012)
article titled “Assessing Emergency Management Training and Exercises. Disaster
Prevention and Management” truly codify why emergency managers and their military
mission partners in the NCR must bridge the gap between both planning and training for
a positive impact on DSCA proficiency. They stated:
For organizations to maximize these benefits, they need to develop more
sophisticated and evidence-based approaches to training needs’ analysis, design,
and evaluation. This needs to become multi-level, encompassing person, team,
organizational, and multi-organization levels. Given the complexity of disaster
response environments and the competencies and systems required, local
government training should be based on correspondingly comprehensive
techniques such as assessment centers to provide holistic training and evaluation.
(p. 517)
The authors’ recommendations clearly articulate the benefits of collaborative
planning and training, and the participants’ responses clearly show their desire to
energize efforts to maximize training opportunities. In order to establish a general
framework for all the entities in the region, I believe the research I have conducted can
unequivocally serve as the center of gravity for dialogue on achieving this goal.
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The current operational environment in the NCR presents a clear dynamic where
the advocacy community has agreed on a common belief with regard to the impact of
DSCA planning and training initiatives. Though they may have diametric positions on
how to fix the problem, the collective advocacy community does have interdependency.
Fenger and Klok (2001) illustrated this point in their article titled “Interdependency,
beliefs, and coalition behavior: A contribution to the advocacy coalition framework”.
They stated, “When we take the interdependencies between actors into account, even
when beliefs are indifferent, symbiotic interdependency may result in coordination
(Fenger and Klok, 2001, p. 163).
Limitations
The primary limitation of this study was using the Joint Forces Headquarters as
the only military headquarters solicited for the research. Being the primary military
organization responsible for all installations in the region and location for the primary
planners for DSCA operations, I decided to limit my research population to that
headquarters only. Next, due to ongoing planning and preparation for the 2017
presidential inauguration, it was difficult to designate interview times and follow-ups to
interview questions. Subsequently, due to inauguration planning and an operational
deployment by the designated Title 32 organization (National Guard), I was not able to
interview the collective research population as outlined in chapters one and three. To
bolster trustworthiness among the collective population in the region, a different Title 32
organization was solicited for the study. Unfortunately, due to prior obligations that were
made before my solicitation, they were unable to provide any participants to inform the
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research. However, for the Title 10 organization and emergency managers who did
participate in the research, I was able to gather rich and thick data that facilitated
answering the two over-arching research questions for the study. Finally, for the two
populations that did participate in the research, saturation was achieved, which further
bolstered trustworthiness of the research.
Recommendations
The scope of my research centered on measuring DSCA proficiency among
emergency managers and their military mission partners within the NCR. This research
permeated from a recommendation from Haynes to include military organization in a
study to determine their understanding of DSCA. Though the effort was made to include
Title 10 (active duty military) and Title 32 (National Guard) in this study, circumstances
beyond my control did not permit so.
Therefore, for my first recommendation, I believe it’s imperative that a future
study includes all populations. Though my research did bridge the gap on one of Haynes
recommendations, which was including military members, I believe in order to ensure
due diligence for the DSCA community in its entirety, Title 32 forces must be
incorporated. As some emergency managers alluded to in this study, their state of origin
normally interfaces with the military, which in their case was the state National Guard.
Therefore, it is only fitting to include Title 32 forces to gain their perspective on DSCA
operations within their state, especially with emergency managers. I unequivocally
believe that this linkage can provide even greater depth into DSCA proficiency among
the collective populations. Additionally, by including all the three organizations, a

198

comparative analysis can be carried out to determine the proficiency levels among the
three separate organizations and the common denominators contributing to their optimal
or sub-optimal proficiency. As the literature in chapter two showed, studies and literature
on DSCA operations are still nascent. As the environment we live in becomes more
complex with unique problem sets, it’s important for those who are conducting DSCA
operations to gain a full understanding of their internal deficiencies. If we do not embark
on this journey, we cannot comprehensively formulate plans to meet future challenges.
Next, in order to continue the evolution of DSCA, I recommend the states that
were represented by their counties and jurisdictions emergency managers in this study
make a significant contribution in DSCA education. This study clearly showed a
disproportionality of DSCA knowledge in the NCR just as Haynes’ research showed a
severe lack of understanding of DCSA by emergency managers in the state of North
Carolina as well. It’s indisputable that each state has the right to establish policies and
directives outlining how DSCA operations will be conducted and what are the authorized
relationships between emergency managers and their military counterparts.
However, states need to understand that federal forces are more responsive than
National Guard forces, which require a call up for mobilization. As Hurricane Katrina
showed, time is the most precious resource in executing a DSCA operation. If timely
decisions are to be made, states may have to authorize affected counties to execute
independent operations until the state response apparatus is at full operational capacity.
However, if the affected county or jurisdiction emergency manager does not have the
institutional knowledge to execute a large-scale response with his or her military mission
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partner, this oversight could ultimately create a conundrum that could cost lives. The
DSCA training course is free, and by serving in the capacity of county emergency
managers in the NCR, this population certainly meets the prerequisites for attending the
course. However, if Offices of Emergency Managers at the state levels do not authorize
this action, they will continue to contribute to the educational delinquency of the very
people who are desperately in need of institutional knowledge.
Finally, once further research is conducted on DSCA proficiency and the findings
are instituted into organizations who have a responsibility in DSCA operations, there
needs to be a feedback mechanism to continuously monitor proficiency levels of key
stakeholders. This research was based on this principle, and as the findings showed, there
are issues and concerns that must be addressed. The two themes of training and exercises
revealed that there is a huge disconnect among the two populations in the NCR. The
participants in this research alluded to financial constraints, which limit exercises, and
collaborative training, which can serve as a great feedback mechanism with the
appropriate metrics for evaluation. However, if leaders do not have the foresight to
properly fund and decipher the results from these mechanisms, positive progress in
DSCA operations will be non-existent. Unfortunately, this unadvisable course of action
has the potential to create a quagmire that may prove difficult to recover from when
emergency managers and their military mission partners are asked to put their untested
skillsets into practical application.
I plan to release my finding to the Metropolitan Washington Council of
Governments in order to show the collective body of decision makers in the region that
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my research has provided the grounds for a comprehensive conversation on DSCA
proficiency and the challenges that the region is facing. The results of the findings may
be well received or viewed with skepticism by the intended audience. However, despite
what position is taken, this research can now serve as the impetus from which the
conversation on DSCA proficiency can begin.
Implications for Social Change
Before discussing the implications of social change for this study, I believe it is
essential to understand what social change is in order to frame the discussion. According
to Leict (2013), social change is the significant alteration of social structure and cultural
patterns through time. Our very own Walden University Social Change web page states
that
Walden University has provided a diverse community of career professionals with
the opportunity to transform themselves as scholar-practitioners so that they can
apply what they’ve learned to effect positive social change. Walden is focused on
inspiring and celebrating the remarkable achievements of our community
members who continue to make a difference by addressing challenges where they
live, in their professions, and in the world around them. (Walden University, n.d.)
With these definitions and views in mind, I believe the research I conducted can
certainly make a contribution to social change in the NCR. First, this research originated
on a recommendation from a previous study in which the researcher saw what he
believed was an issue with DSCA proficiency in his state. My research originated from
the same position in the region in which I reside, and off the recommendation of the

201

previous researcher who recommended ways in which to expand on his research to make
an even greater contribution for advocating change in DSCA proficiency. In essence,
these actions established a chain of custody to build on an issue and inform individuals,
communities, organizations, institutions, cultures, and societies why there’s a need for
change and how that change can positively impact the society in general.
Arguably, social change starts with the individual first. From the individuals who
participated in this research, they have overwhelmingly showed that there’s a need for
change in DSCA proficiency. As alluded to earlier, over a ten-year span, there have been
numerous studies on DSCA, and the common denominator is educating our emergency
managers. This fact is not anecdotal, but rooted in hard data that leaders can use to
determine courses of actions to educate individuals who are entrusted with tremendous
responsibilities. From this research and the collective body of research in general, leaders
at every level can prioritize their organizational resources and priorities to ensure that
individuals have every tool at their disposal to improve individual proficiency. Once the
individual has obtained an optimal level of proficiency, the organization to which he or
she belongs to now becomes the agent for change.
By fostering a learning and growing organization, leaders can look for innovative
ways to routinely measure their internal organizational DSCA proficiency and collaborate
with other organizations to ensure that the collective group has a common understanding
of their partners’ operational responsibilities, deficiencies, and capabilities, which creates
an operational framework to formulate plans and policies.
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Simultaneously, institutions can also invoke change. By reviewing the results and
recommendations from the available research on DSCA proficiency, institutions such as
the Army DSCA training team can tailor academic curriculums to ensure their teachings
are based on recent research. Research collected in an unbiased manner from populations
who have a vested interest in altering or making wholesale changes as to how their
discipline is trained and evaluated should be considered as treasure trove for building
institutional knowledge. This point was captured by Dunlop, Logue, and Isakov (2014) in
their article titled “The Engagement of Academic Institutions in Community Disaster
Response: A Comparative Analysis”. They stated that
Academic institutions of higher education possess a tremendous range of
resources relevant to a community’s overall disaster resilience. Their
multidisciplinary construct inherently fosters interdisciplinary thought and
collaboration, valuable when considering novel solutions for challenging
problems. (p. 88)
As this change manifests in individuals, organizations, and institutions from this
research, cultures, communities, and societies in general can also take part in social
change. The NCR is a conglomerate of culture, communities, and societies. Though they
may have different belief systems, this research coupled with previous studies provides
them with the necessary knowledge to demand a higher level of DSCA proficiency from
those entrusted to execute tasks synonymously with DSCA operations. Vigoda (2015)
expounded on this point in his article titled “Are you being served? The responsiveness of
public administration to citizens’ demands: An empirical examination in Israel”.

203

According to him, “Citizen’s control over the operations of public agencies is a core
necessity in every democracy. It cannot be attained when there is insufficient knowledge
on the fit between what citizens desire and what governments offer” (Vigoda, 2000, p.
165). Optimally, when this paradigm is internalized, cultures, communities, and societies
within the NCR will fully embrace positive social change and serve on equal footing with
their fellow emergency managers and military members. Subsequently, this evolution in
regional social change can foster a sense of belonging. Holmes (2011) encapsulated this
view when he stated it
•

improves the quality of policy being developed, making it more practical and
relevant, and helping to ensure that services are delivered in a more effective and
efficient way;

•

is a way for government to check the health of its relationship with citizens
directly—to check its reputation and status;

•

reveals ways in which government, citizens, and organizations could work more
closely on issues of concern to the community;

•

gives early notice of emerging issues, putting government in a better position to
deal with them in a proactive way, instead of reacting as anger and conflicts arise;

•

provides opportunities for a diversity of voices to be heard on issues that matter to
people;

•

fosters a sense of mutuality, belonging, and a sense of empowerment, all of which
strengthen resilience.
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Theoretical Implications to Positive Social Change
When evaluating the ACF and its empirical implication to social change for this
study, it should be mentioned that the theory itself originated from a challenge by Paul
Sabatier to develop new theories to better understand the processes of policy formation –
a precursor for change. According to Cairney (2014), “It has been subject to an unusually
high number of revisions in the light of experience and a desire to extend its insights” (p.
485). These two examples are synonymous with social change and the research
conducted for measuring DSCA proficiency and certainly promote positive social change
in the NCR.
In its most rudimentary form, ACF focuses on census building among members in
the coalition by understanding their beliefs, values, assumptions, and perceptions of
problems that have the potential to have an impact on the collective advocacy community
through policies (Cairney, 2014). According to the research findings of this study,
members of the NCR coalition have both diverging and shared beliefs on DSCA
proficiency. Additionally, they each have different contributing factors that may have led
to an optimal or less than optimal DSCA proficiency, which can certainly be considered
as their internal organization’s perception of the problem or in some cases, mere
assumptions. Yet, they all encompass a set of values that transcend organizational
boundaries and focus primarily on providing an essential service to local populace and
fellow constituents. From my observation it seemed this value was a prerequisite to
conduct such a potentially dangerous mission. The Barrett Values Center captured the
importance of values when they stated:
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Every individual and every organization is involved in making hundreds of
decisions every day. The decisions we make are a reflection of our values and
beliefs, and they are always directed towards a specific purpose. That purpose is
the satisfaction of our individual or collective (organizational) needs. (Barrett
Values Center, n.d.)
However, by using the findings from this research, coupled with the ACF
methodology, ambivalence and predispositions can be ostracized and true consensus
building can now begin to address the central issue of fixing DSCA proficiency within
the region. More importantly, this process can be executed while simultaneously using
beliefs, values, assumptions, and perceptions of problems as the guiding axioms for the
actual consensus building, which permeates into positive social change. Wooden (2014)
amplified this salient point in his dissertation titled “Mission Assurance as an Operating
Process for the Department of Defense Through the Advocacy Coalition Framework”.
According to Wooden, once consensus building is instituted using the ACF
Resources can be appropriately identified and allocated, and leadership will
become refocused in order to prioritize functions and resources with an intraorganizational orientation. This in turn will serve to enhance the all-hazards
planning and response capabilities of the enterprise. At the same time, all of these
tasks must take into account the current political environment as well as the
unique mission requirements of the agencies in order to balance the construct
development in order to ensure the construct is not overly general or too
constricting (p. 100).
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Finally, the desired outputs from consensus building are shared visions and goals
codified in policies that provide succinct guidance and a linear strategy to achieve
optimal DSCA proficiency. This process is not esoteric, but there are complexities in the
desired formation of policies that must be considered. One being organizational equity
preservation, which will inherently play a major role in policy formation that has the
potential to translate into positive social change. Brokering these equities to reach
common ground in synonymous with the ACF and the utility of the framework is
certainly suited for the challenge. This point was validated by Christopher Weible and
Paul Sabatier, original architects of the ACF, and Kelly McQueen (2009). According to
them,
This complexity requires a conceptual simplification to guide research agendas, to
enable communication among scholars and practitioners, and to develop effective
decision making strategies. One policy process framework that has been
developed to simplify the complexity of public policy is the advocacy coalition
framework. (p. 121)
Positive Social Change
This research is the third study on DSCA proficiency. As alluded to earlier, the
patterns from those studies are consistent with the findings from my research. With these
new findings, conditions certainly exist for a conversation on why there is disproportion
among those who will execute DSCA operations in their counties, state, and region? With
regard to positive social change and my recommendation, the data now exist for leaders
at every level to internally evaluate their current systems, plans, policies, and standard
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operating procedures to determine the proficiency of their organizations. Coupled with
this organizational triage should be a comprehensive plan that systematically lays out a
plan to prioritize what must be fix with consideration to available resources.
This evaluation should certainly be considered non-attributional because as the
research findings revealed, many organizational leaders have been relieved of their
responsibility to conduct traditional DSCA operations; therefore, they cannot be judged
on a task they have no metric for evaluation. Simply stated, how can they be evaluated on
a criterion that has never existed at their level? However, a potential linkage does exist
between emergency managers and their military mission partners within the same
boundaries.
By working cross boundaries to determine where gaps exist in planning,
resourcing, and executing DSCA operations, newly formed cooperation serves as an
impetus for positive social change by levering institutional knowledge and combined
organizational resources to develop plans that will benefit local populace in the event of a
catastrophic event. Subsequently, by continuously nurturing this cooperation with routine
dialogue, planning, training, and evaluations, there’s a standing mechanism in place to
meet the challenges and mitigate asymmetrical threats that are becoming prevalent in our
ever-changing society.
Reflections of the Researcher
Without equivocation, I believe that the manner in which this research was
conducted personifies cogent qualitative research. All participants were treated with
dignity and respect, and to the best of my knowledge from the data they provided, which
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was substantiated in many cases by their counterparts, were accurately captured in the
findings without researcher bias. Simply stated, it was the findings from their data that
guided the research juxtaposed to any researcher bias.
My research has taken me on a journey that has been truly enlightening. In every
sense of the word, I still consider myself a novice researcher, but I’m a novice researcher
who now understands the importance of research. As a researcher, even a novice, there
are responsibilities engrained at the beginning of the research process that guide you
through the research process. Responsibilities such as ensuring anonymity of those who
participate in your research and letting the data lead you to a conclusion rather than
letting researcher bias infringe on the integrity of the study. However, the most important
lesson that I learned was to respect the process itself. Researchers far and wide have
endeavored on this journey to provide groundbreaking findings that now have a
tremendous impact on our society. Therefore, in keeping with this lineage, I believe it’s
imperative to respect the process and protect the time-honored tradition of conducting
research that has the potential to better lives and help leaders make informed decisions
that promote positive social change.
Before starting this endeavor, I genuinely viewed my research through a myopic
lens. Having served as a planner inside the Military District of Washington, I
unequivocally believed that I could predict the outcome of my research because of my
experiences. However, as I started this study, I began to realize that my perceptions of
certain organizations were clearly misconceptions that were not factually based. This was
a valuable teaching point in how perceptions can influence research if left unchecked.
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As the research progressed, I immediately understood the impact my work could
have once I began interviewing my 15 participants. Many participants did not have a
clear understanding of the DSCA process, but as the interviews continued, and when they
began to ask questions which furthered the dialogue, I felt I was making a genuine
contribution to improving DSCA proficiency.
To me that is the true essence of research: first we find a topic that we are truly
passionate about based on what we perceive to be legitimate issues; next, we gather the
necessary data from participants who help to inform the research. We then conduct
analysis, and from that analysis, we render an end result that either confirms or denies our
hypothesis. Subsequently, the true joy is to share the work with colleagues and those
most affected by your study. However, before rendering the results, it’s the responsibility
of the researcher to ensure he/she has followed protocols and procedures that lead to
succinct findings that can withstand scrutiny. As a novice researcher, I’ve learned this
lesson, and hope to pass it on to others who are about start or are currently navigating this
journey.
Conclusion
Before retiring from the military, my last duty location was a mere three miles
from the Pentagon. The same Pentagon that was viciously attacked on 9/11. On that
terrible day, emergency managers and members of our military displayed exceptional
courage, selfless service, and sacrifice that is synonymous with the positions they hold
and the responsibilities they shoulder. Out of that catastrophic event, numerous lessons
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that have been learned pontificated on to ensure if such an event occurs again, our men
and women will have the knowledge and the capability to mitigate the threat.
However, this research, which is a further contribution, has discovered that there
are proficiency issues among those who will execute DSCA operations in the region. As
we learned on that terrible day, a single organization cannot act alone in providing a
comprehensive response and recovery operation designed to restore essential services
while simultaneously protecting local populace. Therefore, there cannot be an unbalanced
equilibrium of DSCA proficiency among the collective group where one organization is
proficient while another is severely lacking. Though we may not be able to stop those
who wish to inflict harm through nefarious activity, we can ensure there’s a synchronized
response that is swift, coordinated, and seamless.
Furthermore, negative contributors such as government bureaucracy, safe
guarding organizational equities, and mere stubbornness to conform have no place in this
endeavor. This research showed there are significant gaps and deficiencies that must be
addressed. Leaders can potentially balk at one set of research findings, but to balk at three
sets of findings and one exploratory study over a ten-year period by four separate set of
researchers with nearly identical results is simply incredulous.
Be it man made or natural, we must be prepared to deal with catastrophic events
that have the potential to easily overwhelm us as hurricane Katrina and the 9/11 attacks
showed. To this point, I believe there are three fundamental questions that leaders and
subordinates who will execute DSCA operations within the NCR must ask themselves.
Are we collectively doing all we can to ensure our efforts are sufficient to mitigate the
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effects from a large-scale catastrophic event? Next, do we understand the scope of our
individual responsibilities during a catastrophic event and the capabilities at our disposal
to facilitate an operation that reduces loss of life by executing a succinct response and
recovery operation? If these questions cannot be answered collectively, the absence of
constructive responses solidifies the underlining point that tremendous work will be
required for DSCA proficiency in the NCR.
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Appendix A: Walden IRB Approval

This email is to notify you that the Institutional Review Board (IRB) has approved your
application for the study entitled, "Measuring Defense Support to Civil Authorities
proficiency within the National Capital Region," conditional upon the approval of the
research partner, as documented in the Army Human Research Protections Office’s
notification of approval, which will need to be submitted to the Walden IRB when
obtained. The researcher may not commence the study until the Walden IRB confirms
receipt of that AHRPO approval notification.
Your approval # is 09-27-16-0482079. You will need to reference this number in your
dissertation and in any future funding or publication submissions. Also attached to this email is the IRB approved consent form. Please note, if this is already in an on-line format,
you will need to update that consent document to include the IRB approval number and
expiration date.
Additionally, I have attached a copy of this approval letter on letterhead per prior
correspondence.
Your IRB approval expires on September 26, 2017. One month before this expiration
date, you will be sent a Continuing Review Form, which must be submitted if you wish to
collect data beyond the approval expiration date.
Please note that this letter indicates that the IRB has approved your research. You may
NOT begin the research phase of your doctoral study, however, until you have received
official notification from the IRB to do so. Once you have received this notification by
email, you may begin your data collection. Your IRB approval is contingent upon your
adherence to the exact procedures described in the final version of the IRB application
materials that have been submitted as of this date. This includes maintaining your current
status with the university. Your IRB approval is only valid while you are an actively
enrolled student at Walden University. If you need to take a leave of absence or are
otherwise unable to remain actively enrolled, your IRB approval is suspended.
Absolutely NO participant recruitment or data collection may occur while a student is not
actively enrolled.
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Appendix B: Interview Questions

1. Approximately how long have you been in your present job position? (Adopted
from Haynes, 2014)
2. Do personnel in your organization have a general understanding of the DSCA?
3. Is DSCA training incorporated into your organization’s training plan on a
recurring basis?
4. Does your organization conduct combined DSCA training with your
emergency management or military mission partners in the NCR? If so, what is
the frequency?
5. Does your organization certify personnel in DSCA operations through the
DSCA training course?
6. What factors do you attribute to your organizational DSCA proficiency or the
lack of it?
7. What recommendations would you make to sustain or improve your
organizational DSCA proficiency?
8. Do organizational financial constraints have an impact on overall DSCA
proficiency within your organization?
9. Does your organization conduct reviews of your internal DSCA policies or the
policies of your counterparts to ensure cogent operations in the event of a major
catastrophic event?

Sub-questions:
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1. Has the planning for the 2017 presidential inauguration fostered greater
emphasis on DSCA planning?
2. Do you believe it is value added for an organization executing DSCA
operations within a shared region collaborate in planning to ensure a common
understanding of roles and responsibilities?
3. Do you believe collective planning and training or lack of it affects collective
DSCA proficiency in the NCR?
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Appendix C: Letter of Cooperation
Community Research Partner Name: Joint Forces Headquarters National Capital Region
Contact Information:
Dear Kelvin Brown
The purpose of this memo is to confirm that the Joint Forces Headquarters National
Capital Region is in full support of your research within our organization. As a
prerequisite for the command supporting your research proposal, a legal review was
conducted and the brief you provided outlined the research parameters which involved
interviewing 5-10 members of our organization.
We understand there will be no coercion of members of our organization to participate in
this research and their participation will be strictly voluntary. Furthermore, participants
will retain the right to withdraw from the study at anytime and protocols will be
established to ensure confidentiality of the participants at all times.
In support of your proposed research, I confirm that I am authorized to approve this
organization’s participation in the research and there are no conflicts with our internal
policies.
Finally, I understand that the data collected will remain entirely confidential and may not
be provided to anyone outside of the student’s supervising faculty/staff without
permission from the Walden University IRB.

Sincerely,
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Appendix D: Request for Change in Procedures Form

Please email this change request form to irb@waldenu.edu.
1. To the IRB, I am requesting to expand the age of emergency managers who are
participating in my research. The current is range is from 45 to 65. I would like to request
the age is extended from 35 to 65. Additionally, this request does not impact my consent
form, recruitment letter, or questionnaire.

2. With this form I have also included a revised consent form with Please send
irb@waldenu.edu a copy of all documents revised or added as a result of the proposed
change (i.e. consent/assent forms, recruitment letters or ads, revised protocols,
questionnaires, etc.) with changes clearly highlighted. If the change involves a request for
additional subjects, indicate the number of additional subjects for which approval is
requested.
3. If your request involves a change in research staff, please provide contact information
for all new personnel, as well as any relevant degrees and qualifications.
Your request to change study procedures/staff will be reviewed by the same method in
which the study was first reviewed, either by the full-committee or through the expedited
review process, unless the change is minor and can be managed through expedited
review. The IRB staff will route changes for review through the most rapid means
possible and will provide an update as to the status of this request when confirming
receipt of the form.

